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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the implications on the performance and business scope of 
knowledge-based service firms (“suppliers”) that build deeply embedded exchange relationships 
with their clients.  Prior research in the relational view has revealed the potential for firms to gain 
advantages (but also to become exposed to hazards) through close inter-organizational 
relationships characterized by greater levels of relationship-specific investments (or “relational 
commitments”).  However, theory development and empirical examinations in the relational 
view have largely been at the level of the dyad.  Thus, the firm-level impacts from deeper 
commitments across a firm’s portfolio of relationships, and whether firms can generate 
competitive advantages from being a more relational partner, are less understood.   
In my first empirical study (chapter two), I extend the relational view by examining the 
firm-level growth performance impacts of supplier firms choosing a more embedded relational 
strategy across their portfolio of client relationships.  I find that suppliers who receive greater 
relational commitments from their existing clients can gain advantages for growing their 
business, but unilateral commitments by suppliers may not provide similar advantages. Rather, 
unilateral supplier commitments may be hazardous for supplier growth performance. 
Furthermore, consistent with the joint value-maximizing perspective of the relational view, I find 
bilateral, or mutual, relational commitments by suppliers and clients provide the greatest 
opportunity for supplier growth.  By contrast, strong relational commitments constrain a supplier 
from taking advantage of more broad-based demand growth within the business domains in 
which that supplier operates, thereby negatively impacting supplier growth performance.  
In my second empirical study (chapter three), I extend the relational view -- and connect 
corporate strategy with business strategy -- by providing a novel, relational theory of corporate 
diversification.  I show that the advantages suppliers gain in sourcing new business from existing 
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clients lead those suppliers to expand their business scope in response to diversification by their 
clients.  Furthermore, I reveal that this “client-led diversification” effect is strengthened by 
suppliers’ client-specific knowledge and clients’ relational commitment to suppliers, and when 
suppliers hold greater excess resource capacity.  
My third empirical study (chapter four), also connects the relational view and corporate 
strategy literatures by investigating how a broader portfolio of businesses impacts supplier 
survival, and how a supplier’s client management strategy moderates this scope-survival 
relationship.  I find that suppliers gain survival advantages through a more diversified portfolio 
of client services, and these supplier scope-survival advantages are enhanced when suppliers 
dedicate a greater fraction of their business to serving long-term clients.  In addition, a supplier’s 
scope-survival advantage is also increased when their clients have a greater presence in fast-
paced, innovative markets, relative to the markets within the supplier’s own business portfolio. 
I test my dissertation predictions using detailed longitudinal panel data on legal patent 
prosecution work outsourced by corporate clients to patent law firms.  The findings provide 
nuanced insights into the value of relationship-specific investments for firm performance and 
business scope, and test the limits to which deeply embedded relationships provide firm-level 
advantages. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Client relationships are critical strategic assets for knowledge-based service firms (e.g., 
law firms, accounting firms, advertising agencies, and management consultancies), and creating 
and capturing value from clients are fundamental drivers of competitive advantage for these 
firms (Maister, 1993).  Salient to the strategies of knowledge-based service firms (hereafter, 
“suppliers”) for attracting, maintaining, and deriving value from clients is the building of deeply 
embedded exchange relationships (Baker 1990; Baker, Faulkner, & Fisher 1998; Chatain, 2011; 
Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Rogan, 2014a).  Extant research has shown that embedded supplier-
client exchange relationships often provide significant advantages for suppliers in capturing new 
business from clients (Chatain, 2011; Maister, 1993) and increasing exchange value (Dyer, 1997; 
Dyer & Chu, 2003), while these strong ties are typically associated with relationship stability and 
longevity (Kang, Mahoney, & Tan, 2009; Mayer, Somaya, & Williamson, 2012; Moeen, 
Somaya, & Mahoney, 2013; Seabright, Levinthal & Fichman, 1992).  
Theoretical explanations for creating and capturing superior value from inter-
organizational exchange relationships are a central concern of the literature in the relational view 
(e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Madhok & Tallman, 1998).  In 
contrast to transaction cost economics, which is focused on ex ante cost minimization from the 
perspective of a single exchange partner (Williamson, 1975), creating value through inter-
organizational strategy fundamentally concerns the recognition of the other exchange partner 
(Zajac & Olsen, 1993).  The central theory advanced by the relational view is that greater 
relationship-specific investments (or relational commitments) build inter-organizational 
relational assets which enable exchange partners to jointly create greater relationship value (i.e., 
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surplus profits) than they could achieve independently (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Zajac & Olsen, 
1993).    
Relational assets can create superior exchange value through a number of different 
mechanisms.  First, relational assets may provide these relational advantages through increasing 
firm revenues. Exchange partners can increase revenues through the joint creation of co-
specialized inter-organizational resources and capabilities, and the combining of complementary 
assets (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  These unique, productive resources (Madhok & Tallman, 1998) 
have inimitable and non-substitutable attributes which can drive and sustain firm competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). Moreover, the focus by exchange 
partners on long term joint value creation, rather than short term gains through minimizing 
transaction costs, provides economic safeguards on relationship-specific investments, and 
increases the net present value of relational assets (Dyer & Singh, 1998).   
Second, relational assets can provide value through the efficient production of exchange 
output and the reduction of relationship governance costs. For example, specialized inter-
organizational knowledge transfer routines creates efficiencies in communication (Zollo, Reuer, 
& Singh, 2002) and supports the development of partner-specific absorptive capacity (Zahra & 
George, 200), that, in turn, can increase the quality, reliability and speed of exchange output 
(Asanuma, 1989; Dyer, 1996).  In addition, greater familiarity and trust between exchange 
partners, and the desire to preserve relationship value over the longer term, can lower the costs of 
contracting over exchanges (Macneil, 1980; Williamson, 1979; 1985; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 
1995) by promoting less formal, and self-enforcing, mechanisms of relationship governance 
(Macauley, 1963; Macneil, 1980; Telser, 1980). 
Third, relational assets can create value for exchange partners by reducing risk. In the 
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pursuit of higher revenues, firms naturally take on a certain level of strategic risk. A stable 
stream of revenues from embedded exchange relationships may, on the one hand, allow firms to 
be more risk averse in that they do not need to take on risky ventures to generate profits, or, on 
the other hand, may provide a “safety net” that allows firms to take on high-reward, yet high-risk 
ventures, but reduces the impacts of downside loss.    
However, given the criticality of client relationships for supplier value creation, it is 
surprising that, compared to other areas of management scholarship, and even research on other 
types of inter-organizational relationships (e.g., strategic alliances), relatively little is understood 
about the strategies that suppliers formulate and implement to manage client relationships and 
what the performance consequences of those strategies are.  Furthermore, the relational view is a 
theoretical perspective that has largely been developed and applied at the level of the dyad, and 
therefore the implications for firm-level strategy and performance from relationship-specific 
investments are less clear.   
The small body of research that has examined the composition of exchange relationships 
at the firm (or portfolio)-level suggests suppliers may not necessarily vary their client 
management strategies at the dyadic-level.  Rather, across their portfolio of clients, suppliers 
may implement either a more “relational” (i.e., embedded, committed) or “discrete transactional” 
(i.e., arms-length, flexible) strategy (Baker et al., 1998; Broschak, 2004; Dyer, 1997; Moeen et 
al., 2013).   Under a relational strategy, the propensity for supplier-client exchange may, largely, 
be driven by the underlying value created from relationship-specific investments.  The desire to 
preserve relationship value into the future aligns the incentives of exchange partners and induces 
cooperative behavior (Axelrod, 1984; Gulati, 1995; Vanneste & Frank, 2013).  In turn, existing 
clients become fertile ground for supplier new business (Chatain, 2011; Maister, 1993; Mayer et 
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al., 2012; Moeen et al., 2013).   In contrast, exchange relationships following a discrete 
transactional approach (Macneil, 1980) are grounded in neoclassical economics and classical 
contracting approaches (Williamson, 1985), in which no exchange relationship need precede the 
transaction, and there is no commitment for exchanges in the future.  One important distinction, 
therefore, between relational and discrete transactional approaches is that a relational approach 
creates value from strategies of commitment to the other partner, but which may constrain the 
formation of new relationships, while a discrete transactional approach creates value from 
strategies that enable market flexibility but are less effective for the economic bonding of 
exchange partners (Ghemawat & del Sol, 1998; Moeen et al., 2013). 
One strategy a supplier may implement to create and capture value from client 
relationships is to dynamically adjust its scope of client services according to the emerging needs 
of its existing clients.  While strategic management research, particularly in corporate strategy, 
has provided substantial insights for explaining both the antecedents and performance 
consequences of a firm’s portfolio of businesses (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Palich, Cardinal, & 
Miller, 2000; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989; Robins & Wiersema, 1995; Wan et al., 2011), 
connecting corporate strategy with cooperative strategy
1
 in the context of supplier-client 
relationships is largely absent from the literature.  At the same time, while the relational view has 
developed considerable insights into the advantages of inter-firm coordination and exchange 
performance, the implications of relationship-specific investments for horizontal business scope 
have yet to be examined.   
The connection between suppliers’ corporate-level strategy of defining and adjusting 
their scope of client services, and their business-level strategy of generating competitive 
                                                          
1
 Cooperative strategy is the dominant perspective theorized in the relational view, and spans supplier-client 
relationships, as well as the various modes of strategic alliances.  In this dissertation, cooperative strategy is used in 
the context of supplier-client relationships and is interchangeable with the relational view. 
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advantages from their portfolio of client relationships is particularly relevant in knowledge-based 
service industries.  At a basic level, a broader array of client services can provide advantages for 
suppliers in terms of cross-selling services to clients and reducing rivalry for client business 
(Chatain & Zemsky, 2011; Siggelkow, 2003), while a higher volume of exchanges and the 
creation of multiplex ties can stabilize exchange relationships (Chatain, 2011; Rogan, 2014a).  
Furthermore, relationship-specific investments typically exhibit some degree of scalability and 
redeployability which can lower the risks and adjustment costs of supplier expansion into new 
lines of business (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Lucas, 1967; Sakhartov & Folta, 2014).  Indeed, 
while holding resources and capabilities that are specific to a particular market or technology are 
assumed in the extant research literature to increase adjustment costs due to their lower 
alternative use value (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978), when resource investments are 
specialized to a particular exchange partner, then those resources (e.g., partner-specific 
knowledge) may be efficiently deployed across the different markets within the business 
portfolio of that exchange partner (Chatain & Zemsky, 2007).  Therefore, relationship-specific 
investments can provide inducements (rather than barriers) for suppliers to diversify their 
business scope (Penrose, 1959) in line with the needs of clients with whom they share relational 
assets. 
This dissertation advances the strategic management literature by examining both the 
strategies that suppliers formulate and implement to manage their portfolio of client 
relationships, and what the performance consequences of those strategies are. More specifically, 
I investigate how greater relationship-specific investments impact the horizontal business scope 
of suppliers, and how these investments influence two distinct measures of supplier performance 
- growth and survival.  In knowledge-based service industries, the size of suppliers and their 
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ability to grow their business is a strong signal of firm strength and quality (Galanter & Palay, 
1991; Maister, 1993).  Such a reputation is important for client acquisition and retention (Baker, 
1990; Greenwood et al., 2005) and provides advantages for attracting and motivating a 
professional workforce (Maister, 1993; Teece, 2003). However, the intensity of competition for 
clients and professional talent can make even the largest supplier vulnerable to failure, especially 
if they suffer a sharp decrease in revenues and/or lose key clients and employees (Harper, 2013).  
Thus, growth and survival are relevant performance measures for the empirical context of this 
dissertation.  To summarize, across three empirical dissertation chapters, I address the following 
research questions: 
Chapter 2: What is the effect of relational assets shared between suppliers and their 
clients on the long-run growth performance of suppliers? 
 
Chapter 3:  To what extent do relational assets shared between suppliers and their 
clients determine the horizontal business scope of suppliers?  
 
Chapter 4:  How does the horizontal business scope of suppliers impact their survival 
and what is the effect of relational assets shared between suppliers and their clients 
on this scope-survival relationship? 
 
These dissertation research questions, along with key variables and empirical models, are 
outlined in Table 1.1, and the connections between the empirical studies are provided in Figure 
1.1. 
 
Overview of the Empirical Studies in this Dissertation 
While the relational view extols the superior value that can be created and captured from 
deeper relationship-specific investments, other research suggests that these investments may, in 
contrast, have negative impacts on value creation and value capture (i.e., relational hazards) 
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(Poppo, Zhou, & Rhu, 2008a).  For example, firms in exchange relationships may fail to 
innovate and become inert, leading to lower productivity and revenues (Anderson & Jap, 2005), 
while specialized relationship investments are at a greater risk of obsolescence which reduces 
their value-creating potential (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Uzzi, 1997).  In addition, by 
focusing on a narrow body of clients, suppliers may increase the opportunity costs of forgone, 
higher-value, market opportunities (Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger, 2008). Moreover, it is unclear 
from the extant research literature whether relationship advantages created at the dyad-level lead 
to advantages at the firm-level, or whether deeper relationship-specific investments lead, instead, 
to firm-level hazards.  Therefore, examining the implications of relationship-specific investments 
across a supplier’s entire portfolio of clients represents an important avenue for advancing our 
understanding of the performance consequences for suppliers who build strong relational ties 
with their clients. Thus, in chapter 2, I address this gap and extend the relational view through a 
portfolio-level examination of the impact of relationship-specific investments on the long-run 
growth performance of suppliers.   
Another theoretical assumption in the relational view is that unilateral relationship-
specific investments lead to positive relationship outcomes through higher revenues and/or lower 
costs (Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998). However, this logic is contrary to that put forth by 
transaction cost economics (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1975), which maintains unilateral 
relationship-specific investments may be value destroying due to the increased risks of partner 
opportunism (which lowers the proportion of surplus profits that can be appropriated by the focal 
exchange partner) and higher costs of contracting over exchanges.  Although the relational 
contracting literature (Macneil, 1980; Williamson, 1979; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995) 
maintains that exchanges involving specialized investments can be more efficiently governed 
 8 
 
through mutually committed, cooperative exchange relationships, little attention has been given 
to empirically examining whether unilateral relationship-specific investments lead to positive or 
negative firm outcomes (Kang et al., 2009 being one notable exception) or whether mutual forms 
of relationship governance overcome any negative impacts of specialized investments.  
Accordingly, I address this theoretical tension in chapter 2 by empirically testing the impact on 
supplier growth performance from unilateral relationship-specific investments by suppliers and 
their clients, and also, the effects on supplier growth performance from mutual (i.e., joint) 
relationship-specific investments by these exchange partners.  In chapter 2, I contribute to the 
relational view through a firm-level examination of whether suppliers capture performance 
advantages from a relational, as opposed to transactional, strategy.  I also extend the relational 
view by revealing conditions under which relational advantages, that are theorized to exist at the 
level of individual relationship, aggregate to firm-level advantages. Finally, I identify conditions 
under which relationship-specific investments harm firm-level performance, and which run 
counter to the predictions of the relational view.  My explicit theorizing on how relationship-
specific investments impact firm growth performance also contributes to recent research that 
criticizes management research for abstract conceptualizations of firm performance and the use 
of empirical measures that do not sufficiently align with the underlying theoretical constructs 
(Miller, Washburn & Glick, 2013).   
Beyond how relationship-specific investments impact the growth performance of 
suppliers, they may also influence the scope of services suppliers provide to clients.  Although 
prior research has examined the antecedents of horizontal business scope (see Hoskisson & Hitt, 
1990 and Wan et al., 2011 for reviews of this research), a demand-side perspective of 
diversification is largely absent from the literature.  Indeed, the ability to draw on relational 
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assets could be especially relevant when the needs of clients change (Chatain, 2011; Chatain & 
Zemsky, 2011; Klemperer, 1992; Maister, 1993), whereby the new business opportunities 
materializing from changes in the scope of existing clients’ outsourced work lead to suppliers 
changing their own business scope in response these new demand opportunities.  In chapter 3, I 
examine how the advantages gained from deeper investments in relationships-specific assets lead 
suppliers to expand their business scope in response to scope changes by their existing clients.  
Moreover, I examine the impact on supplier diversification when clients diversify away from 
suppliers, and explain and predict how, and when, relational assets can be efficiently leveraged 
into new lines of business, thereby reducing the strategic risks and resource adjustment costs 
associated with firm expansion.  Therefore, in chapter 3, I contribute to the research literatures 
on cooperative and corporate strategy by providing a novel explanation for horizontal 
diversification that is driven by vertical exchange relationships. In addition, this novel, relational 
theory of diversification builds explicit connections between corporate and business-level 
strategy.  Furthermore, in contrast to prior resource-based studies of corporate diversification that 
posit firms are more likely to apply excess firm resources towards entering related lines of 
business (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980; 1982), I suggest suppliers can apply their under-
utilized client-specific resources towards entering markets that are less related to their current 
business portfolio. 
Despite the insights from prior research regarding the impacts of business scope and 
relationship-specific investments for, respectively, firm and relationship performance, 
understanding how these factors impact firm survival is relatively less clear.  While extant 
research suggests a broader business scope may confer survival advantages for firms (Bercovitz 
& Mitchell, 2007), firms may be more likely to fail if they expand into more distant markets 
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(Sorenson et al., 2006) or expand too quickly (Barnett & Freeman, 2001).  Similarly, the impacts 
of relationship-specific investments on firm survival have also been found to be inconclusive.  
On the one hand, the stability and endurance of committed relationships may increase firm 
survival (Hoetker, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 2007; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988) and buffer 
firms from disruptive changes in the environment (Miner, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990), but on 
the other hand, increased dependency on exchange partners can decrease a firm’s outside options 
and can make that firm more vulnerable to failure (Lee, Mun, & Park, 2014; Singh & Mitchell, 
1996).   More fundamentally, however, no study has connected business scope to relationship-
specific investments to explain firm survival. 
I fill this research gap in chapter 4 by investigating the joint effects of business scope and 
relationship-specific investments on the probability of supplier survival. As a baseline, I predict 
greater supplier diversification increases the probability of supplier survival.  Then, I examine 
whether suppliers can increase their survival chances when, along with holding a broader 
business scope, they also dedicate a greater share of organizational resources and attention to 
serving long-term clients with whom they are more likely to build relational assets. In addition, 
clients are a rich source of critical market information and a conduit for supplier learning, and I 
suggest that suppliers can increase their scope-survival advantages when their clients operate in 
relatively faster and more innovative markets. While chapter 4 primarily addresses the question 
of how business scope and relational assets impact supplier survival, it also tackles an important 
managerial dilemma by investigating the extent to which suppliers should design their 
organization to meet the needs of their existing clients; or to put differently, whether suppliers 
should formulate and implement strategies that are based on commitment or flexibility 
(Ghemawat & del Sol, 1998).  Thus, in chapter 4, I again connect corporate-level strategy with 
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business-level strategy by revealing an important interactive relationship between a supplier’s 
business scope and its relational strategy for firm survival.   I also extend the small body of 
diversification research that connects business scope to organizational mortality (e.g., Barnett & 
Freeman, 2001; Bercovitz & Mitchell, 2007; Sorenson et al., 2006; Stern & Henderson, 2004), 
while contributing to recent studies which examine the value suppliers can create from providing 
multiple services to their clients, and how these multi-service offerings increase relationship 
stability (Chatain, 2011; Chatain & Zemsky, 2007).  
In conclusion, this dissertation examines the impact of relational assets that are shared 
between suppliers and their clients, on the performance and business scope of suppliers.  In 
contrast to the dyad-level theorizing in the relational view, across three empirical studies I 
advance the literature through firm-level examinations of performance, and through investigating 
a novel driver of firm diversification.  Finally, by adopting a firm-level perspective I provide 
new insights into the strategic implications of being a more relational, as opposed to 
transactional, exchange partner. 
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Table 1.1:  Summary of the research questions and empirical design across the three empirical chapters. 
Chapter Research Question Dependent Variable Independent Variables Empirical Model 
 
Chapter 2: Relational 
Advantage and the Growth 
Performance of Knowledge-
Based Service Firms 
 
What is the effect of 
relational assets shared 
between suppliers and their 
clients on the long-run 
growth performance of 
suppliers? 
 
Five-year logged growth of 
attorney headcount in 
suppliers 
 
1. Client-Specific Knowledge 
 
2. Relational (client) 
Commitment 
 
3. Market Growth 
 
 
 
Ordinary Least Squares 
regression with Newey-
West Standard Errors 
 
Chapter 3: Relational 
Advantage and Partner-
Driven Corporate Scope: The 
Case for Client-Led 
Diversification 
 
To what extent do relational 
assets shared between 
suppliers and their clients 
determine the horizontal 
business scope of suppliers? 
 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
(HHI) of supplier patent legal 
work conducted across 
technology domains over 
three years 
 
1. Client Diversification 
 
2. Client-Specific Knowledge 
 
3. Relational (client) 
Commitment 
 
4. Relative Market Growth 
 
5. Supplier Resource Slack 
 
Ordinary Least Squares 
regression with supplier-
year fixed effects 
 
Chapter 4: Corporate Scope 
and the Survival of 
Knowledge-Based Service 
Firms 
 
 
How does the horizontal 
business scope of suppliers 
impact their survival and 
what is the effect of relational 
assets shared between 
suppliers and their clients on 
this scope-survival 
relationship? 
 
Supplier firm survival.  
Binary variable equal to 1 in 
year t if the focal supplier 
survival through year t+1. 
 
1. Supplier Diversification 
 
2. Long-term Clients 
 
3. Client Market Opportunity 
 
 
Discrete-time survival 
analysis 
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Figure 1.1:  Relationships between the three dissertation empirical chapters 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
RELATIONAL ADVANTAGE AND THE GROWTH PERFORMANCE OF 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED SERVICE FIRMS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The relational view (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale, et al., 2000) emphasizes how firms 
can achieve long-run performance advantages through the greater use of cooperative inter-
organizational relationships (Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Zajac & 
Olsen, 1993). Theorizing in this literature maintains that investments in relationship-specific 
resources and capabilities and the building of reciprocal and less formal relationship governance 
mechanisms are important drivers of such “relational advantages” (Dyer, 1996; 1997; Dyer & 
Singh, 1998).  Relationship-specific investments (or relational commitments) -- such as 
dedicated assets, shared routines, partner-specific knowledge, and mutual dispute resolution 
mechanisms -- increase value creation by improving relationship productivity, enabling 
contractual flexibility, and mitigating opportunistic behavior between partners (Asanuma, 1989; 
Dyer, 1996; 1997; Kale et al., 2000; Macneil, 1980; Williamson, 1985; Zaheer et al., 1998; 
Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Zollo et al., 2002). Furthermore, in supplier-client relationships, 
relational commitments can provide advantages for suppliers in capturing new business from 
clients, while relationship value is preserved through greater stability and endurance of those 
relationships (Baker 1990; Baker et al., 1998; Chatain, 2011; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; 
Moeen et al., 2013).  
However, a related stream of research challenges the predictions of relational advantage 
within the relational view. These studies suggest that deeply embedded inter-organizational ties 
can decrease relationship productivity through relationship inertia (Anderson & Jap, 2005), while 
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relationship-specific resources and capabilities are at increased risk of obsolescence, particularly 
in dynamic market environments (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Uzzi, 1997). In addition, 
firms may incur substantial opportunity costs by forgoing alternative and potentially higher-
value market opportunities with new exchange partners (Lazzerini et al., 2008), as well as 
becoming vulnerable to the turnover of key exchange managers (Baker et al., 1998; Broschak, 
2004). Thus, rather than achieve performance advantages, exchange partners may instead be 
exposed to the hazards inherent in deeply embedded relationships (Poppo et al., 2008a; Uzzi, 
1997).   
The equivocal support concerning the efficacy of relationship-specific investments for 
value creation suggests a theoretical tension underpinning the relational view.  On the one hand, 
these relational commitments can increase exchange value and the volume of new business 
gained from existing exchange partners.  On the other hand, relational commitments can 
constrain new relationship formation and can reduce environmental adaptability. Moreover, 
while this tension in the literature has mainly focused on the advantages and hazards of dyad-
level relational commitments for dyadic relationship performance (e.g., Dyer, 1997; Kotabe, 
Martin, & Domoto, 2003), the implications for firm-level strategy and performance are less clear.    
I seek to fill these gaps in the extant research literature by examining the impact of 
relational commitments on the long-run growth performance of knowledge-based service 
suppliers (i.e., firms who provide business services such as legal, accounting, consulting, and 
advertising services to corporate clients).  As explained by Maister, growth is essential for 
knowledge-based service suppliers “in order to motivate and retain the firm’s best staff. Without 
growth, much of the dynamism of the [firm] practice will be lost, and morale will suffer.”2 
                                                          
2
 Indeed, leading US legal industry publication National Law Journal publishes annual rankings of the top 350 
corporate law firms, where these firms are ranked by number of attorneys. It is also well understood that, in 
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(1993: 36).    In framing this study, the distinction between theorizing at the firm-level as 
opposed to dyad-level is important to underscore.  First, given the inertial constraints (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984) many firms may face in unlocking interdependent knowledge sets and routines 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982) or abandoning irreversible commitments in 
specialized resources (Ghemawat & del Sol, 1998), firms are unlikely to have the internal 
flexibility to adjust and vary their relational commitment level to different partners. Instead, 
rather than adjusting relational commitments at the dyad level, prior research and practitioner 
evidence suggests supplier firms often vary in the extent to which they adopt a more relational 
(embedded) versus transactional (arms-length) firm-level strategy (Baker, 1990; Dyer, 1997; 
Ghemawat & del Sol, 1998; Helper & Henderson, 2014). Second, while relational commitments 
may enhance the value created within the focal relationship (Dyer & Singh, 1998, Madhok & 
Tallman, 1998), it leaves open the question of how that value is appropriated and which 
exchange partner benefits the most from it (Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996). For example, 
although prior research has explained that some firms may make unilateral partner-specific 
commitments to gain inter-temporal (learning and partner-specific) advantages (Kang et al., 
2009), the long run performance implications of such commitments have not been investigated.  
Finally, the implications of relational commitments across a firm’s entire portfolio of 
relationships may extend beyond those captured at the dyad-level (Baker, 1990; Moeen et al., 
2013; Shipilov, 2012).   In particular, it is unclear whether the dyad-level relational advantages 
espoused by the relational view actually translate to positive firm-level outcomes.  Therefore, it 
is valuable to understand both the firm-level advantages and drawbacks of being a more 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
knowledge-based industries, firm revenues and profits are closely tied to the size of the firm. In separate analyses on 
the largest US corporate law firms, five year growth in attorney headcount was significantly correlated with five 
year growth in firm revenues (r=0.84).  
 
 17 
 
relational partner
3
. 
I theorize that suppliers investing in deeper client-specific knowledge (supplier side 
commitment) and suppliers who receive a greater fraction of their clients’ new business (client 
side commitment) are able to grow their firm faster than suppliers who choose more arms-length 
relational ties.  In addition, consistent with the joint value-maximizing perspective of the 
relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Zajac & Olsen, 1993), I also 
postulate that mutual (i.e., joint or bilateral) relational commitments from both suppliers and 
clients provide the most favorable conditions for supplier growth.  Finally, I test the limits to 
which relational commitments provide firm-level advantages.  I maintain that in fast-growing 
markets, greater relational commitments reduce supplier growth performance.  This negative 
impact from the market is theorized to be a consequence of greater opportunity costs through 
forgoing more broad-based demand growth within the business domains in which the supplier 
operates (Lazzerini et al., 2008) and a greater risk of knowledge obsolescence (Balakrishnan & 
Wernerfelt, 1986) due to limited exposure to important market advancements (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003). 
I test my hypotheses in the context of outsourced knowledge-based services, which are 
known to suffer from higher levels of information asymmetries and partner monitoring problems 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) and are generally difficult to explicitly contract for (Mayer & 
Nickerson, 2005). Consequently, value-creation in supplier-client relationships may rely to a 
significant degree on relationship-specific resources and capabilities and cooperative forms of 
                                                          
3 The strategic aspects of firms’ decisions to make relationship-specific investments and the impact of those 
strategies for firm outcomes have been emphasized in the research literature.  For example, Ghemawat & del Sol 
note; “Choices concerning investment or disinvestment in resources that are more [firm] specific tend to be less 
reversible and should therefore be regarded as more strategic. These choices create a need to look beyond the 
present to the future, to think through things ahead of time. Managers should focus on such choices not only because 
they are difficult to make, but also because they can be counted to have a disproportionately large, long-lived 
impact—for better or worse—on the performance of the organization” (1998: 34 ). 
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relationship governance (Mayer et al., 2012; Moeen et al., 2013; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  My 
empirical tests are conducted on a longitudinal sample of patent law firms and the scope of 
patent prosecution services they provide to their corporate clients. The fine-grained project-level 
data available in this setting on outsourcing and relational strategies provide an excellent real 
world context in which to test my predictions. 
This study makes a number of contributions to strategic management research.  First, I 
contribute to the research literature on cooperative strategy by examining how deeply embedded 
inter-organizational relationships impact firm-level outcomes.  While the relational view 
maintains a positive association between relationship-specific investments and relationship 
performance (e.g., Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Kotabe, et al., 2003, Krishnan, et al., 2006; 
Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Zaheer et al., 1998), I extend this perspective by examining how 
these investments affect firm performance.  Second, I connect the relational view to resource-
based theory (e.g., Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984) by examining how intangible 
and difficult-to-imitate resources and capabilities that span organizational boundaries (as 
opposed to be being firm-specific) can drive firm competitive advantage (Madhok & Tallman, 
1998). Finally, I respond to recent calls for management scholarship to move beyond abstract 
conceptualizations of firm performance and the use of empirical measures that may not align 
with underlying theoretical constructs (see Miller, Washburn & Glick, 2013).  Accordingly, I 
explicitly define firm performance in terms of supplier growth performance and develop my 
theoretical premises to explain and predict how and when relationship-specific investments may 
positively or negatively impact this growth.   
In the next sections, I present the theoretical foundations of the relational view and 
describe how new theoretical insights can be gained from examining the firm-level implications 
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of relational commitments.  I then develop my hypotheses for empirical analyses. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
According to the relational view, specialized inter-organizational resources and 
capabilities can jointly generate higher relationship value for exchange partners than either 
partner could achieve independently (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Zajac & 
Olsen, 1993). This theoretical premise suggests, for example, that the building of idiosyncratic 
inter-organizational processes and routines can provide efficiencies in the communication and 
task coordination between exchange partners (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2000; Zollo et al., 2002).  
In addition, greater transparency and reciprocity between exchange partners can increase the 
volume of tacit and proprietary knowledge exchange (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; 1998; 
Oxley, 1997), resulting in higher levels of inter-organizational learning (Powell, Koput, & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003) and the building of partner-specific expertise 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005).  In turn, exchange partners may 
identify a greater array of synergistic combinations of inter-organizational complementary 
resources (Madhok & Tallman, 1998), manage partner-specific interdependencies with 
increasing effectiveness (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Moeen et al., 2013), and in supplier-client 
relationships, produce customized products and services that more precisely meet the needs of 
clients (Chatain, 2011; Priem, 2007).  
However, although building specialized inter-organizational resources and capabilities 
may increase exchange value within the focal relationship, those investments are typically less 
applicable outside of the focal setting (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Subramani & Venkatraman, 
2003; Williamson, 1975). Lower alternative use value for specialized resources can weaken a 
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firm’s bargaining power in an exchange, exposing that firm to potential opportunistic behavior 
by the other exchange partner (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1975).  On the other hand, while 
these exchange hazards may, all else equal, dissuade firms from making deeper relational 
commitments, when longer-term joint relationship value outweighs the short-term gains from 
acting opportunistically, the incentivizes of exchange partners are said to be aligned (i.e., a 
mutual desire to preserve relationship value) and, therefore, behavioral uncertainty is reduced 
(Axelrod, 1984; Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002; Macneil, 1980; Vanneste & Frank, 2013; 
Zajac & Olsen, 1993).   
Allied to this forward looking perspective, the development of shared cooperative norms 
that promote the health of the relationship, and reinforce the belief that the other exchange 
partner will not act opportunistically, can also be the consequence of a positive exchange history 
between suppliers and clients (Gulati, 1995; Heide & Miner, 1992; Macneil, 1980; Madhok, 
1995; Poppo et al., 2008a; Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Vanneste, Puranam, & Kretschmer, 2013; 
Williamson, 1985; Zaheer et al., 1998).  As a result, formal contracting over exchange 
relationships (Williamson, 1975) may be complemented (or substituted) by more relational forms 
of contracting that are undergirded not by complex legal prescriptions, but by goodwill, trust, 
and embedded cooperative norms (Corts & Singh, 2004; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Hoetker, 
2005; Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1980; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).   
Yet, despite the broad appeal for building relational advantages in supplier-client 
relationships, the imperfect transferability of relationship-specific resources and capabilities 
(Ghemawat & del Sol, 1998; Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985) and penalties that may be 
imposed by clients on suppliers for breaching cooperative norms (Axelrod, 1984; Rogan, 2014b), 
may restrict the opportunities for suppliers to gain new clients. These market constraints can lead 
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to suppliers becoming over-dependent on a narrow body of existing clients (Baker, 1990; 
Sorenson & Waguespack, 2006), which can, again, expose suppliers to the hazards inherent in 
embedded relationships (Baker, 1990; Uzzi, 1997). 
While the theorizing thus far has evolved in the literature mainly through dyad-level 
research examinations, the implications for firm-level outcomes from dyadic commitments are 
palpable.  For example, while the value created from specialized dyadic investments may also 
increase firm-level performance, the drawbacks to dyadic commitments may also manifest at the 
firm-level and detrimentally impact the longer-term competitiveness of firms.  Certainly, if all 
relationships are valuable opportunities for firms, then focusing on an individual relationship 
(i.e., at the dyad-level) can neglect examining the antecedents and consequences of a firm’s 
entire portfolio of relationships, and the implications of how dyadic advantages translate to the 
firm-level (Baker, 1990; Shipilov, 2012).  
Building from prior literature in the relational view, the present study examines the firm-
level performance implications for suppliers who share greater relational commitments with their 
clients.  Both scholars and practitioners alike suggest that creating value through inter-
organizational relational commitments are likely to be a firm-level strategy: For example, 
Ghemawat & del Sol note that firms often encounter a strategic tension between commitment 
and flexibility: “companies must frequently choose between commitment to competing in a 
particular way and the flexibility to compete effectively in a variety of ways” (1998: 26 emphasis 
added).  This sentiment is echoed in the following comment by a corporate law firm executive: 
“It’s not just about going to the client and talking about pricing…what we try to instill into the 
client is the understanding that we are willing to be true partners”4.  Therefore, in this study I 
                                                          
4
 Quote obtained from panel discussion with law firm executives hosted by Practising Law Institute. Reproduced 
with permission. 
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seek to generate new insights regarding the value of relational commitments for firm 
performance by considering the firm-level implications of relational commitments as outcomes 
of a relational strategy.  A relational strategy is conceptualized as the building and use of 
relationship-specific resources and capabilities and mutual forms of relationship governance to 
support longer-term economic commitments with exchange partners. 
 
Client-Specific Knowledge 
Prior studies reveal that new outsourced client projects are valuable new business 
opportunities for knowledge-based service suppliers (Maister, 1993; Mayer et al., 2012) and the 
effective competition for this new business is often reduced to a small pool of suppliers who 
have made commitments to gain a deeper understanding of their clients’ business (Chatain, 2011; 
Coates et al., 201; Moeen et al., 2013).  This “client-specific knowledge” may reside as the skills, 
knowledge, and experience of exchange managers (e.g., lawyers or advertising agents who 
manage client projects and interact directly with client stakeholders) that are specific to meeting 
the needs of the client (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Williamson, 1985), and may be 
complemented by firm-level client-specific resources and capabilities that are necessary for 
executing client projects, such as specialized knowledge-transfer routines and building unique 
bundles of complementary inter-organizational assets (Zollo et al., 2002).   
In knowledge-based service industries, many suppliers compete through non-price forms 
of rivalry, such as market status, reputation, and service quality (Baker et al., 1998; Chatain, 
2011; Han, 1994; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988).  Greater investments in client-specific 
knowledge may support a broader market differentiation strategy of suppliers (Porter, 1980) by 
providing a significant source of added-value to clients in service delivery (Brandenburger & 
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Stuart, 1996; Chatain, 2011) and increase total value creation in the relationship (Zajac & Olsen, 
1993). Moreover, market frictions such as learning about new business opportunities, screening 
alternatives, and communication costs are reduced when working with existing clients (relative 
to other potential clients) to develop new business.  It is therefore not surprising that suppliers 
are often advised to be especially attentive to the array of new business opportunities available 
from existing clients (Maister, 1993).   
In addition to supplier-side advantages (Chatain, 2011; Moeen et al., 2013), clients can 
gain from learning about supplier capabilities and behavioral patterns which can be then 
leveraged into future transactions with that supplier (Argyres & Zenger, 2012; Mayer et al., 
2012).  Indeed, the following quote from an executive of a client firm emphasizes the value 
clients place on suppliers learning about their business: 
“We are looking for [legal suppliers] who are really willing themselves to show that they 
are willing and capable to invest in the relationship…The switching costs of using 
another [law] firm exist”5. 
I suggest suppliers can achieve long-run growth performance advantages through making 
deeper investments in the businesses of their clients. First, relative to all possible supplier options 
for a client, the number of suppliers holding deep levels of client-specific knowledge is likely to 
be small (Chatain, 2011).  Suppliers who make such knowledge investments therefore have 
advantages in capturing greater volumes of future business from those clients (Chatain, 2011; 
Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Mayer et al., 2012). Second, suppliers can utilize client-specific 
knowledge to provide customized client services, increasing their “added-value” (Brandenburger 
& Stuart, 1996) and in turn, the upper bound on a client’s willingness to pay (Priem, 2007). 
                                                          
5 
Quote from panel discussion of corporate executives hosted by Practising Law Institute. Reproduced with 
permission 
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Indeed, the decision to invest in client-specific knowledge may be an ex-ante strategic decision 
(Kang et al., 2009) in order to reduce rivalry for client new business and to capture a greater 
share of relationship value (Brandenburger & Stuart, 2007; MacDonald & Ryall, 2004). Third, 
although client-specific knowledge investments are irreversible commitments (Ghemawat & del 
Sol, 1998), when viewed across multiple transactions, suppliers can generate both scope and 
scale economies through the dissemination and re-use of this knowledge, thereby lowering the 
overall costs of service provision (Chatain & Zemsky, 2007; Krugman, 1980). I therefore present 
the following hypothesis: 
H1:  The greater the client-specific knowledge of a supplier, the higher the growth 
performance of that supplier. 
 
Relational (client) Commitment 
Clients often prefer to use an existing supplier when they have a new outsourced 
knowledge-based project rather than use a new supplier (Chatain, 2011; Mayer et al., 2012).  
This outsourcing strategy decreases the costs of searching for and vetting new suppliers, while 
information spillovers across repeated economic exchanges (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999) ease 
the challenges for clients in determining both the true quality of supplier capabilities (Akerlof, 
1970; Barzel, 1982) and the level of productive effort applied by suppliers in service delivery 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).    
While repeated exchanges are clearly important for building relationship-specific 
resources and capabilities (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Macneil, 1980), clients can also signal 
greater relational commitment by providing suppliers with a larger fraction of their outsourced 
work (Axelrod, 1984; Schelling, 1960).  Although clients may lose strategic flexibility by 
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increasing its reliance on a single supplier (Moeen et al., 2013), clients are also conveying 
positive expectations of relationship continuity and cooperative behavior. Indeed, practitioners 
suggest that cooperative behavior and developing close inter-organizational ties are important 
strategic choices for some firms in the pursuit of value creation.  For example, take the following 
comment from an executive of client firm Du Pont: 
 “[Law] Firms felt a greater commitment to Du Pont when they were entrusted with our 
entire [intellectual property] business in their country or region. In many, the senior 
leadership on their own initiative undertook a study of Du Pont's business and 
demonstrated an eagerness to adapt their practices to meet our needs. We were gratified 
by the tremendous enthusiasm and commitment displayed by the selected firms. Our 
work now received much needed management attention and closer professional focus” 
(Dull & Gould, 2002). 
Importantly, this “preferential status” enables suppliers to capture a greater share of clients’ 
premium, high value, and strategically important work (Wilkins, 2009).   By undertaking a 
greater share of these important client projects, suppliers have greater (client-specific) learning 
opportunities that allow them to more effectively manage interdependencies across client 
projects (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995) while also providing greater opportunities to build 
individual-level relationships that encourage the transfer of important tacit knowledge.  
Moreover, mutual expectations for positive relationship conduct can stimulate deeper 
relationship-specific investments that increase relationship longevity and the flow of clients’ new 
business to the supplier (Bercovitz, Jap, & Nickerson, 2006; Larson, 1992; Macneil, 1980; 
McEvily & Marcus, 2005; Uzzi, 1997).   
 Taken together, I suggest that greater relational commitment from a supplier’s portfolio 
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of client’s increases supplier growth performance as the signal of cooperative behavior provides 
the necessary economic safeguards that suppliers may require before making investments to 
grow the firm.  In addition, capturing a greater share of client’s work allows suppliers to more 
effectively manage and coordinate client projects (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995), freeing up 
resources that can, again, be applied towards growing the firm (Penrose, 1959).  Thus, I offer the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: The greater the level of relational commitment a supplier receives from its portfolio of 
clients, the higher the growth performance of that supplier.  
 
 Mutual Commitment 
The relational view, which draws from, and is complemented by, the relational 
contracting literature (e.g., Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1980; Telser, 1980; Vanneste & Frank, 
2014), maintains that exchange partners are incentivized to behave cooperatively when the 
longer-term joint gains from relationship-specific investments are greater than the potential 
short-term individual gains exchange partners can generate by acting in self-interest (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Heide & Miner, 1992; Telser, 1980; Zajac & Olsen, 1993).  Joint relationship 
investments are often associated with the development of greater levels of cooperative norms 
(Bercovitz, et al., 2006; Williamson, 1979) that incentivize deeper relationship-specific 
investments, (Williamson, 1983), and in turn, create higher relationship value (Zajac & Olsen, 
1993). Although unilateral relational commitments can place one exchange partner in an inferior 
bargaining position relative to the other partner (Williamson, 1985), mutual relational 
commitments are bilateral relationship-specific investments made by both partners under the 
expectations of fairness and ongoing cooperative behavior.   
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Moreover, it has been long established in the research literature that the creation of joint 
value may be an important strategic concern for firms who recognize that accommodating the 
interests of the other exchange partner can lead to mutually beneficial outcomes (Schelling, 
1960).  Indeed, commitments to joint value creation may form an integral part of a broader 
relational strategy, as the following anecdotal evidence from a law firm executive suggests; 
“Both the client and the firm look for ways to strengthen the partnering relationship by 
generating mutual benefits which provide additional incentives to achieve the best 
possible results. As a result, clients have recognized that, by focusing more work in fewer 
firms, they can achieve better results”6. 
The insight from the above quote is tantalizing as it suggests clients can induce suppliers to make 
greater relationship-specific investments (for example, in deeper levels of client-specific 
knowledge) by committing to provide those suppliers with greater share of their outsourced (and 
premium) work over the longer term (Moeen et al., 2013; Wilkins, 2009). Thus, relational 
(client) commitment provides a credible safeguard on the future value of supplier investments, 
therefore incentivizing suppliers to make deeper, irreversible relational commitments that have 
the potential to create the highest value (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  However, clients may only be 
willing to make greater relational commitments to suppliers should they also have expectations 
that those suppliers will reciprocate.  In effect, both suppliers and clients must provide credible 
signals of mutual commitment that safeguard relationship-specific investments;  suppliers 
through formulating and implementing a relational strategy and investing in their clients’ 
business, and client’s through the promise of a greater share of its outsourced work and 
commitment to cooperation.  
                                                          
6
 Quote taken from an interview with Robert Hays, managing partner of a leading US corporate law firm.  Interview 
with Robert Hays. The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, 14(2): February 2006. 
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One important outcome of mutual relational commitments is the development of greater 
levels of cooperative relational norms that enable more effective relationship governance 
(Macneil, 1980; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1979).  These norms galvanize partners such that 
exchange contracts become concerned less with stipulating and enforcing the legal rights and 
obligations of partners (although these are still important), and more concerned with defining the 
obligations for cooperative behavior and establishing expectations for relationship conduct -- in 
other words, relational contracting (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1980; Telser, 1980; Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995).  Through relational contracting, exchange relationships are governed 
through informal and mutually accommodating governance mechanisms that rely to a greater 
extent on the goodwill, trust, and flexibility of exchange partners (Macneil, 1980).  Prior research 
studies show that relational contracting can be a highly efficient means of governing 
relationships by lowering transaction-costs and mitigating contractual hazards (e.g., 
opportunism) even when relationship-specific resources and capabilities are important drivers of 
exchange value (Dyer, 1997; Williamson, 1979).   
In sum, mutual relational commitments provide safeguards for both the supplier and 
clients when making relationship-specific investments.  Suppliers benefit from capturing a 
greater share of their clients’ outsourced work, but the relational commitments provided by 
clients and the mutual development of cooperative norms also mitigate the potential hazards of 
investments in client-specific knowledge.  Suppliers, thus, have incentives to invest in building 
knowledge and capabilities that deliver the highest levels of value through being able to precisely 
meet the needs of clients. Mutual commitment, therefore, provides the greatest level of economic 
bonding, placing the supplier in a strong position to capture significant volumes of new business 
from existing clients over the longer term, which leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H3:  The greater the client-specific knowledge of a supplier, the stronger the positive 
association between relational (client) commitment and the growth performance of that 
supplier.  
 
 Market Growth 
Fast-paced, rapidly growing markets provide favorable conditions for suppliers to capture 
greater volumes of outsourced demand across a broader range of clients, which in turn, confers 
advantages for growing their business.  Compared to markets where the level of outsourced 
client demand is relatively stable over time, higher growth markets are characterized by year-on-
year increases in the level of demand that allow suppliers to leverage scalable resources and to 
extend firm capacity by bringing in new talent (Levinthal & Wu, 2010; Sakhartov & Folta, 
2014).  
However, strategies for extracting value in higher growth markets -- which necessitates 
suppliers to be responsive to frequent changes in the knowledge requirements of those markets 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003) -- are likely to 
compete with strategies for capturing value from embedded client relationships. (Ghemawat & 
del Sol, 1998).  For example, the former strategy typically leads suppliers to gain, and 
continually update, specialized expertise in an industry and/or profession in order to serve a 
broader range of clients (Mayer et al., 2012).  However, suppliers implementing the latter 
strategy are likely to find their strategic flexibility compromised due to a narrower knowledge-
base and holding resources and capabilities that are more specialized to the needs of embedded 
clients rather than the market (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Leonard-
Barton, 1992; Subramani & Venkatraman, 2003; Williamson, 1985). Moreover, these suppliers 
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are likely to face greater barriers in updating their knowledge base in line with the requirements 
of the market. In knowledge-based services, interacting with a broader array of clients is a 
considerable driver of supplier learning (Coates et al., 2011; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003) and 
suppliers who focus on maintaining deeply embedded client relationships are at an increased risk 
of knowledge obsolescence and reduced market competitiveness over the longer term (Anderson 
& Jap, 2005; Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986).  
One factor that may influence a supplier’s tendency towards embedded client 
relationships is uncertainty regarding both the conduct and the level of value that can be 
appropriated from exchanges with new clients.  This uncertainty is higher at the inception of the 
relationship (Barzel, 1982; Hölmstrom, 1979) and arguably has a stronger impact on a supplier’s 
decision to form new relationships in growing markets as the needs of clients change with 
greater frequency (Moeen et al., 2013).  In these conditions, exchange contracts are likely to 
require frequent renegotiation or remain largely incomplete, opening the possibility of 
opportunism by clients.  In contrast, suppliers following a relational strategy have greater 
safeguards on opportunistic behavior and may (perhaps myopically) prefer continue to direct 
organizational resources towards deepening those relationships, even if this results in the 
neglecting of alternative and potentially higher-value market opportunities with new clients 
(Lazzarini et al., 2008; Sorenson & Waguespack, 2006).  However, the opportunity costs (for 
supplier growth) from forgoing new clients are likely to be greater in higher-growth markets; not 
only are suppliers failing to take advantage of favorable conditions for growing their firm, but by 
relinquishing potential new clients to rival suppliers they are also providing greater opportunities 
for those rivals to gain capability advantages and increase their market share. 
In sum, rather than supporting a supplier’s value proposition, relational commitments in 
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high growth markets can reduce a supplier’s ability to attract new business.  In such contexts, 
clients may place high value on a supplier’s exposure and responsiveness to cutting-edge market 
knowledge which they can access an incorporate into their business (Coates et al., 2011; Mayer 
et al., 2012).  Not surprisingly, prior research findings show that in these markets, clients may 
prefer more transactional, arms-length ties with suppliers in order to retain strategic flexibility 
and reduce the costs of switching between suppliers as their needs change (Moeen et al., 2013).   
Effectively, for a supplier following a relational strategy, the ex-ante large numbers competitive 
market is “fundamentally transformed” and the supplier’s “market” reduces from large to small 
numbers (Sorenson & Waguespack, 2006; Williamson, 1985), limiting the number of new clients 
the supplier is able to capture (Chatain & Zemsky, 2011).  I therefore predict that greater 
relational commitments in higher growth markets to have a significant negative impact on 
supplier growth performance, and accordingly, I present the following pair of hypotheses: 
H4a: The greater the growth of the markets within a supplier’s portfolio, the weaker the 
positive association between client-specific knowledge and supplier growth performance. 
 
H4b: The greater the growth of the markets within a supplier’s portfolio, the weaker the 
positive association between relational (client) commitment and supplier growth 
performance.  
 
SAMPLE AND METHODS 
Sample 
I tested my hypotheses using a longitudinal panel dataset on relationships between patent 
law firms (suppliers) and their corporate clients. The primary data source used to identify the law 
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firm sample was the official patent attorney roster of registered patent attorneys published by the 
Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
Before being allowed to practice patent law, patent attorneys are required to register before the 
US patent bar, after which they are included on the OED roster.  The OED roster details the 
name, employer and unique registration code for each registered patent attorney, and is 
continually updated to include newly registered patent attorneys and to reflect mobility of patent 
attorneys between employers.  Thus, for any point in time it is possible to identify the number of 
patent attorneys employed by suppliers. My supplier sample consists of 126 patent law firms 
who in 1990 had at least five patent attorneys and who were present throughout the entire 
observation period in order to allow detailed empirical tracking. 
I investigated relationships between patent law firms and client firms using data on 
outsourced patent prosecution work.  Patent prosecution is the process of writing, filing, and 
managing the legal and administrative requirements with the USPTO until the patent is granted 
(which, on average, is approximately three years from filing the patent with the USPTO). Client 
firms may undertake patent prosecution work in-house or outsource it to a patent law firm.  In 
essence, the prosecution of each patent is a narrowly defined project whereby an outsourced 
patent represents a transaction between the client and supplier.  To create my sample of 
outsourced patents, I obtained all utility patents filed (and subsequently granted) to the USPTO 
during the period from 1988 to 1995.  Each patent application identifies the client, law firm (or 
name of in-house patent attorney) who prosecuted the patent, and the specific technological 
classification of the patented invention.  To identify those patents outsourced to my sample of 
patent law firms, I used multiple search algorithms on each law firm name to search in the 
“Attorney or Agent” field on the patent application. Using the detailed information within patent 
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applications, for each year I created fine-grained patent portfolios for each supplier and client 
firm, and then used these portfolios to construct detailed transactional histories between each 
patent law firm and their clients. Including prior years used to build variables and accounting for 
lagging independent variables by five years in the primary analyses (see below), I identified a 
core sample of approximately 192,000 patents outsourced by roughly 27,000 clients to my 
sample of 126 suppliers. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Supplier Growth Performance:  The interest in this study resides in examining the growth 
in patent attorneys for each patent law firm across five-year intervals. I measured Supplier 
Growth Performance as the five-year log-difference
7
 in the number of patent attorneys employed 
by each patent law firm.  Log-difference models are standard practice for measuring growth 
(e.g., Chen, Williams, & Agarwal, 2012; Coad & Teruel, 2013; Geroski, 1995; Podolny, Stuart, 
& Hannan, 1996) and are good approximation for capturing the relative percentage growth rate.  
In addition, difference-models remove unobserved firm-specific variation across time periods, 
thus allaying concerns of potential measurement error (Allison, 1990; Henderson & Fredrickson, 
2001; Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004).   
 
Independent Variables 
Client-Specific Knowledge: Following prior research, I used patent backward self-
citations as a measure of client-specific knowledge (Moeen et al., 2013; Wang & Chen, 2010; 
Wang, He, & Mahoney, 2009).  Backward patent citations identify the body of prior knowledge 
that the focal patent builds on.  A backward self-citation is an instance where a client’s patent 
                                                          
7 
log(S(t) – S(t-1) / S(t-1)) = log(S(t)) – log(S(t-1)), where S is size.  See Coad (2009) for derivation. 
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cites a patent that belongs to the same client, and indicates the accumulation of firm-specific 
knowledge (Wang et al., 2009).  To prosecute an outsourced patent with backward self-citations, 
a law firm must hold detailed knowledge of the technological background of the patent which 
includes knowledge of the clients’ prior cited technologies (Moeen et al., 2013).  When a 
supplier’s patent portfolio contains a greater proportion of backward self-citations (to all 
citations) this indicates that the patent work performed by the supplier requires greater levels of 
client-specific knowledge.  To compute Client-Specific Knowledge, over the prior three years I 
calculated the average percentage of backward citations to all citations in the law firm’s patent 
prosecution work.    
 
Relational (client) Commitment: For each client in each year in my sample, I obtained 
their number of outsourced patents and calculated the three-year percentage of those patents to 
each of the suppliers in my sample.  A higher fraction of client work outsourced to a particular 
supplier is an indication that the client has made a greater relational commitment to that supplier 
(Moeen et al., 2013).  However, a supplier’s attention and resource allocation may be 
heterogeneously distributed among clients, even if the share of work received from those clients 
is similar.  Estimates could be biased if I did not correct for clients who may be more important 
to a supplier.  Accordingly, I weighted the share of client work outsourced to the focal supplier 
by the fraction of that supplier’s total business accounted for by each client in the previous three 
years.   I then aggregated across clients to compute a weighted portfolio-level measure of 
Relational (client) Commitment for each supplier in each year. 
 
 
 35 
 
Market Growth: Using the universe of utility patents (i.e., outsourced patents and those 
completed in-house by clients) between 1988 and 1995, I computed the growth of each 
technological industry domain (where industry domains are measured by four-digit International 
Patent Class (IPC)) by calculating a rolling three-year log-difference growth-rate in the number 
of patents in each four-digit IPC (Moeen et al., 2013). I then calculated a supplier-specific 
market growth measure by weighting the log-growth of each IPC within the supplier’s business 
portfolio by the fraction of that supplier’s patents in those IPCs (over the prior three years).  
Market Growth is thus a weighted average measure of growth in markets within a supplier’s 
portfolio, where the weights reflect the relevance of supplier expertise in each industry (IPC) 
domain (Mayer et al., 2012).    
 
Controls 
In my models, I also included a number of firm-level controls that may impact supplier 
growth performance.  Client Dynamism is the growth in patenting from existing clients within a 
suppliers portfolio, with more dynamic clients providing greater new business opportunities for 
suppliers.  To compute this measure, I calculated three year log-difference growth-rate in patents 
outsourced by clients and aggregated across the clients in a supplier’s portfolio, weighting each 
client by the three-year fraction of work they account for in the focal suppliers’ portfolio.  
Outsourced Percentage is the rolling three-year percentage of patents outsourced by each client 
(as a fraction of total patents for each client) in a supplier’s portfolio, weighted by the three-year 
fraction of that suppliers’ total business accounted for by each of those clients.  I then aggregated 
across all clients within the suppliers’ portfolio. The extent of outsourcing (relative to patent 
work completed internally by the client) may influence a client’s outsourcing strategy (Mayer et 
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al., 2013; Moeen et al., 2013).  Outsourced Volume is the number of patents outsourced by each 
client to a focal supplier, which, again, is weighted by the three-year fraction of that suppliers’ 
total business accounted for by those clients before aggregating across all clients in the supplier’s 
portfolio. Supplier Size is computed as the number of patent attorneys employed by a supplier in 
the prior period (and is the base year of the growth model) and mitigates bias toward smaller 
firms who may grow faster than larger firms (Coad et al., 2014; Hall, 1987; Schreyer, 2000).  
Supplier Turnover is calculated as the number of attorney exits from each supplier in the prior 
three years divided by the average number of supplier attorneys for the same prior three years, 
and controls for the effect of employee mobility which has been shown to impact the 
productivity of supplier-client relationships (Broschak, 2004; Somaya, Williamson, & 
Lorinkova, 2008).  Supplier Scope is measured as a Herfindahl index (HHI) computed from the 
share of supplier patents in each 4-digit IPC, corrected for bias in HHI measures associated with 
patent counts at lower numbers (Hall, 2002).  Domain Expertise is measured as the three-year 
share of non-prior art citations (such as citations to academic publications and research 
presentations) among all citations in a supplier’s patent portfolio.  A higher share of non-prior art 
citations is an indication that a supplier builds more on specialized scientific knowledge relative 
to practical inventions (Cassiman, Veugelers, & Zuniga, 2008; Squicciarini, Dernis, & Criscuolo, 
2013).  Occupational Expertise is calculated as the percentage of patents in the supplier’s prior 
patent work that cite a previously litigated patent.  Such patents are themselves about six times 
more likely to be subject to litigation than an average patent, and clients are likely to seek 
superior occupational expertise to prosecute these patents in case they are later contested in the 
courts (Mayer et al., 2012).  All independent and control variables are log-transformed to 
linearize the econometric model and to allow coefficients to be interpreted in terms of elasticity. 
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Econometric Model 
This study is concerned with measuring growth performance in patent law firms, where 
the interest resides in examining differences between firms, rather than changes within the same 
firm (e.g., comparing the effect of one firm following a more relational strategy than another).  
The data were organized in dynamic cross-sectional panels and I used a pooled cross-section 
time series model with lagged independent variables to test my hypotheses.  The temporal 
properties of pooled cross-section models can make these models susceptible to 
heteroskedasicity and serial correlation in the residuals when estimating using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) (Beck & Katz, 1995).  A significant Breusch-Pagan (1979) test statistic indicated 
the presence of heteroskedasicity, while a Cumby-Huizinga (1992) test indicated potential serial 
correlation in the residuals over the prior three years to the observation year.  If uncorrected, the 
standard errors could be biased and report false levels of statistical significance.  Accordingly, I 
employed a Newey-West standard error correction (Newey & West, 1987) in my estimates 
which adjusts the standard errors for both heteroskedasicity and potential non-independence in 
the distribution of residuals due to serial correlation (Greene, 2003).  An alternative to OLS with 
Newey-West standard errors is a Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) model with 
autocorrelation correction, which uses an estimate of the error process for the autocorrelation 
correction. However, in time-series cross-sectional models, the estimated coefficients from 
FGLS will not necessarily have the optimal properties of OLS (Gujarati, 2003) because the error 
process has a large number of parameters which can cause standard errors to understate their true 
variability (Beck & Katz, 1995).  Finally, in the primary analyses that estimated five-year 
supplier growth performance, all independent and control variables were lagged by five years.  
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RESULTS 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report the summary statistics and correlation matrix respectively.  I 
calculated variance inflation factors (VIF) for the independent and control variables.  A VIF 
below 10 indicates that multicollinearity does not influence results (Welsch, 1982).  The mean 
VIF for all variables was 1.68, and the highest VIF for a single variable was 2.79. 
Table 2.3 presents results from the main OLS model with Newey-West standard errors in 
which Model 1 includes the control variables only.  For the control variables, it is notable that, 
with the exception of Model 2, Market Growth has a positive and statistically significant impact 
on supplier growth performance, however Client-Dynamism has no statistically significant 
impact on supplier growth performance.  Model 2 reports the result for hypothesis 1, which 
posited suppliers holding greater levels of Client-Specific Knowledge have higher growth 
performance.  The coefficient on the variable is not statistically significant, thus in Model 2, H1 
is not supported.  Model 3 tests hypothesis 2 which predicted a greater level of relationship 
commitment from a supplier’s clients has a positive impact on supplier growth performance.  
The coefficient on Relational (client) Commitment is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
strongly supporting H2, and indicating that suppliers who capture a greater fraction of 
outsourced work from their clients are able to grow more rapidly.  Hypothesis 3 posited that 
Mutual Commitment has a positive effect on supplier growth performance. Model 4 reports this 
result.  The positive and significant coefficient at the 5% level offers robust support for H3.  
Figure 2.1 illuminates the effect of Mutual Commitment on supplier growth performance.  
We observe suppliers who receive higher levels of relational commitment from clients have the 
greatest opportunity for growth when they also hold higher levels of client-specific knowledge.  
However, when relational (client) commitment is low, greater client-specific knowledge has a 
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constraining effect on supplier growth performance which is the opposite of the prediction of H1. 
Finally, it is important to underscore that the negative and significant coefficients on Client-
Specific Knowledge and Relational (client) Commitment in Model 4 should be interpreted as the 
residual effect on these coefficients when the interaction term (H3) is zero.  However, this does 
not occur in my data. Thus, readers should refer to Figure 2.1 for an interpretation of these main 
effects rather than interpreting the coefficients as true negative slopes.     
Model 5 provides the result for hypothesis 4a, which posited Market Growth to have a 
negative effect on supplier growth performance when Client-Specific Knowledge is higher. The 
coefficient on the variable is negative and significant at the 5% level, thus supporting H4a. 
Figure 2.2 interprets H4a graphically, and comparison of the slopes provides strong evidence for 
the constraining effect of client-specific knowledge on supplier growth performance.  We 
observe clearly that in higher growth markets, suppliers accumulating greater levels of client-
specific knowledge realize lower growth performance.  We notice also that in stable markets, 
client-specific knowledge actually has a negligible effect on supplier growth performance; 
although overall growth performance is also lower in these more stable markets 
Model 6 reports hypothesis 4b, which similar to H4a, predicted Market Growth to have a 
negative effect on supplier growth performance when the level of Relational (client) 
Commitment from a supplier’s client portfolio is higher.  The coefficient on H4b is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, offering strong support for this hypothesis. Figure 2.3 provides 
graphical representation of H4b.  Comparing slopes, we see that as relational (client) 
commitment increases, suppliers who operate in higher growth markets suffer a growth penalty.  
However, we also observe that when suppliers compete in more stable markets an increase in 
relational commitment from clients provides substantial growth advantages.    Finally, Model 7 
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includes all variables.  Comparing the models and figures together, with the exception of H1 the 
empirical findings corroborate most of this study’s predictions. 
 
Additional Analyses 
A number of additional analyses were undertaken to test the robustness of the primary 
results, and are presented in Appendix A.  First, to address concerns that relationship-specific 
investments only impact supplier growth performance over a specific time horizon, analyses 
were also conducted over four-year and three-year growth intervals.  These results were 
consistent with the main empirical findings presented in Table 3, although levels of statistical 
significance became weaker as the time intervals decreased, suggesting that relationship-specific 
investments have a greater impact on long-run rather than short-run growth performance.  
Second, alternative supplier growth specifications were tested.  I calculated a conventional (i.e., 
non-logged) relative growth-rate model that measured the five year percentage change in 
attorney headcount from the initial size in t-5.  I also calculated the Compound Annual Growth 
Rate (CAGR) in number of attorneys.  CAGR is a metric commonly used in finance to measure 
growth of investment returns. Finally, I computed supplier growth performance using a DHS 
Index (Davis, Haltiwanger, & Schuh, 1996) that calculates supplier growth performance relative 
to the average of the initial and final attorney headcount.  The DHS Index counters concerns that 
initial size may not be a reliable indicator of a firm’s actual size, and which may produce 
abnormally high or low growth rates (Coad, 2009; Friedman, 1992). Again, results from these 
alternative dependent variable specifications confirm the main predictions in this study, ruling 
out concerns that the primary findings are an artefact of the log-difference growth measure.   
While this study measured market growth in terms of the three-year logged growth-rate 
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in the number of patents in each four-digit IPC, I also used an alternative measure by calculating 
the three-year logged growth-rate in the number of clients in each IPC, which similarly 
represents broad-based new business opportunities for suppliers. The results were almost 
identical, corroborating H4a and H4b (the statistical correlation between market growth in 
patents and market growth in clients is approximately 0.9).  Finally, I conducted analyses using 
robust standard errors clustered by firm as opposed to Newey-West standards errors and, again, 
the results hold. Taken together, the confirmatory robustness tests provide confidence in the 
empirical findings and variable specifications used in the present study.  
 
Limitations 
This study does, however, suffer from several limitations.  The first limitation concerns 
the generalizability of results. While patent legal services are archetypal of knowledge-based 
services, and thus the theorizing and findings in this study are likely to be broadly applicable 
across other knowledge-based services contexts (e.g., accounting, management consulting) and 
possibly other types of knowledge-intensive industries (e.g., IT software consulting, healthcare), 
they may be less applicable to contexts in which physical assets are important drivers of value.  
For example, substantial sunk-cost investments in specialized tooling or manufacturing facilities 
may bring a different set of strategic concerns and incentives for managers of those firms 
compared to managers of firms whose strategic assets are human capital and client relationships.  
However, despite the potential limitations in generalizability, the context of patent legal services 
is an excellent laboratory for studies of relational strategies due to the detailed, project-level data 
available for outsourced patent work which enable the construction of fine-grained transaction 
histories and relational portfolios between suppliers and clients.  
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The second, related, limitation concerns the scope of observed client relationships.  This 
study is a single industry setting, i.e., patent legal services; however some firms in my sample 
may also offer legal services beyond this context and thus have greater opportunities to build 
relational assets with clients. Although data on the scope of legal services offered by my sample 
of law firms were not available, I was able to identify which of my sample firms were include in 
the annual National Law Journal (NLJ) rankings of the top 250 US corporate law firms (“NLJ 
250”), which are typically broad-based firms offering an array of legal services8. In additional 
analyses (see Appendix A), I created a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm was an NLJ 250 
firm and included this variable in re-running the main empirical models.  The coefficient on NLJ 
250 was positive and significant across all models at either the 5% or 10% level, and 
importantly, the coefficients on the hypotheses were consistent with the main findings of this 
study.   
Finally, it is possible that clients provide a greater share of outsourced demand to 
suppliers with a superior market reputation and therefore it is the suppliers’ reputation for quality 
rather level of relational commitments per se that drive supplier growth performance.  Firm 
reputation is unobservable in my dataset and may therefore constitute a source of endogeneity.  
However, concerns of supplier growth performance being driven by this unobserved factor are 
reduced through three factors.  First, the dummy variable NLJ 250 discussed above can also be 
interpreted as a control for firm quality and reputation.   Second, the control variables of domain 
expertise and occupational expertise are measures of superior industry (domain) or professional 
(occupational) capabilities.  As shown in Table 3, these control variables are not statistically 
                                                          
8
 Two firms in my sample, Fish & Neave and Fish & Richardson, are specialized intellectual property law firms and 
consistently featured in the NLJ 250.   
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significant. Furthermore, in unreported results, domain expertise and occupational expertise were 
interacted with both client-specific knowledge and relational (client) commitment, and again the 
coefficients were not statistically significant.  Third, superior quality firms should realize growth 
advantages in higher growth markets, even if their client relationships were characterized by 
deeper relational commitments.  Yet, as the results of H4a and H4b suggest, in these markets 
patent law firms suffer a growth penalty when they share deeper relational commitments with 
clients.  Therefore, while not being able to control specifically for firm reputation, I believe the 
reported results and additional analyses alleviate this data limitation. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Drawing from the relational view, in this study I investigated how relationship-specific 
investments (or relational commitments), impacted the growth performance of knowledge-based 
service suppliers.  The empirical setting for this study was patent legal services, and I utilized the 
detailed information contained within outsourced patents to construct fine-grained relational 
portfolios between patent law firms and their portfolio of clients.  In contrast to many studies in 
the relational view that are focused at the dyad-level, the current study adopted a firm-level 
perspective that accounted for all client relationships within a supplier’s portfolio.  Therefore, 
one contribution of this study is to the nascent literature which examines the firm-level outcomes 
of greater relational commitments in supplier-client relationships (e.g., Baker, 1990, Moeen et 
al., 2013).  Furthermore, by examining relationship-based drivers of supplier growth 
performance, which naturally considers the effects of information spillovers across repeated 
transactions between the same exchange partners, this study informs the growing body of 
research that examines the outcomes of repeated transactions within dyadic buyer-supplier 
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relationships (e.g., Kang et al., 2009).  Another theoretical contribution of this study is to connect 
the relational view with resource-based theory (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
For example, the logic of isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984) extoled by resource-based theory 
to hold firm-specific resources in place and protect firm performance advantages from being 
eroded by rival firms, can also be applied to the intangible and difficult to replicate co-
specialized inter-organizational resources and capabilities examined in this study. 
The theorizing in this study builds on the prior insight that suppliers are often favorably 
placed to capture new business from their existing clients, which in turn provides greater 
opportunities to build relational advantages (Chatain, 2011; Maister, 1993, Mayer et al., 2012; 
Moeen et al., 2013).  However, the present study is also informed by literature that uncovers a 
possible “dark side” to embedded inter-organizational relationships (e.g., Anderson & Jap, 2005; 
Lee, 2013; Poppo et al., 2008b; Uzzi, 1997).   This literature reveals the potential tradeoffs for 
firms who build embedded ties, such as increased partner switching costs (leading to persistence 
bias in relationships), and a greater risk of knowledge obsolescence.  Bringing these opposing 
perspectives together into a single theoretical framework, this study contributes to the relational 
view by providing a more nuanced investigation of the performance implications for suppliers 
who make greater relational commitments to their clients through implemented a relational 
strategy. 
The relational view emphasizes partner-specific knowledge as key driver of relationship 
value creation (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  However, while specialized knowledge investments may 
improve relationship productivity (e.g., Dyer 1997; Kotabe et al., 2003), the redeployment of 
specialized knowledge to alternative contexts is typically associated with a loss in productive 
value (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson 1985). Consequently, greater value creation from using 
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specialized knowledge for its intended purpose is likely to increase the persistence bias of 
existing exchange relationships.  The unexpected finding in this study that higher levels of client-
specific knowledge may constrain supplier growth performance (Hypothesis 1, see Figure 2.1) is 
an indication of the tradeoffs inherent in building relationship-specific resources and capabilities. 
Indeed, while the relational view proposes suppliers can achieve greater value from client-
specific knowledge investments, transaction cost economics (1985; 1996) maintains that 
unilateral relationship-specific investments without ex ante economic safeguards are hazardous 
due to asymmetric ex post bargaining power and the constraining attributes of specialized 
resources (Klein et al., 1978).  Although, Kang et al., (2009) found that far-sighted suppliers may 
be willing to make unilateral relationship-specific investments in order to gain longer term 
payoffs in terms of learning, capability development, and strategic positioning, their study is, 
nonetheless, at the dyad level.  When considered across a portfolio of relationships, the hazards 
and constraints associated with a portfolio of specialized resources may be greater than the 
potential relationship advantages extoled by the relational view. Thus, I extend literature in the 
relational view by highlighting an important firm-level consequence of making unilateral 
relationship-specific investments. 
Drawing from the theoretical premise that credible signals of relationship commitment 
from clients can lead to performance advantages for suppliers, I found empirical support for the 
prediction that supplier growth performance is higher when clients provide suppliers with a 
greater fraction of their outsourced work (Hypothesis 2).   While gaining a greater volume of 
new business from clients provides favorable conditions for relational assets to build, capturing a 
greater fraction of a clients’ new business indicates that the client is strongly committed to 
cooperative behavior and relationship longevity, which, in turn, provides incentives for a 
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supplier to make deeper relationship-specific investments.  This finding also suggests suppliers 
derive substantial value from existing clients when those relationships can be governed through 
more informal, and self-enforcing, mechanisms (Macneil, 1980; Poppo et al., 2008a; Telser, 
1980). Moreover, the control variable Outsourced Volume was not statistically significant 
indicating that simply gaining more outsourced work from clients is not sufficient to drive firm 
performance
9
. Thus, one important contribution of this finding is to the relational governance 
(and relational contracting) literature by showing that informal mechanisms of relationship 
governance not only provide advantages within the focal relationship, but aggregated across 
many clients, relational governance can also deliver positive firm-level performance outcomes.  
Although the findings in this study suggest that the direct effects of relational (client) 
commitment and client-specific knowledge have opposing impacts on supplier growth 
performance, these relational mechanisms may actually be concomitant and mutually reinforcing 
for value creation (Bercovitz et al., 2006; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Zajac & Olsen, 1993).  The 
finding in this study that mutual (or joint) relational commitment from suppliers and clients 
maximizes supplier growth performance (Hypothesis 3) corroborates this line of theorizing. 
Thus, I extend the relational view by empirically revealing the firm-level advantages that can be 
achieved when both exchange partners are jointly committed to the health of the relationship. 
The current study also investigated the impact of market conditions on supplier growth 
                                                          
9 
The distinction between volume of work and fraction of work is important to underscore.  Clients may choose to 
outsource a larger volume of more routine, less complex work to suppliers who can generate economies of scale 
(Krugman, 1980).  By performing greater quantities of similar work across many clients, supplier can pass on this 
discount by charging clients a lower fee for the services than it would cost clients to complete the work themselves. 
Thus, a client’s decision to outsource larger volumes of work to a supplier is akin to “make versus buy” logic of 
transaction cost economics, where not only is it less costly for a client to contract with an external firm to perform 
the requisite work (Williamson, 1975), but also clients may differentiate between suppliers based on price.   Here, 
relationship-specific resources and capabilities may develop as an organic process through information spillovers 
across repeated transactions, rather than through any deliberate or strategic relational commitments, which is 
indicated through shifting a greater share of outsourced work to a smaller number of suppliers (Moeen et al., 2013). 
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performance.  In higher growth markets, broader-based demand growth provides greater 
opportunities for suppliers to capture greater volumes of new business and, in turn, opportunities 
to grow their firm.  However, the ability of suppliers to exploit these markets by maintaining 
resource flexibility and building generalizable resources and capabilities arguably competes with 
strategies of suppliers for creating value from specific resource investments and stable client 
relationships.  Furthermore, prior literature reveals that when markets advance rapidly in their 
underlying knowledge requirements, clients, on average, prefer weaker ties with suppliers in 
order to maintain flexibility in sourcing new suppliers with requisite capabilities (Moeen et al., 
2013).  My findings support this theoretical premise by showing that when the markets within a 
supplier’s business portfolio grow more rapidly, greater client-specific knowledge investments 
by suppliers (Hypothesis 4a) and greater relational commitment from clients (Hypothesis 4b) 
significantly lowers supplier growth performance.  This result is in contrast to the positive and 
significant direct effect of market growth on supplier growth.  I therefore extend the relational 
view by revealing prevailing market conditions have important implications for the efficacy of 
relationship-specific investments for value creation.  
The empirical findings in this study offer a number of interesting future research 
opportunities.  First, by adopting a firm-level perspective of relational advantage and examining 
the performance hazards from relationship-specific investments, future research should further 
investigate the consequences of formulating and implementing relational strategies within inter-
organizational relationships.  For example, the assumption in this study is that suppliers may find 
their ability to capture new business constrained by the switching costs associated with 
redeploying specialized resources to other clients.  However, the willingness of suppliers to 
invest deeply in a client’s business may provide those suppliers an important avenue for market 
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differentiation, resulting in a greater ability to capture new clients who themselves are searching 
for suppliers who could perform the role of “strategic partner”.  Second, future research should 
look beyond the specific empirical context of supplier-client relationships in outsourced patent 
legal services.  Other types of knowledge-based services, such as accounting or management 
consulting, may rely less on relational advantages, or may be bound by industry regulations in 
terms of relationship longevity. Thus, future research may investigate the extent to which 
suppliers are willing to make relationship-specific investments when relationships have an 
enforced duration, and examine the implications for supplier outcomes from making specific 
investments under such conditions.  Third, the effect of relative standing differences between 
suppliers and clients is another opportunity for future research.  For example, are suppliers more 
likely to realize advantages or hazards by making relationship-specific investments with clients 
who have a higher or lower relative standing?  On the one hand, building strong ties with clients 
of superior standing may increase the reputation of the supplier and enable it to gain further high-
caliber clients. On the other hand, suppliers may find themselves at a power disadvantage with 
clients and thus become over-exposed to relational hazards, such as opportunism from dominant 
clients (Baker, 1990).  Untangling these effects would provide nuanced insight into the dynamics 
of supplier-client relationships.  Finally, this study used firm growth as a measure of 
performance.  An alternative approach could be to investigate the effect of relationship-specific 
investments on firm survival, which is also a viable performance measure. 
In conclusion, I believe that the research findings in the current study make important 
contributions to the strategic management field by highlighting that the strategies which deliver 
advantages at the level of dyad do not necessarily translate up to firm-level, and additionally, that 
market factors have an important bearing on the efficacy of relationship-specific investments for 
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value creation. I encourage researchers to use this study as a platform when investigating the 
antecedents and consequences of embedded inter-organizational relationships.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 2.1:  Summary statistics of key variables 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
Between 
S.D. 
Within 
S.D. 
Supplier Growth Performance 0.20 0.38 -2.08 1.77 0.33 0.19 
Client-Specific Knowledge  0.10 0.04 0.02 0.25 0.03 0.02 
Relational (client) Commitment 0.55 0.14 0.01 0.98 0.12 0.08 
Market Growth 0.22 0.11 -0.02 0.62 0.08 0.07 
Client Dynamism 0.40 0.90 -3.36 3.64 0.51 0.75 
Outsourced Percentage 0.71 0.15 0.04 1.00 0.13 0.08 
Outsourced Volume (to focal supplier) 68.95 146.35 0.95 1157.13 141.83 36.06 
Supplier Size  26.13 27.30 1.00 189.00 26.93 5.31 
Turnover 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.86 0.06 0.05 
Supplier Scope 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.24 0.03 0.02 
Domain Expertise 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.63 0.08 0.02 
Occupational Expertise 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 
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Table 2.2: Correlations between variables 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Supplier Growth Performance 
1 
           
2 Client-Specific Knowledge  
0.00 1 
          
3 Relational (client) Commitment 
0.10 0.17 1 
         
4 Market Growth 
0.22 -0.05 0.02 1 
        
5 Client Dynamism 
0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.25 1 
       
6 Outsourced Percentage 
0.07 0.15 0.29 0.06 0.06 1 
      
7 Outsourced Volume (to focal supplier) 
0.03 0.32 0.19 0.31 0.00 0.16 1 
     
8 Supplier Size  
0.35 0.13 0.02 0.26 -0.06 -0.12 0.17 1 
    
9 Turnover 
-0.04 0.02 -0.15 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 1 
   
10 Supplier Scope 
-0.01 0.00 0.14 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.30 -0.11 -0.06 1 
  
11 Domain Expertise 
0.16 0.07 -0.01 0.26 0.00 -0.10 -0.04 0.22 0.03 0.28 1 
 
12 Occupational Expertise 
0.20 -0.18 -0.01 0.32 0.19 -0.04 -0.16 0.19 0.01 0.11 0.14 1 
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Table 2.3: Determinants of supplier growth performance (logged) over five years 
 
Logged Variables   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Client-Specific Knowledge  H1 
 
-0.0806 
 
-1.786** 0.0920 
 
-1.484** 
   (0.0582) 
 
(0.732) (0.0967) 
 
(0.703) 
Relational (client) Commitment H2 
  
0.268*** -0.731* 
 
0.775*** -0.159 
  
 
 
(0.0887) (0.398) 
 
(0.198) (0.400) 
Client-Specific Knowledge 
*Relational (client) Commitment 
(Mutual Commitment) 
H3 
   
0.423** 
  
0.380** 
  
 
  
(0.174) 
  
(0.164) 
Market Growth * Client-Specific 
Knowledge 
H4a 
    
-1.161** 
 
-0.874* 
   
   
(0.554) 
 
(0.511) 
Market Growth * Relational  (client) 
Commitment 
H4b 
     
-3.093*** -2.879*** 
              (0.991) (0.948) 
Market Growth 
 
0.848* 0.722 0.919* 0.794* 3.379** 13.46*** 14.47*** 
 
 
(0.489) (0.456) (0.475) (0.448) (1.350) (4.151) (4.119) 
Client Dynamism 
 
-0.00567 -0.00566 -0.00574 -0.00480 -0.00596 -0.00534 -0.00475 
  
(0.00430) (0.00431) (0.00419) (0.00411) (0.00428) (0.00402) (0.00394) 
Outsourced Percentage 
 
2.761* 2.884* 1.939 1.980 2.830* 1.914 1.921 
  
(1.480) (1.481) (1.367) (1.287) (1.476) (1.274) (1.201) 
Outsourced Volume (to focal 
supplier)  
-0.00890 
0.00395 -0.0187 -0.00403 0.00730 -0.0219 -0.00493 
  
(0.0241) (0.0256) (0.0242) (0.0254) (0.0252) (0.0235) (0.0247) 
Supplier Size  
 
0.0461 0.0489 0.0471 0.0541 0.0519 0.0513 0.0598* 
  
(0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0350) (0.0347) (0.0359) (0.0346) (0.0345) 
Turnover 
 
0.0225 0.0221 0.0290 0.0265 0.0193 0.0307 0.0262 
  
(0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0234) (0.0231) (0.0237) (0.0231) (0.0228) 
Supplier Scope 
 -0.0328 -0.0348 -0.0496 -0.0531 -0.0452 -0.0482 -0.0595 
 
 
(0.0426) (0.0421) (0.0429) (0.0395) (0.0415) (0.0413) (0.0378) 
Domain Expertise 
 
0.0393 0.0431 0.0529 0.0573 0.0474 0.0489 0.0568 
 
 
(0.0422) (0.0415) (0.0393) (0.0385) (0.0415) (0.0383) (0.0381) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.0658 0.0702 0.0356 0.0481 0.0718 0.0422 0.0545 
  
(0.0885) (0.0865) (0.0867) (0.0834) (0.0863) (0.0791) (0.0769) 
Constant 
 
-2.779* -2.727* -3.025** 1.110 -3.074** -5.068*** -1.461 
  
(1.433) (1.395) (1.390) (1.751) (1.429) (1.619) (1.925) 
         Year Dummies 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-Squared 
 
0.099 0.105 0.127 0.146 0.112 0.149 0.171 
Number of Suppliers   126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Observations  750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares model with Newey-West standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2.1:  Mutual Commitment: Interaction effect of client-specific knowledge and 
relational (client) commitment on supplier growth performance 
  
Note: High and low values are one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. 
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Figure 2.2:  Interaction effect of market growth and client-specific knowledge on supplier 
growth performance 
 
 
 
Note: High and low values are one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.3:  Interaction effect of market growth and relational (client) commitment on 
supplier growth performance 
 
 
Note: High and low values are one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RELATIONAL ADVANTAGE AND PARTNER-DRIVEN CORPORATE SCOPE: THE 
CASE FOR CLIENT-LED DIVERSIFICATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The relational view (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale, et al., 2000) has its foundations in 
the value that can be created when exchange partners jointly make investments in building 
relationship-specific resources, capabilities and dispute resolution mechanisms, which 
collectively represent the partners’ shared relational capital (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Madhok & 
Tallman, 1998; Williamson, 1985; Zajac & Olsen, 1993).  Investments in relational capital – 
such as dedicated assets, inter-firm routines, and relational governance mechanisms – can 
enhance the productivity of exchange relationships while also managing the risks of 
opportunistic behavior between exchange partners (Asanuma, 1989; Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Kale et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997; Williamson, 1985; Zaheer, et al., 1998; Zollo, Reuer, & 
Singh, 2002).  Not surprisingly, relational capital has been shown to have significant advantages 
in managing buyer-supplier relationships, resulting in improved transactional performance, 
longevity of relationships, and ability to capture new business (e.g., Baker, et al., 1998; Chatain, 
2011; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Hoetker, 2005). 
While the relational view has developed considerable insights into the advantages of 
relational capital for inter-firm coordination and exchange performance, the implications of 
relational advantage for corporate scope – specifically the horizontal scope of partner firms – 
remain largely unexplored.  However, the opportunities for investigating this question are 
palpable, both in prior research and managerial practice.  For example, research studies reveal 
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that buyers often prefer to select an existing supplier when they have a new outsourced need 
(Chatain, 2011; Mayer et al., 2012), which can potentially draw suppliers into new lines of 
outsourced business.  Additionally, research suggests that the buyer’s choice of supplier for an 
individual product may be influenced by the opportunity to buy multiple products from the same 
supplier, especially when inter-dependencies or complementarities exist between those 
outsourced needs (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Moeen et al., 2013; Novak & Stern, 2009; 
Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009) or when buyers can economize on the transaction costs of 
managing many suppliers (Klemperer, 1992).  A broader horizontal scope may also enable firms 
to build stronger, multiplex ties with buyers by cross-selling multiple products or services to 
them (Rogan, 2014a; Siggelkow, 2003).  Anecdotally, managers in supplier firms also report 
pressures from existing buyers to diversify in order to meet the increasingly diverse needs of the 
buyers.  For example, in October 2002, when intellectual property law firm Lee, Mann, Smith, 
McWilliams, Sweeney & Ohlson (Lee Mann) diversified by merging with the full service law 
firm Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Dennis M. McWilliams, a key partner in Lee Mann, noted that 
his firm had “been successful as an intellectual property firm, but we are finding with greater 
frequency that our clients are requiring a broader range of legal services than we can provide.”10 
While it has long been recognized that diversification derives from unique non-
contractible resources of the firm (e.g., Farjoun, 1994; Miller, 2004; Montgomery & Hariharan, 
1991; Robins & Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999; Teece, 1980; 1982), recent scholarship has 
highlighted the need for these resources to be scalable (Levinthal & Wu, 2010) or redeployable 
(Sakhartov & Folta, 2014) in order to support diversification.  Many relational assets exhibit 
some degree of scalability (e.g., bilateral trust and reputation) or redeployability (e.g. partner-
specific knowledge built during prior projects), and they can therefore be a viable foundation for 
                                                          
10
 See: http://www.insideindianabusiness.com/newsitem.asp?id=2964 (accessed 07/22/2014). 
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firm diversification.  However, relational assets are uniquely constrained in the uses to which 
they are fungible or synergistic (Levinthal & Wu, 2010; Sakhartov & Folta, 2014) – specifically, 
they only have value in business activity with a specific partner, and thus their ability to support 
diversification is partner-specific.  Therefore, a theory of corporate scope based on relational 
advantage must ultimately be built on a partner-driven rationale. 
Drawing on prior research that suggests that buyer-supplier relationships can become 
self-perpetuating due to information impactedness, relational experience and ex post small 
numbers relationships (Chatain, 2011; Mayer et al., 2012; Williamson, 1975; 1985), I develop 
and test a relational theory of changes in the horizontal scope of supplier firms that is driven by 
the changing scope of their buyers (i.e., clients
11), which I label “client-led diversification.”  
Building on this baseline prediction, I develop hypotheses positing that this client-led 
diversification effect is stronger when a supplier has invested in greater levels of client-specific 
knowledge, and when clients provide higher levels of relational commitment with the supplier.  
Both partner-specific knowledge investments and credible relational commitment are forms of 
relational capital, which may be viewed as (partially) scalable and redeployable resource inputs 
that generate scope economies across a range of services provided to the same client (Chatain, 
2011; Chatain & Zemsky, 2007).  Finally, I examine two additional conditions which may 
stimulate client-led diversification.  First, the markets of clients may offer greater opportunities 
for growth and profitability than a supplier’s current markets, thus providing incentives for 
suppliers to respond to client diversification. Second, the ability of suppliers to generate excess 
resources can deliver cost and resource-based advantages if applied to diversification 
(Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982).  
                                                          
11
 “Buyers” and “Clients” are used interchangeably throughout this study. 
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 I test my propositions in the context of outsourced knowledge-based services, which are 
generally difficult to explicitly contract for and may therefore rely to a significant degree on 
relationship-specific investments and relational capital (Mayer & Nickerson, 2005; Moeen et al., 
2013; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  Because these types of services – and knowledge-impacted 
outsourcing in general – are growing rapidly and representing an increasing share of the 
economy, I expect my relational theory of firm diversification and empirical work to have 
significant value for future research.  My empirical tests are conducted on a longitudinal sample 
of patent law firms and the scope of patent prosecution services they provide (measured across 
diverse industry domains) for their corporate clients.  Due to the detailed project-level data 
available in this setting on outsourcing, relational assets, and firm diversification, it provides a 
useful real world laboratory in which to test my predictions. 
My research seeks to make a number of contributions to strategic management 
scholarship by bridging the research literatures on cooperative strategy and corporate strategy, 
and moreover, connecting corporate-level strategy with business-level strategy.  First, I 
contribute to the cooperative strategy literature by building on the well-understood implications 
of the relational view for dyadic relationship performance (e.g., Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Chu, 2003; 
Kotabe et al., 2003, Krishnan et al., 2006; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Zaheer et al., 1998), and 
extend these insights to develop and test a theory about how relational capital impacts firm-level 
corporate scope.  Second, I advance the corporate strategy literature by highlighting a hitherto 
unexplored rationale for diversification.  One of the dominant perspectives in the corporate 
diversification literature is that firms diversify to capture production-related synergies from 
sharing scalable resources across lines of business or from redeploying under-utilized resources 
from one business line to another (e.g., Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Levinthal & Wu, 2010; 
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Penrose, 1959; Sakhartov & Folta, 2014; Teece, 1982).  I offer the perspective that – by a similar 
logic – relational capital is a (buyer and supplier) firm-specific resource that may also be 
leveraged into new lines of business and lead to diversification; however, because this resource 
is also partner-specific, the supplier’s diversification is in turn related to client diversification.  
Finally, by exploring the limits of client-led diversification outcomes, I also contribute to the 
emerging literatures on demand-side strategy (e.g., Adner & Zemsky, 2006), and value creation 
in buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., Chatain, 2011; Chatain & Zemsky, 2007).  
 
THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical foundations of the relational view are grounded in the premise that a 
firm’s critical resources may be substantially embedded within inter-organizational relationships 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998).  Relationship-specific resources and relational governance can improve 
exchange performance and increase the likelihood of future transactions between those exchange 
partners (Baker, 1990; Baker et al., 1998; Chatain, 2011; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Hoetker, 
2005; Mayer et al., 2012; Moeen et al., 2013).  While transaction cost economics argues that 
specific investments may increase the risk of partner opportunism and costs of contracting over 
exchanges (Williamson, 1985), the relational view maintains that these investments are 
important for realizing relational value (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Zajac & Olsen, 1993) and that the 
attendant risks and costs can be mitigated through relational governance (Dyer, 1997; Kale et al., 
2000; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Williamson, 1979; Zaheer et al., 1998).  
Critically, relational governance reduces exchange hazards through embedded norms of trust and 
cooperation, which enable contractual adaptation and management of partner conflict (Gulati, 
1995; Macneil, 1980; Uzzi, 1997; Vanneste & Frank, 2013; Vanneste, et al., 2014); while the 
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longer-term perspective on value creation incentivizes the further development of these 
governance mechanisms and increases relational commitment (Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Chu, 2003).   
The ability to draw on relational advantages may be especially relevant when the needs of 
clients change.  To service clients’ new needs, suppliers can leverage shared relational assets and 
relational governance, and draw on internal stocks of relationship-specific capabilities such as 
detailed knowledge of the client’s business and client-specific routines.  Supplier advantages in 
acquiring new business from existing clients are enhanced in the context of knowledge-intensive 
outsourcing, as in the case of knowledge-based services (e.g., law firms, accounting firms, and 
management consultancies).  These types of transactions are strongly impacted by multiple 
sources of market frictions such as demand uncertainty, weak performance measurement, 
information asymmetry, and appropriation hazards (Mayer & Nickerson, 2005; Mayer & 
Salomon, 2006; Moeen et al., 2013).  In such contexts, working with existing suppliers may give 
client firms a modicum of control over the risks and hazards presented by outsourcing.  
Therefore, the new outsourcing needs of a client become valuable opportunities for its existing 
suppliers as they typically enjoy a significant advantage in capturing this business (Chatain, 
2011; Chatain & Zemsky, 2011; Coates et al., 2011).  
 
Client Diversification 
I begin my theorizing by noting the important role that a supplier’s existing clients may 
play in inducing the supplier to diversify.  Transaction cost economics suggests that prior 
outsourcing often engenders a “fundamental transformation” by which the buyer and supplier are 
cast into a small numbers relationship, which fosters continued transactions between them 
(Williamson, 1975; 1985).  For example, prior outsourcing typically leads to partner-specific 
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information exchange that has value for future transactions, leading to an “information 
impacted” relationship (Williamson, 1975).  The ability to draw on knowledge about an existing 
client’s idiosyncratic technologies, priorities, and strategic interdependencies can reduce 
information asymmetries and learning costs that may otherwise be incurred when undertaking a 
knowledge-based project for a new client (Chatain & Zemsky, 2007; Ethiraj et al., 2005).  The 
relational view suggests that the client also gains from learning about supplier capabilities, 
organization and behavioral patterns, which can be leveraged into future transactions with the 
supplier.   
Moreover, even ordinary market frictions such as learning about new business 
opportunities, screening alternatives, and communication costs are reduced when working with 
existing clients (relative to other potential clients) to develop new business.  The relational view 
also emphasizes the importance of exchange managers in creating and sustaining inter-firm 
relationships (Carnahan & Somaya, 2013; Kale et al., 2000), and exchange managers’ relational 
capabilities can play a valuable role in helping suppliers find and manage new business with 
existing clients (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1985; Mayer & Argyres, 2004).  Thus, consistent with 
extant diversification theory, which suggests that firms can gain economic synergies by sharing 
complementary resources across multiple lines of business (Panzar & Wilig, 1981; Sakhartov & 
Folta, 2014; Teece, 1982), suppliers can benefit from previously developed relationship-specific 
advantages by “cross-selling” a variety of outsourced work to clients (Chatain, 2011; Chatain & 
Zemsky, 2007).   
Not surprisingly, knowledge-based service firms are often advised to leverage existing 
client relationships instead of sourcing new clients, as the latter can involve significant client 
development and mutual learning costs (Maister, 1993; Wilkins, 2009).  Prior studies have also 
 62 
 
shown that clients prefer to use an existing supplier when outsourcing work in a new area (e.g., 
Chatain, 2011).  Moreover, if suppliers don’t respond to the new needs of existing clients, rival 
suppliers may have an opportunity to poach those clients over the long run (Bower, 2014) by 
establishing a new relationship and/or increasing their added value with the client 
(Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996; Chatain, 2011; Seabright et al., 1992).  Therefore, new business 
opportunities materializing from changes in the scope of existing clients’ outsourced work can be 
an important demand-pull factor that leads suppliers to change their own business scope.  Thus, 
the diversification of clients’ outsourced work across a supplier’s portfolio of clients can provide 
a significant impetus for changes in supplier scope.  Accordingly, I propose the following: 
H1. Greater diversification in the outsourcing needs of a supplier’s existing clients will 
be associated with greater supplier diversification. 
 
Client-Specific Knowledge 
Idiosyncratic, partner-specific knowledge is proposed in the relational view as a critical 
component of joint value creation (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  For a supplier, detailed knowledge 
about a client’s business creates efficiencies in learning and problem solving (Zollo, et al., 2002), 
and enables the supplier to effectively identify client needs, coordinate interdependencies across 
projects and more precisely customize services for the client (Chatain, 2011; Chatain & Zemsky, 
2007; Ethiraj et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2009).  For example, within the empirical context of this 
study (legal services), commentators have frequently noted how law firms establish dedicated 
client teams that develop and use deep knowledge about the client’s business (Wilkins, 2009), 
which is often cited by clients as fundamental to a successful relationship.
12
 
                                                          
12
 The following comments from corporate counsels, who hire law firms for their companies, emphasize the point: 
“Understand the business. This can't be overstated. …the best [attorneys] do it thoroughly to come up with results 
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When clients derive strategic value from suppliers holding client-specific knowledge, the 
potential pool of suitable suppliers available to clients may be greatly reduced (Chatain, 2011; 
Rosen, 2002).  Lacking the client-specific knowledge that is often gained from prior outsourced 
work undertaken for that client, new suppliers face more limited opportunities to understand the 
client’s business or to develop relationships with its outsourcing managers.  Effectively, rivalry 
for the client’s new business reduces to small numbers competition (Chatain & Zemsky, 2011; 
Moeen, et al., 2013; Williamson, 1985) and the resulting shift in competitive forces favors 
suppliers who have client-specific knowledge (Chatain, 2011).  Prior empirical research has also 
established that when suppliers hold greater levels of client-specific knowledge, exchange 
relationships with those clients are more likely to be expanded and persist (Chatain, 2011; 
Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Mayer et al., 2012; Moeen et al., 2013).   
The persistence of client-supplier relationships is not only due to the potential for 
creating higher value from client-specific knowledge.  Suppliers are also inherently limited in 
their ability to apply specific knowledge relating to one client to other clients’ outsourced work 
(Williamson, 1985).  By definition, relationship-specific resources cannot be redeployed outside 
the focal relationship without incurring a significant loss in the productive value of such 
resources (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Klein et al., 1978; Subramani & Venkatraman, 2003; 
Williamson, 1985).  Once these specific knowledge investments are made, the ex-ante large 
numbers competitive market is “fundamentally transformed” into an ex-post bilateral monopoly 
(Williamson, 1985) and relationships may persist due to the supplier switching costs associated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
oriented and cost effective solutions that are consistent with core values of the company. And doing that is a key to a 
successful, long-term relationship with me.” “Take time to truly learn the client's business so you understand what 
their needs are … [and] think strategically.”  
http://www.wickerparkgroup.com/ClientBestPractices/ClientBestPractices.aspx (accessed May 21, 2014). 
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with developing similar specific knowledge with other clients.  Moreover, uncertainty about the 
potential value that may be generated in alternative client relationships may produce a 
persistence bias (Lazzarini et al., 2008), which is likely to be higher when suppliers hold higher 
client-specific knowledge. 
Resource-based explanations for corporate scope maintain that diversification stems from 
scalable or slack firm-specific resources with alternative uses that cannot otherwise be accessed 
through the market (Levinthal & Wu, 2010; Panzar & Willig, 1981; Penrose, 1959; Sakhartov & 
Folta, 2014; Teece, 1982).  In knowledge-intensive industries, diversification is more likely to be 
driven by firms’ human capital resources, which can be redeployed (or scaled) into related areas 
where these resources are also valuable (Farjoun, 1994).  However, when the knowledge 
resources held by the firm’s human capital is client-specific, diversification that is enabled by 
these resources will also be client-specific and is therefore likely to be driven by diversification 
in clients’ outsourced needs.  In particular, if clients diversify into areas that are new to the 
supplier, the supplier may diversify into these areas to leverage the client-specific knowledge 
resources held by its human capital. 
In sum, suppliers have an advantage in capturing new business from their existing clients, 
and in adding value to this work, when they hold client-specific knowledge (Chatain, 2011; 
Mayer et al., 2012; Moeen et al., 2013).  Even if the new business is in areas outside the current 
business scope of the supplier, it represents a significant opportunity to grow revenues and add 
value to clients, which is ultimately beneficial for the supplier’s long run performance.  
Moreover, the limited redeployability of client-specific knowledge investments means that the 
supplier may be less able to add value to other clients or to find other opportunities to generate 
business.  Finally, the supplier’s willingness to respond to client needs in new areas and make 
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further relationship-specific investments may be seen as a credible signal of commitment to the 
relationship (Schelling, 1960; Spence, 1973), which may help to reduce the likelihood of client 
loss and thus safeguard prior client-specific knowledge investments.  Accordingly, when a 
supplier’s clients undertake diversification, I posit that the supplier will be more likely to 
respond by also increasing its own diversification when it holds higher (as opposed to lower) 
levels of client-specific knowledge.  Therefore, I propose: 
H2. The greater the level of client-specific knowledge held by a supplier (developed 
through prior work for clients), the stronger the effect of clients’ diversification on 
diversification by that supplier. 
 
Relational (client) Commitment 
While the prior discussion explains how client-specific knowledge may provide suppliers 
with a relative advantage in taking on new business from that client, suppliers may also 
experience such an advantage if clients are more strongly committed in their relationships with 
them.  Prior research suggests that a client can provide a credible signal of such commitment 
(Schelling, 1960; Spence, 1973) by allocating a greater share of its outsourced work to the 
supplier, which is in turn characteristic of more relational (as opposed to transactional) client-
supplier relationships (Baker, 1990; Moeen, et al., 2013).  By placing a greater reliance on the 
supplier for its outsourced needs, which makes it more difficult to switch its business to other 
suppliers, the client conveys positive expectations of relationship continuity to the supplier 
(Poppo et al., 2008).  Client commitments of this nature may lead to higher levels of trust 
between the partners (Gulati, 1995; Kale et al., 2000) and additional relationship-specific 
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investments (Bercovitz, et al., 2006; Dyer, 1997; Williamson, 1983), as well as more elaborate 
informal relational governance (Macneil, 1980).  
The mutual benefits realized when clients provide suppliers with greater relational 
commitment have often been noted by practicing managers.  Consider, for example, the 
following quote from a legal executive at DuPont, which significantly concentrated its legal 
outsourcing to fewer external legal suppliers in order to establish more partnership-like 
relationships with them: 
“[Law] firms felt a greater commitment to DuPont when they were entrusted with our entire 
IP [intellectual property] business in their country or region.  In many, the senior leadership 
on their own initiative undertook a study of DuPont's business and demonstrated an 
eagerness to adapt their practices to meet our needs. […] Our work now received much 
needed management attention and closer professional focus.” (Dull & Gould, 2002).   
A similar strategy from Tyco International, which concentrated its legal work into a single law 
firm, Eversheds LLP, led legal industry commentators to note:  
“The two-way partnership ties the firm to the client but, just as crucially, ties the client to 
the firm. Through the first 18 months of the deal, Eversheds has built up detailed inside 
knowledge of Tyco and the specific risks it faces.  Changing outside counsel now would 
mean that Tyco has to go through the arduous process of educating a new firm.  Breaking up 
has suddenly become a lot harder to do” (Neil, 2008, emphasis added).   
Tyco’s experience highlights two distinct – albeit related – reasons why suppliers who 
receive strong relational commitment from their clients may feel compelled to undertake client-
led diversification.  First, because the client is more closely tied to a focal supplier, the supplier’s 
investments in servicing new client needs may be both warranted and better safeguarded.  In 
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other words, being responsive to client requirements is a quid pro quo for client relational 
commitment, and the expectation of continued business (credibly signaled by client 
commitment) is a guarantor of the investments incurred in being responsive.  Thus, in a repeated 
game between supplier and client, the future value of the relationship (shadow of the future) to 
which the client has already made a relational commitment (shadow of the past) may induce the 
supplier to conform to expectations of being responsive to client needs even in new areas (Poppo 
et al., 2008).  In other words, these mutual client and supplier commitments may be self-
enforcing (Telser, 1980; Williamson, 1983). 
Second, greater relational commitment from a client implies that the focal supplier has 
the best opportunity (relative to other suppliers) to learn about the client, and exploit 
complementarities in its outsourced work.  Transactional spillovers and resource 
interdependence between projects means that outsourcing can often lose its discrete attributes 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Macneil, 1980), which is a common feature of knowledge-based 
outsourced work (Moeen et al., 2013; Novak & Stern, 2009).  In turn, the supplier with the 
greatest opportunity to undertake client work is most likely to develop the requisite knowledge 
that can be recombined and reused in related future work (Argyres & Zenger, 2012; Ethiraj et al., 
2005; Mayer et al., 2012; Nonaka, 1994).  Moreover, greater levels of inter-organizational 
knowledge transfer and the existence of complex inter-relationships and dependencies between 
projects may expedite the development of shared routines and a common language between the 
client and supplier (Mitchell & Singh, 1996; Zollo & Winter, 2002), which can in turn be a 
significant advantage for undertaking future outsourced work. 
In summary, when relational client commitment is high (as signaled by giving the 
supplier a larger share of its business) the opportunity to leverage relational advantages into new 
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areas of business, along with the safeguards of relational governance and client commitment for 
such expansion, incentivizes suppliers to respond to client diversification by diversifying the 
scope of their own business in parallel.  Aggregated over the supplier’s entire portfolio of clients, 
this rationale suggests the following hypothesis: 
H3. The greater the level of relational commitment provided by clients in a supplier’s 
portfolio, the stronger the effect of client diversification on diversification by that 
supplier. 
 
Client Market Opportunity 
The impact of client-specific knowledge and relational commitment on client-led 
diversification (discussed above) highlights the role of opportunities made available by relational 
advantages when a supplier’s clients choose to diversify their outsourced work.  However, it is 
important to ask what other conditions exist that may incentivize suppliers to grow their business 
and create value through client-led diversification, or alternatively, may compete with the 
opportunities stemming from existing clients.  Put differently, what is the supplier’s opportunity 
cost of diversifying in response to its clients’ diversification?  This question is important because 
it is well known that diversification is costly for firms in terms of the organizational costs of 
increased coordination, distributed managerial attention and dilution of focused, knowledge-
based capabilities (Grant, Jammine, & Thomas, 1988; Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Montgomery & 
Wernerfelt, 1988; Ocasio, 1997; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989).   
Compared to firms in capital intensive industries (e.g., manufacturing), knowledge-based 
service firms have advantages in mobilizing resources according to market conditions.  For 
example, in rapidly growing markets, firms can reuse scalable resources, at least up to their 
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productive capacity (Levinthal & Wu, 2010), and can often redeploy excess resources into what 
are likely to be among their highest valued uses (Sakhartov & Folta, 2014).  Additionally, price 
competition between firms is also likely to be lower in fast growing markets, resulting in higher 
price-cost margins for firms (Porter, 1980).   Fast growing markets thus hold the potential to 
provide firms with significant opportunities for business growth and profitability.  Indeed, prior 
research in legal services finds that greater demand in particular markets leads firms to deepen 
their capabilities in those markets in order to capture a greater share of new business (Garicano 
& Hubbard 2007).  By the same logic, if more valuable opportunities existing in alternative 
markets, then firms may expand their business scope to take advantage of those opportunities 
(Sakhartov & Folta, 2014). 
I maintain that higher growth in the markets of clients represents an attractive opportunity 
for suppliers to tap into and capture greater volumes of outsourced work.  To be specific, market 
growth may represent a significant demand-pull for suppliers when the markets in which clients 
operate (i.e., the client’s entire outsourced business portfolio) are growing at a greater pace than 
the existing markets served by suppliers.  Moreover, suppliers can reduce the risks associated 
with diversification by using their existing clients as a platform to gain a market foothold.  
Alternatively, if clients diversify into markets that do not provide superior business opportunities 
than the suppliers’ current markets, then supplier incentives to under-take client-led 
diversification are lower. 
In sum, when the markets of a supplier’s clients are growing at a faster pace relative to 
that supplier’s existing markets, alternative options for creating value through diversifying into 
those markets are presented to suppliers.  However, when suppliers operate in relatively faster 
growing markets than their clients do, they already enjoy significant opportunities to grow their 
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business profitably and thus have little incentive to diversify.  Therefore, I present the following 
hypothesis; 
H4. The higher the growth in the markets of (a supplier’s) clients relative to growth in 
the markets of a supplier (“client market opportunity”), the stronger the effect of client 
diversification on diversification by that supplier. 
 
Supplier Excess Capacity 
The availability of organizational resources is an important criterion for the successful 
implementation of firm strategies.  While firms may acquire requisite resources through strategic 
factor markets, forming strategic alliances, or undertaking merger and acquisition, they may also 
generate surplus internal resources in the form of excess capacity.  
Although excess resource capacity may be generated through the failure to achieve 
aspirational performance goals (i.e., productive resources are under-utilized), firms also generate 
excess resource capacity through increasing task efficiency (Penrose, 1959) and routinizing 
organizational knowledge (Winter & Szulanski, 2002), which can then be applied to alternative 
strategies for increasing profitability and growing the firm (Mahoney, 1995; Penrose, 1959).   
The relationship between excess firm resources and firm diversification has a long 
tradition in the resource-based management literature (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982).  
Although one strategic option for firms is to divest or contract out excess capacity through the 
market, the resource-based approach maintains that it may be more economically efficient for 
firms to redeploy those resources by entering new lines of business (Levy & Haber, 1986; Teece, 
1982).  More specifically, diversification is likely to be preferred over divestment or contracting 
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out when the transaction costs of using market mechanisms to reduce excess capacity are greater 
than the costs of internal redeployment (Teece, 1982). 
For a number of reasons, the contracting out or divesting of excess resource capacity may 
not be a viable option for knowledge-based service suppliers.  First, a supplier’s critical 
resources are the human capital of its professional workforce.  The trading of knowledge (i.e., 
contracting out), especially tacit knowledge, is fraught with impediments is generally considered 
difficult and costly to transfer (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Simonin, 1999; Szulanski, 1996), in 
addition to the transaction costs of negotiation, writing contracts, and appropriate governance 
mechanisms that safeguard proprietary knowledge.  These costs and knowledge transfer 
difficulties are all but eliminated with internal resource transfer -- i.e., diversification.  Second, 
contracting out employees to rival suppliers is likely to be strategically unattractive due to 
concerns of losing those employees on a permanent basis, and potentially clients who could 
switch their business.  More fundamentally, however, the contracting out of excess resource 
capacity could lead to significant conflicts of interest in terms of clients, who often select their 
outsourced suppliers with at least some degree of consideration of the other clients a supplier 
serves (Maister, 1993; Coates et al., 2011). 
Prior research findings support the notion that suppliers often prefer to use internal, rather 
than external, markets to redeploy excess resources.  For example, Mishina and colleagues note 
firms apply excess capacity “…to new markets’ and ‘grow[th] by expanding our customer base 
and increasing our sales to existing customers’” (2004: 1187), while excess resources generated 
though client interaction have been found to lead to suppliers intensifying their future 
interactions with those clients (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008). Finally, practitioner evidence 
suggests that suppliers with excess capacity often prefer to intensify their search for new 
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business opportunities rather than releasing knowledge workers into the labor markets (Manch & 
Shannon, 2006; Olmstead, 2013). 
 Taken together, suppliers who build excess resources capacity in the process of 
efficiently serving clients are likely to have incentives to exploit those knowledge resources 
through internal redeployment – i.e., diversification.  Because a significant proportion of supplier 
excess resources involve knowledge and routines that are more applicable to their existing clients 
(and these clients are a likely source of future new business), I suggest that when suppliers hold 
higher levels of excess resource capacity, diversification moves by their existing clients provide 
a demand opportunity, and therefore, incentives, for suppliers to redeploy those resources 
towards their own diversification strategies.  I therefore provide the following hypothesis; 
H5. The greater the excess resource capacity of a supplier, the stronger the effect of client 
diversification on diversification by that supplier. 
 
SAMPLE AND METHODS 
I tested my hypotheses using detailed longitudinal (1990-2000) data on a focal sample 
U.S. patent law firms (suppliers) and their corporate clients.  I identified my patent law firm 
sample using the official roster of registered patent attorneys published by the Office of 
Enrollment and Discipline (OED) of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  As a 
requirement to practice patent law, patent attorneys must be admitted to and registered with the 
U.S. patent bar, after which they are listed on the patent attorney roster.  My sample consists of 
patent law firms that employed at least ten patent attorneys in 1990 (to avoid survivor bias), at 
which time most of these law firms were specialized in patent (or intellectual property) law.  
Following prior research, I chose this cut-off to ensure that (i) suppliers in my sample undertook 
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sufficient volumes of patent legal work to build relational assets with innovative clients (Somaya 
et al., 2008)
13
, and (ii) suppliers held sufficient resources to be meaningfully diversified 
(Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991). I initially identified 101 U.S. patent law firms, and 
subsequently dropped two firms with missing patent data and two firms that failed in the second 
year of our observation period, yielding a final sample of 97 firms. 
I sought to examine the relationship between client and supplier diversification in patent 
prosecution work, which entails tasks related to the legal and administrative processes of writing 
and filing patent applications, and interacting with the USPTO until the patents are issued.  To 
identify patents outsourced to my sample of patent law firms (suppliers), I obtained records of all 
utility patents filed (and subsequently granted) by the USPTO in the period 1986-2000.  The 
prosecution work for each patent is a narrowly defined project that, if outsourced, represents an 
individual outsourcing transaction between a client and a supplier.  I identified patents 
outsourced to my sample of suppliers by searching for each supplier’s name in the “Attorney or 
Agent” field of the patent, and then manually cross-checking the returned firms to ensure 
accuracy and to rule out false positives in the search results.
14
  Each patent record thus obtained 
uniquely identifies the law firm who prosecuted the patent, the client applying for the patent, and 
the technology classification of the invention.  Using these detailed data from the patent records, 
I constructed year-by-year patent portfolios for each supplier.  Including additional years for 
variable construction (1986-1990), I identified approximately 315,000 unique patents outsourced 
to my sample of suppliers by almost 39,000 clients.   
                                                          
13
 Somaya, Williamson, & Lorinkova (2008) found that patent law firms employing less than ten patent attorneys, 
on average, worked on less than one patent a year for their entire set of innovative Fortune 500 client firms (129 
firms). 
14
 For example, law firm Baker & Daniels was searched as “Baker & Daniels”, “Baker Daniels”, “Baker and 
Daniels” and “Baker”). If the search also returned patents with (say) “Marshall T. Baker” as the patent attorney 
(rather than the firm Baker & Daniels), these patents were dropped. 
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Dependent Variable.   
Supplier Diversification:  The dependent variable in this study measures the supplier’s 
business scope, which in this case is the scope of patent legal services across different 
technological domains.  Patent prosecution work requires both legal and technological expertise, 
and patent lawyers are required to have a technical background (typically at least a bachelors’ 
degree), which enables them to understand inventions and to write and prosecute patent 
applications effectively.  Thus, if a patent law firm were to expand its services into new 
technology domains, it would be undertaking work that needs different types of knowledge 
resources, implying a diversification of its business scope.  I measured Supplier Diversification 
by employing the technology domains that patents are classified into under the International 
Patent Classification (IPC) system.  Akin to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system, 
the IPC system (but not the U.S. patent classification system) is a nested hierarchy where each 
group of lower-level classes is a subset of the technology class from the level above (Lerner, 
1995).
15
  Following past practice, I used the third level of technology classification (4-digit IPC 
class) to build my diversification measure (Lerner, 1995; Moeen et al., 2013), which provides a 
good balance between granularity and meaningful technological distinctions.  I calculated the 
supplier’s diversification across different technological domains with a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Yang, Narayanan, & Carolis, 2013), using the 
fractions of the law firm’s patents across 1806 4-digit IPCs, and subtracting this HHI index from 
one to obtain a diversification measure.  Specifically, for each supplier i in year t I measure: 
                                                          
15
 IPC classes are of the form XNNY/nnn/mm, where X denotes the “section” and NN is a number signifying the 
“class” and Y is the “subclass”; nnn and mm and three and two digit numbers denoting the “group” and “subgroup” 
within this class.  For example, A61B contains technologies relating to “DIAGNOSIS; SURGERY; 
IDENTIFICATION,” which falls under the section A covering “Human Necessities” and the Class 61 covering 
“HEALTH; LIFE SAVING; AMUSEMENT.” See: 
http://web2.wipo.int/ipcpub/#refresh=page&notion=scheme&version=20140101&symbol=A61 (accessed 
08/03/2014). 
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𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  (1 − ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡
2
𝑛
𝑘=1
) 
 
where Nik is the share of supplier i patents in the k
th 
IPC, and n is the total number of IPCs.  HHI 
measures from count data can be biased (Hall, 2002), and more so when the counts are small.  I 
followed Hall (2002) in correcting my HHI measure for this bias, as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
(𝑁𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡) − 1
𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 1
 
 
where Nit  is the total number of patents for supplier i in year t .  The variable is highly skewed, 
so I use a logged version of this measure in my models to reduce heteroskedasticity.
16
   
 
Independent Variables 
Client Diversification.  I measured Client Diversification as the diversification “away 
from the supplier” of the outsourced patent prosecution work of all clients in a supplier’s 
portfolio, weighted by each client’s share in the supplier’s total business.  Accordingly, I first 
constructed a clients’ scope vector (where each vector dimension is one 4-digit IPC) that 
represents the weighted average footprint of a supplier’s portfolio of clients across different IPC 
technology domains.  I then calculated a clients’ HHI index (“clients HHI”) using these weighted 
clients’ patent shares, and then applied the Hall (2002) bias correction.  Although I am interested 
in aggregate diversification of the supplier’s clients, I also need to be concerned about whether 
                                                          
16
 Specifically, supplier diversification is measured as [1 – ln(HHI*10000)/ln(10000)]. Multiplying by 10,000 yields 
an HHI computed with percentages, which ensures that the logs are positive. This slightly complex transformation 
reflects the fact that the variable skews to the left (so the log transformation needs to be applied to the HHI term, 
rather than (1-HHI)). 
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this diversification occurs in a direction that is towards or away from the supplier’s extant 
business scope.  For example, what constitutes a newer domain for clients may be a core area of 
business for the supplier, which is unlikely to lead to supplier diversification.  Accordingly, I 
calculated whether clients diversified away from a supplier’s business scope by calculating the 
Mahalanobis Distance between the clients’ scope vector and the supplier’s own scope vector, 
measured by the shares of its patents across IPC technology domains over the prior three years.
17
  
The Client Diversification variable was then computed as the product of 1-clients’ HHI and 
Mahalanobis Distance, so that client diversification into IPCs having low overlap with the 
supplier’s scope is given more weight in my measure.   
 
Client-Specific Knowledge. Following prior research, I employed patent backward self-
citations as a measure of clients’ firm-specific knowledge held by the supplier (Moeen et al., 
2013; Wang & Chen, 2010; Wang et al., 2009).  Backward patent citations indicate the body of 
prior knowledge that the focal patent builds on, and backward self-citations indicate that the 
focal patent builds on patents that belong to the same client.  Thus, if a law firm has worked on 
patents with a higher proportion of backward self-citations in the past, the firm would likely have 
developed deeper knowledge of its clients’ unique technologies (and in turn their businesses).  I 
computed my measure of Client-Specific Knowledge for each supplier by the average percentage 
of backward self-citations (relative to all citations) in the law firm’s patent prosecution work in 
the prior three years.  
 
                                                          
17
 Mahalanobis Distance has an advantage over Euclidean Distance in that it corrects for correlations between the 
organizational dimensions on which the distance is being calculated (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009).  Because the 
Mahalanobis Distance does not have an upper bound of one, I divided it by 100 so that my final client diversification 
measure (like supplier diversification) varies between zero and one. 
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Relational (client) Commitment. For each client in my sample, I obtained the number of 
patents outsourced to US patent law firms, and calculated the three-year percentage of those 
outsourced patents to each of the supplier in my sample.  In this way, I identified the share of 
patent work that each supplier captures from its clients, where a higher share indicates that the 
client has made a greater relational commitment to a particular supplier (Moeen et al., 2013).  In 
turn, I aggregated these supplier-client business shares to compute a portfolio-level measure of 
Relational (client) Commitment for the supplier by weighting with the fraction of the supplier’s 
business from each client in the previous three years.   
 
Client Market Opportunity: I calculated the extent to which greater new business 
opportunities for suppliers exist in the markets of clients, relative to the focal supplier’s own 
markets, as the difference between growth in the markets of a supplier’s clients and growth in 
markets of that supplier.  Using the universe of patents applied to, and granted by, the USPTO, I 
computed a running three-year log- growth in the number of patents in each 4-digt IPC 
technology domain, and used these growth rates to compute separate measures for “client market 
growth” and “supplier market growth”.  Specifically, for each supplier i in year t, I measured18;  
 
𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ [(∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑛
𝑘=1
) ∗  𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡]
𝑛
𝑗=1
−  ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑛
𝑘=1
  
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡 is the three-year log-growth of patents in each IPC k, weighted by the three-year 
fraction of client j patents in IPC k,  𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the three-year fraction of client j patents accounted 
                                                          
18
 Where the first term is client market growth and the second term is supplier market growth. 
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for in supplier i’s business portfolio, and  𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡is the three-year share of supplier i’s patents in 
each IPC k. 
 
Supplier Excess Capacity: Suppliers may generate excess resource capacity when serving 
clients more efficiently, which allows them to increase to their volume of new business relative 
to the size of their workforce.  For example, the codifying of client-specific knowledge decreases 
the time and costs associated with learning about clients’ new needs, while the construction of 
client-specific routines creates efficiencies for knowledge-transfer and service delivery.  In 
addition, refined intra-firm coordination mechanisms and organizational-level routines for 
handling large volumes of business are likely to release resources at the individual-level (i.e., the 
time of employees) which can be deployed towards searching for new business opportunities.  
Thus, the ability of patent attorneys to take on higher levels patent legal work is an indicator of a 
supplier’s resource capacity.  Accordingly, for each supplier, I obtained the total number of 
patents filed in the focal year and then divided this figure by the number of patent attorneys 
registered at the USPTO as employed by that supplier in the same year.  Effectively, I computed 
the average number of patents worked on by each patent attorney.    
 
Control Variables 
In addition to the moderating variables - Client-Specific Knowledge, Relational (client) 
Commitment, Relative Market Growth, and Supplier Excess Capacity – whose main effects are 
included in our models, I also controlled for a number of firm-level covariates that change over 
time.  As described below, my fixed effects models already control for average firm and year 
level variation – whether observed or unobserved – in the data.  Occupational Expertise is 
 79 
 
calculated as the percentage of patents in the patent work undertaken by the supplier that cite any 
previously litigated patent.  Such patents are themselves about six times more likely to be subject 
to litigation than an average patent, which places a premium on more fungible legal expertise (as 
opposed to technology-specific expertise) during patent prosecution (Mayer et al., 2012).  Non-
patent Citation Share is measured as the three-year share of non-patent prior art citations (such 
as citations to academic publications and research presentations) among all citations in a 
supplier’s patent portfolio.  A higher share of non-patent prior art citations may be another 
indicator of supplier specialized knowledge, but which is broadly applicable across technology 
domains.  Supplier Size is measured as the number of patent attorneys employed by the supplier 
in the prior year.  Larger firms typically have greater multi-use assets that can be leveraged into 
new markets at a lower marginal cost than smaller firms (Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991; 
Penrose, 1959).  Supplier Turnover is measured for each supplier as the three-year percentage of 
patent attorney exits to the three-year average number of patent attorneys.  A high turnover of 
attorneys can deplete a supplier’s critical resources (Coff, 1999) and can lead to the dissolution 
of client relationships (Broschak, 2004).  Client Size; I proxy the average size of a supplier’s 
clients by measuring the total level of innovation from clients within a supplier’s portfolio.  For 
each year, I coded the number of patents obtained by each client and weighted those patents by 
the fraction of a supplier’s business accounted for by that client in the previous three years to 
compute a weighted average measure of client innovation for each supplier in each year. Larger 
clients may have a broader spectrum of outsourced needs but may also be more challenging for 
suppliers to build relational capital.  Outsourced Percentage is computed as the three-year 
percentage of patents outsourced by each client (as a fraction of total patents for each client) in a 
supplier’s portfolio, weighted by the three-year fraction of that suppliers’ total business 
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accounted for by each of those clients which is then aggregated across all clients within the 
suppliers’ portfolio.  Clients who outsource a greater share of their patent prosecution work are 
more likely build deeper relationships with suppliers (Moeen et al., 2013). 
 
Econometric model   
I am interested in modeling dynamic changes to supplier diversification over time as the 
outsourced needs of their clients change.  My unit of analysis is supplier-year and my data are 
organized in longitudinal supplier panels over time.  Therefore, I employ panel data econometric 
techniques to model changes in supplier diversification over time.  Specifically, I fit an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) panel data model that incorporates firm fixed effects with a full set of year 
indicator variables.  A significant test statistic in the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 
1978) indicated that I should prefer a fixed effects OLS model to the alternative random effects 
OLS model.  A significant F statistic (Wald test) also rejected the null that all year coefficients 
are jointly equal to zero.  As described earlier, I lagged my independent and control variables by 
one year to mitigate reverse causality.  Finally, I correct for error structures that are not 
independently and identically distributed (in particular heteroskedastic and within-firm 
correlated errors) by computing robust standard errors clustered by firm.  My fixed effects OLS 
estimates identify the covariates of within-firm changes in diversification while holding constant 
unobserved time-invariant differences between firms and secular yearly changes across the entire 
set of firms in my sample. 
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RESULTS 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report, respectively, the summary statistics and correlation matrix of 
variables.  A Variance Inflation Factor test indicated that multicollinearity is not a concern in my 
model.  Table 3.3 presents the main results from my fixed effects OLS model.  Model 1 includes 
only the control variables.  Model 2 reports the results for hypothesis 1, which predicted a 
positive relationship between the scope of outsourced client needs and the horizontal scope of 
suppliers.  The coefficient of Client Diversification is positive and significant at the 5% level 
indicating empirical support for hypothesis 1 in my data. 
Model 3 tests hypotheses 2 and 3, which predict that relational assets -- specifically the 
supplier’s Client-Specific Knowledge and the client’s Relational (client) Commitment -- will 
strengthen the client-led diversification effect found in Model 2 (results are identical if I model 
each interaction separately).  Model 3 finds that the coefficient of the interaction between Client-
Specific Knowledge and Client Diversification is positive and significant at the 5% level, 
suggesting empirical support for H2.  Thus, suppliers with higher levels of client-specific 
knowledge are more likely to respond to their clients’ diversification into new areas.  Similarly, I 
find that the coefficient of the interaction between Relational (client) Commitment and Client 
Diversification is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting empirical support for H3.  
Thus, when suppliers find themselves in outsourcing relationships to which clients have made 
significant relational commitments, they are more likely to undertake client-led diversification.  
Moreover, in Model 3 (and the full model – Model 6) the independent effects of client-specific 
knowledge and client relational commitment, included in my models as control variables, are 
negative and significant.  These coefficients show that, without client diversification, suppliers 
with higher relational assets are less likely to diversify, indicating that these specialized 
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resources generally limit diversification opportunities for supplier firms.  Taken together, the two 
sets of coefficients highlight the client-specific nature of synergies made available by relational 
assets.   
I graphically interpret the two interactions from Model 3 in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, in each 
case by holding the level of the other interacted variable (relational (client) commitment and 
client-specific knowledge, respectively) at its mean.  Figure 3.1 shows that higher levels of 
Client-Specific Knowledge reduce the extent of supplier diversification in general, but increase 
the propensity of suppliers to undertake client-led diversification.  Figure 3.2 illustrates a similar 
relationship for Relational (client) Commitment – while supplier diversification generally 
increases with client diversification, the slope is higher when relational commitment is high (as 
opposed to low).  The graphs also help to interpret the negative sign on the coefficient of Client 
Diversification in Model 3, and this coefficient cannot be understood without the interaction 
terms.  As the figures show, supplier diversification generally increases with client 
diversification; therefore, the negative coefficient should be interpreted as the residual effect 
when the interaction terms are zero, which never occurs within the range of my data. 
Model 4 presents my test of hypothesis 4 – the interaction between client diversification 
and Client Market Opportunity.  However, I find no support for this hypothesis, indicating that 
greater demand opportunities in client markets relative to the supplier’s existing markets are not 
sufficient for suppliers to increase their tendency to undertake client-led diversification.  Figure 
3.3 confirms the statistical findings of H4.  We see that while supplier diversification is on 
average higher when client diversification is also higher (as per H1), there is no significant 
difference in the two slopes represented by high and low relative market growth. 
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Model 5 tests hypothesis 5, which is the interaction between client diversification and 
Supplier Excess Capacity.  The coefficient of this variable is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, offering strong statistical support for H5 and suggesting that suppliers with greater 
availability of resources are more likely to undertake client-led diversification. It is also notable 
that in Model 5 (and the full model) that the independent effect of Supplier Excess Capacity has 
a strong negative effect on the tendency of suppliers to diversify.  This result indicates that, 
absent client diversification, suppliers choose to apply excess resources to exploiting markets 
within their current portfolio.  Figure 3.4 graphically illustrates H5 and shows that higher 
Supplier Excess Capacity reduces supplier diversification in general, but when client 
diversification is higher, the slope for supplier diversification is higher when supplier excess 
capacity is high (as opposed to low). As discussed above, my findings in the full model – Model 
6 – are fully consistent with the earlier models.  
Taken together, my findings provide substantial support for client-led diversification and 
the influence of relational assets on this driver of supplier scope.  However, while the availability 
of supplier resources increases likelihood client-led diversification, my findings suggest that 
greater demand opportunities in client markets (relative to supplier markets) do not have a 
similarly positive effect.  
 
Limitations  
My findings are not, however, without limitations.  First, the legal services industry is 
archetypal of knowledge-based services, and my context provides rich fine-grained project-level 
data with which to test my propositions.  However, there may be heterogeneity across 
knowledge-based service industries regarding the extent to which relational assets and relational 
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advantage matter in outsourcing.  Although research in advertising (e.g., Baker et al., 1998; 
Broschak, 2004; Rogan, 2014a; Rogan, 2014b), investment banking (Baker, 1990), and auditing 
(Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Seabright et al., 1992) provide strong empirical support for the 
importance of relational assets and relational embeddedness, my findings may not generalize to 
other knowledge-based service contexts and thus more research is required in contexts outside of 
legal services in regards to how such relational advantages and client diversification impact 
supplier scope.   
Second, my research focuses on firms providing specialized work within patent legal 
services, but the drivers of corporate strategy in firms providing services across multiple legal 
services domains may be somewhat different from the firms in my sample.  While I was not able 
to identify the scope of legal services (outside of patent legal services) offered by firms in my 
sample, I did identify 12 firms that were listed in the annual National Law Journal (NLJ) 
rankings of the largest, and typically highly diversified, 250 corporate law firms.  I removed 
these firms from my sample and ran my main regression models (from Table 3) again.  Although 
I did not find statistical support for H1 or, again, H4, all other hypotheses were supported, 
thereby corroborating my main thesis that client-led diversification is driven by relational assets 
held between suppliers and clients (see Appendix B). 
Third, this study has limitations in terms of measurement.  In particular, while my 
theorizing draws strongly on the notion of relational governance, I lack a direct measure for this 
construct.  Prior work has captured relational governance through survey instruments, but this is 
not a viable option for longitudinal data such as those employed in this study.  My measure of 
supplier excess resource capacity is also subject to limitations.  Specifically, I only captured one 
possible mechanism through which excess capacity may be generated.  Indeed, it is also possible 
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that suppliers with a low volume of patents per attorney hold excess capacity through capturing 
insufficient levels of new business.  In addition, suppliers can often increase their volume of new 
business by employing relatively more junior employees to managers (i.e., increase their 
leverage ratio).  However, I am unable in my dataset to identify the hierarchical level of patent 
attorneys.  Therefore, my measure of supplier excess capacity, while valid, is only limitedly so, 
and future research may seek to identify a more robust measure of excess capacity for 
knowledge-based service suppliers. 
Finally, although my focus has been on knowledge-based services (which are now a very 
large and growing sector of the economy), my theoretical logic may also apply to manufacturing 
and other sectors; however, it is very difficult to generalize my empirical findings to these 
settings and, again, represents, a limitation of my study but also an area for future research. 
 
Additional Analyses  
The present study investigates how firm-level relational capital developed within 
supplier-client relationships impacts supplier diversification.  However, we must also consider 
that relational capital can also build at the individual-level (Kale et al., 2000). Accordingly, I 
examined if, and to what extent, my results could be explained by individual-level mechanisms.  
If individual-level factors are important, I would expect this to be picked up through employee 
mobility (Broschak, 2004; Somaya et al., 2008) such that suppliers with higher employee 
turnover should be less inclined to undertake client-led diversification, particularly where 
relational assets are concerned.  Accordingly, I split my sample by high and low (median) 
turnover suppliers and re-ran my main models.  The findings from my sub-sample of high 
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turnover suppliers corroborated my main predictions and rejected the notion that my findings are 
driven by individual-level mechanisms.  
Another, related, logic is that relational capital is localized within a particular area of the 
client firm and may not easily transfer to another client department division. This implies that 
suppliers may be more likely to build relational assets with smaller, as opposed to larger, clients, 
and which would bias my results to favoring those suppliers with a number of smaller clients.   
Again, I split my sample by average (median) client size and ran my models on the two sub-
samples.  While the direct effect of client diversification on supplier diversification (H1) was 
positive but not significant, robust statistical support remains for the interaction effects of client-
specific knowledge (H2) and relational commitment (H3).  Taken together, my additional 
analyses rule out the alternative explanation of client-led diversification being driven by 
individual-level mechanisms and support my theorizing that suppliers build relational capital at 
the firm-level, which they then leverage into diversification strategies. 
Finally, because relational capital is a shared resource between exchange partners, I 
should consider the possibility that that the scope strategy of suppliers could drive the scope of 
clients.  In other words, I need to examine and empirically rule out reverse causality, which I 
address as follows.  First, my fixed effects model has a lagged structure that ensures a causal 
relationship from client diversification to supplier diversification.  Second, a Granger (1969) 
causality test did not support supplier diversification as useful for predicting client 
diversification.  Third, theoretically and practically, client outsourcing strategies for patent legal 
work are make or buy decisions for the intellectual property of technology.  It is unlikely that 
clients would devise or change their innovation strategy (i.e., which technology to produce) 
based on the scope of their legal suppliers.  Therefore, taken together, my model structure, 
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additional empirical tests, and context provide confidence that reverse causality should not be a 
concern in the current study.  Appendix B presents the results of my additional analyses. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, I articulated a novel theoretical link between relational advantage and 
corporate scope leading to the phenomenon of client-led (or partner-led) diversification.  Using a 
sample of patent law firms, I found significant empirical support for the proposition that these 
supplier firms expand business scope when their clients also diversify (away from areas that the 
supplier operates in), and that this effect is stronger when the supplier shares key relational assets 
– specifically, client-specific knowledge and client relational commitment – with its portfolio of 
clients.  I also found robust empirical support for client-led diversification when suppliers have 
spare productive resources to apply to diversification strategies.  In contrast to extant research 
that typically considers that firms apply excess resources to enter related markets (e.g., Penrose, 
1959; Teece, 1980; 1982), I found that suppliers can apply excess resources to enter markets that 
are less related to their current knowledge base.  Surprisingly I found no empirical support for 
the prediction that greater demand in client markets relative to suppliers’ own markets increase 
the proclivity of client-led diversification.  I investigated this result further by running my 
models on client market growth and supplier market growth as separate variables.  We would 
expect growth in client markets to induce client-led diversification while growth in a suppliers 
own markets to diminish the value of relational assets and allow suppliers to profitably grow 
without costly diversification (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Mitchell & Singh, 1996; 
Moeen et al., 2013).  However, I again found no statistical support for either of these predictions. 
It is unclear if this lack of empirical support is driven by the suboptimal behavior by firms, who 
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may take on easy business from existing clients despite attractive market opportunities (that may 
be costly to develop), or if it is an anomaly of my data and measures.  However, the resolution of 
these questions must await future research.  Subject to the limitations noted in the previous 
section, my research has a number of implications for the literatures on relational advantage and 
corporate strategy, which I discuss below.   
First, while prior research in the relational view has highlighted the value of relational 
assets shared between exchange partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale et al., 2000; Madhok & 
Tallman, 1998), the focus of this literature has primarily been on value creation and performance 
outcomes at the dyadic level (e.g., Chatain, 2011; Dyer, 1996; 1997; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Wang et 
al., 2009; Zaheer et al., 1998).  My study extends research in the relational view by going beyond 
the dyad to examine the firm-level impacts of relational assets embedded in a firm’s portfolio of 
relationships (e.g., Mitchell & Singh, 1996; Moeen et al., 2013), and assessing their implications 
for the corporate strategy – specifically horizontal scope – of firms.  However, my research also 
leaves unanswered a number of important questions that can be addressed by future work.  For 
example, my research does not answer the question of which partner firm should take the lead in 
diversification, and under what conditions.  While it may make sense in the context of 
professional service firms that clients or buyers may lead suppliers’ diversification, it is 
conceivable in other contexts that downstream firms – such as assemblers or distributors – may 
be led to diversify by their suppliers.  Moreover, it is unclear if the theoretical logic I develop 
will also extend to partner firms who are not vertically related, such as R&D alliance partners 
who may plausibly lead each other in diversifying into new technological areas.  Finally, another 
important dimension remaining to be explored is the impact on firm performance, including 
potential negative impacts, of relationally-driven changes in corporate scope.  Consequently, I 
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believe that the current study has the potential to stimulate a robust program of academic inquiry 
into a hitherto underexplored area within the relational view; namely the many implications of 
the relational view for firms’ (horizontal) corporate-level strategies. 
Second, my research further underscores the importance of relational governance and 
relational assets in shaping buyer-supplier relationships.  Because of their role in creating 
relational value, mutual assets and commitments can play a role in value-based strategies 
(Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996; Chatain & Zemsky, 2007) and in turn provide suppliers with an 
advantage in getting business from their existing buyers (Chatain, 2011; Hoetker, 2005; Maister, 
1993; Mayer et al., 2012).  At the same time, these relational assets are also critical for 
safeguarding future relation-specific investments and may simultaneously bear the expectation of 
continued mutual investments and responsiveness to partners’ needs (Bercovitz, et al., 2006; 
Dyer, 1997; Macneil, 1980; Moeen et al., 2013; Poppo et al., 2008a).  My findings show that 
these impacts of relational assets and commitments may strengthen the tendency of suppliers to 
undertake diversification in response to their buyers’ needs.  In turn, the willingness to undertake 
such diversification may itself be a component of relational governance and trust in the exchange 
relationship, as well as of supplier advantage in adding value to future projects with the buyer, 
which remains to be explored in future work. 
Traditional resource-based explanations of diversification in the management literature 
are grounded in theories of synergistic resource sharing by firms across related lines of business 
to capture scope economies (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Levinthal & Wu, 2010; Teece, 
1982), or the redeployment of under-utilized resources within the firm (Penrose, 1959; Sakhartov 
& Folta, 2014).  My research casts partner-specific resources and commitments as special types 
of such resources that can support diversification; however, because these resources are 
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specialized to a particular transaction partner the opportunities for generating synergies or 
redeploying these resources are also limited to that partner.  It is no surprise, then, that my 
findings indicate that relational assets are negatively associated with diversification in general, 
but increase supplier firm diversification in response to partner (client) diversification.  Thus, a 
central contribution of my study to the extant diversification literature is that a firm’s horizontal 
scope can be driven by its vertical relationships.  In turn, these findings are related to an 
emerging literature that emphasizes the role of managerial slack in forcing tradeoffs between the 
horizontal and vertical scope of the firm (e.g., Brahm, Parmigiani, & Tarijan, 2013; Rawley & 
Simcoe, 2010).  Interestingly, a reduction in vertical scope inherently implies the creation of 
vertical relationships, which may in turn drive horizontal scope based on the logic developed in 
this chapter; thus further investigation and integration of the mechanisms driving these two 
streams of scholarship is an intriguing prospect for future research.  Last but not least, the 
expansion of horizontal scope by firms to leverage their partner-specific relational assets is 
fraught with questions regarding the opportunities and challenges posed by such diversification.  
Firms may find that their relational assets facilitate the acquisition of resources and capabilities 
to operate successfully in new business areas, and at the same time strain their managerial 
resources and incur diseconomies of scope.  Future research may investigate which of these two 
effects dominate, and under what conditions.  In summary, it is my hope that the current study 
will spur a renaissance of research that further explores the fertile intersection of the relational 
view and corporate strategy. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 Table 3.1:  Summary statistics of key variables 
 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
Between 
S.D. 
Within 
S.D. 
       Supplier Diversification 0.40 0.08 0.13 0.59 0.06 0.05 
       Client Diversification 0.22 0.07 0.01 0.45 0.06 0.04 
       Client Specific Knowledge 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.25 0.03 0.02 
       Relational (client) Commitment 0.45 0.16 0.01 0.76 0.11 0.01 
       Client Market Opportunity -0.04 0.05 -0.30 0.38 0.04 0.05 
       Supplier Excess Capacity 10.08 10.68 0.03 89.42 9.60 4.03 
       Occupational Expertise 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 
       Non-Patent Citation Share 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.46 0.07 0.03 
       Supplier Size 33.47 27.56 6.00 189.00 25.38 9.14 
       Client Size 42.76 78.81 0.038 533.30 66.09 37.91 
       Turnover 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.54 0.05 0.07 
       Outsourced Percentage 0.71 0.11 0.13 1.00 0.08 0.08 
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Table 3.2: Correlations between variables 
 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Supplier Diversification 1 
           
2. Client Diversification 0.22 1 
          
3. Client Specific Knowledge -0.03 0.21 1 
         
4. Relational (client) Commitment -0.05 0.13 -0.05 1 
        
5. Client Market Opportunity 0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.00 1 
       
6. Supplier Excess Capacity 0.04 0.48 0.27 0.08 0.13 1 
      
7. Occupational Expertise -0.34 -0.20 -0.13 0.23 -0.19 -0.33 1 
     
8. Non-Patent Citation Share -0.31 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.21 -0.12 0.28 1 
    
9. Supplier Size -0.09 0.42 0.22 -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 0.11 0.32 1 
   
10. Client Size -0.33 0.49 0.42 -0.01 0.16 0.58 -0.16 0.11 0.38 1 
  
11. Turnover 0.00 -0.04 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.14 -0.05 0.15 0.08 0.09 1 
 
12. Outsourced Percentage -0.02 -0.10 0.08 0.38 0.34 0.11 0.05 -0.20 -0.18 0.10 0.05 1 
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Table 3.3:  Determinants of supplier diversification (fixed effects ordinary least squares 
model) 
 
Independent Variables   1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
 
            
Client Diversification H1 
 
0.214** -0.531* 0.224** 0.0695 -0.603* 
   
(0.0949) (0.311) (0.108) (0.120) (0.319) 
Client Diversification * Client 
Specific Knowledge H2 
  
4.245** 
  
3.694** 
    
(1.723) 
  
(1.739) 
Client Diversification * 
Relational (client) Commitment H3 
  
0.791** 
  
0.811** 
    
(0.385) 
  
(0.385) 
Client Diversification * Client 
Market Opportunity H4 
   
0.206 
 
0.202 
     
(1.005) 
 
(1.026) 
Client Diversification * Supplier 
Excess Capacity  H5 
    
0.0165*** 0.0144** 
            (0.00571) (0.00615) 
Client Specific Knowledge 
 
-0.324* -0.285 -1.030** -0.289 -0.256 -0.917** 
  
(0.174) (0.176) (0.395) (0.175) (0.175) (0.407) 
Relational (client) Commitment 
 
-0.0299 -0.0534 -0.190** -0.0535 -0.0335 -0.176** 
  
(0.0393) (0.0382) (0.0787) (0.0383) (0.0395) (0.0800) 
Client Market Opportunity 
 
0.0428 0.0448 0.0333 0.00610 0.0523 0.00469 
  
(0.0606) (0.0603) (0.0591) (0.216) (0.0611) (0.223) 
Supplier Excess Capacity   0.000379 -0.000372 -0.000520 -0.000384 -0.00508*** -0.00462** 
  (0.000876) (0.000819) (0.000821) (0.000817) (0.00176) (0.00186) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.352 0.280 0.381 0.288 0.281 0.392 
  
(0.615) (0.590) (0.591) (0.590) (0.573) (0.579) 
Non-Patent Citation Share 
 
0.0345 0.0746 0.0135 0.0721 0.0750 0.0164 
  
(0.109) (0.113) (0.105) (0.111) (0.109) (0.101) 
Supplier Size 
 
5.57e-05 -0.000216 -0.000360 -0.000210 -0.000225 -0.000348 
  
(0.000344) (0.000332) (0.000303) (0.000329) (0.000318) (0.000290) 
Client Size 
 
-0.0574** -0.0690*** -0.0640*** -0.0691*** -0.0541** -0.0503** 
  
(0.0264) (0.0261) (0.0240) (0.0261) (0.0265) (0.0240) 
Turnover 
 
0.00339 0.000425 0.000172 0.000147 0.0141 0.0115 
  
(0.0345) (0.0343) (0.0328) (0.0340) (0.0352) (0.0334) 
Outsourced Percentage 
 
0.00504 0.0185 0.00836 0.0202 0.0133 0.00589 
  
(0.0412) (0.0443) (0.0441) (0.0447) (0.0433) (0.0436) 
Constant 
 
0.507*** 0.480*** 0.617*** 0.477*** 0.482*** 0.608*** 
  
(0.0513) (0.0577) (0.0763) (0.0586) (0.0559) (0.0781) 
        Year Fixed Effects  
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 
 
840 840 840 840 840 840 
R-squared 
 
0.125 0.141 0.168 0.141 0.156 0.178 
Number of Suppliers   97 97 97 97 97 97 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.1: Interaction effect of client diversification and client specific knowledge on 
supplier diversification 
 
Note:  High and low values are one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.2: Interaction effect of client diversification and relational (client) commitment on 
supplier diversification 
 
Note:  High and low values are one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. 
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Figure 3.3: Interaction effect of client diversification and client market opportunity on 
supplier diversification 
 
 Note:  High and low values are one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.4: Interaction effect of client diversification and supplier excess capacity on 
supplier diversification 
 
 
 Note:  High and low values are one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
CORPORATE SCOPE AND THE SURVIVAL OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED SERVICE 
FIRMS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A firm’s business scope -- or level of diversification -- is a fundamental strategic concern 
for managers, and understanding both the drivers of a firm’s portfolio of businesses and the 
implications for firm performance have dominated scholarly thought for decades (Hoskisson & 
Hitt, 1990; Palich et al., 2000; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989; Robins & Wiersema, 1995; 
Wan et al., 2011).  For knowledge-based service suppliers, such as law firms, management 
consultancies, and advertising agencies, prior research suggests that a broader scope of client 
services offers the potential for superior firm performance as suppliers can conduct a greater 
volume of transactions with clients and reduce the competition they face for client business 
(Chatain, 2011; Chatain & Zemsky, 2011; Klemperer, 1992; Maister, 1993; Siggelkow, 2003).  
In turn, suppliers fulfilling multiple service needs of clients can often leverage their greater 
understanding of clients’ business to develop specialized inter-organizational resources and 
capabilities that increase relationship performance and strengthen ties between those exchange 
partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). When formulating and 
implementing their diversification strategies, suppliers may exploit these “relational assets” that 
lead to advantages in gaining new business from existing clients (Chatain, 2011; Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Kale et al., 2000) and to adjust (or “by adjusting”) their business scope as new needs of 
clients emerge (Mawdsley & Somaya, 2015).  Alternatively, suppliers may compose their scope 
of services in line with broader market opportunities and formulate strategies for capturing 
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greater volumes of business from new, rather than existing, clients (Porter, 1996).  While the 
former, relational-focused, strategy creates value through committed and stable client ties, the 
latter, market-focused, strategy creates value through maintaining resource and market flexibility 
(Ghemawat & del Sol, 1998), and there are potential benefits and tradeoffs to both approaches.  
Despite the insights from prior research regarding the impacts of corporate scope and 
relational assets for firm and relationship performance, understanding how these factors impact 
firm survival is relatively less clear.  Indeed, studies have only recently begun to explore 
linkages between corporate scope and organizational survival (or failure) (e.g., Barnett & 
Freeman, 2001; Bercovitz & Mitchell, 2007; Sorenson et al., 2006; Stern & Henderson, 2004), 
and research findings are equivocal.  For example, all else equal, there appears to be a consensus 
that a broader business scope brings survival advantages for firms, but when examining 
underlying contingencies, firms may be more likely to fail if they expand into less related 
markets (Sorenson et al., 2006), broaden their scope too quickly (Barnett & Freeman, 2001), or if 
competitors also introduce new products (Stern & Henderson, 2004).  Moreover, the 
implementation of a diversification strategy can increase the risk of firm failure (Sorenson et al., 
2006).   
The research literature connecting relational assets to firm survival is also relatively 
sparse.  What research has been produced suggests long-term buyer-supplier relationships 
increase supplier survival rates when relational assets are important for buyer needs (Hoetker et 
al., 2007).  However, when a firm’s portfolio of relationships becomes over-embedded, 
vulnerability to failure can increase (e.g., Uzzi, 1997).   Other studies show that collaborative 
alliance relationships can increase firm failure when one exchange partner depends greatly on the 
other partner (Lee et al., 2014) or when one partner dissolves or forms another relationship 
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(Singh & Mitchell, 1996).  Furthermore, alliances can make firms vulnerable to environmental 
shocks due to constraints in being able to adequately respond to a shock (Mitchell & Singh, 
1996).  On the other hand, inter-organizational relationships can buffer firms from external 
pressures, leading to a decreased failure rate (Miner et al., 1990), and indeed,  relational assets 
have been found to be important for the survival of newly established firms (e.g., Baum, 
Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Hite, 2003; Hite & Hesterly, 2001).  Finally, while the relational 
view extols the value of relational assets for superior performance outcomes (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Madhok & Tallman, 1998), other research finds that relational assets can, in contrast, lead 
to poorer performance, increased partner dependency, and constraints on resource adaptability 
(Anderson & Jap, 2005; Baker, 1990; Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Mayer et al., 2012; 
Poppo et al., 2008a).  Thus, across both streams of literature, research findings are equivocal on 
the drivers of firm survival (and failure), and currently no study connects relational assets with 
corporate scope to examine the survival of firms. 
This study seeks to fill this research gap by investigating the effects of business scope 
and relational assets on the survival of knowledge-based service suppliers.  The connection 
between these two literatures (i.e., corporate diversification and the relational view) is 
particularly salient as the existence of suppliers is solely determined by its ability to sell 
knowledge-based services to clients (Maister, 1993; von Nordenflycht, 2010).  Therefore, the 
scope of what suppliers can provide to clients, and the strategies which suppliers employ to 
attract, retain, and capture value from their clients are fundamental to supplier well-being.   
In this study, I theorize and predict that suppliers gain survival advantages from a broader 
scope of client services. I also postulate that this scope-survival advantage is enhanced when 
suppliers dedicate a greater share of their organizational resources and attention to serving long-
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term, repeated clients with whom they are more likely to build relationship-specific assets.  
Finally, I examine how market conditions impact supplier survival.  Specifically, I maintain that 
when client markets are growing faster than the markets of suppliers, suppliers have greater 
opportunities to learn from their clients and develop new competencies.  Thus greater client 
market opportunities, again, is predicted to increase the positive effect of supplier diversification 
on supplier survival.  
I test my hypotheses using a detailed longitudinal dataset on US patent law firms and the 
scope of patent legal work they provide to their corporate clients. Knowledge-based services 
suffer from higher levels of information asymmetries and partner monitoring problems which 
make these services difficult to explicitly contract over (Mayer & Nickerson, 2005).  Therefore, 
exchange relationships between suppliers and clients often depend on relational assets and more 
flexible, mutual forms of relationship governance for value creation (Moeen et al., 2013; 
Williamson, 1985).  Moreover, the micro-level data available on outsourced patent projects 
across diverse technology industries provide an excellent real-world laboratory to test my 
propositions. 
The current study makes a number of contributions to management literature.  First, 
through the joint examination of how a supplier’s scope strategy and relational orientation 
towards its clients impact supplier survival, I connect corporate-level strategy with business-level 
strategy.  While firms’ strategic actions bridge these levels of strategy, research explorations of 
where to compete (i.e., which markets), and how to compete (i.e., strategies and capabilities for 
competitive advantage), have largely developed independently.   Second, by examining supplier 
survival as the performance outcome, I extend the nascent stream of diversification research that 
connects business scope to organizational mortality.  In addition, this research investigation 
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extends the relational view by taking the theoretical and empirical level of analysis from the 
dyad-level to the firm-level.  Third, this study contributes to and extends recent research that 
examines the value that suppliers can create from providing multiple services to their clients 
(Chatain, 2011; Chatain & Zemsky, 2007).  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
It is well established in strategic management research that the composition of a firm’s 
portfolio of businesses has important ramifications for firm performance (e.g., Chatterjee & 
Wernerfelt, 1994; Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Palich et al., 2000;  Robins & Wiersema, 
1995; Rumelt, 1974; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987).  On 
the one hand, this research maintains that a broader business scope allows firms to capture 
portfolio-level advantages over more specialized firms, such as greater resource synergies and 
production-based economies of scope (Panzar & Willig, 1981; Teece, 1980; 1982).  On the other 
hand, diversified firms may fail to capture desired synergies from their business portfolio and 
trade at a “discount” to specialized, single industry firms (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 
1994).  However, while these studies have focused primarily on antecedents of superior 
(financial) performance, diversification also impacts other aspects of firm performance, namely, 
firm survival (Bercovitz & Mitchell, 2007).  Indeed, even if, as some studies suggest, diversified 
firms bear a “diversification discount” (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994), a broader 
business scope also diversifies market risk (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994), which may confer 
survival advantages. 
One of the dominant lines of inquiry in the extant diversification literature is whether 
firms gain performance advantages when their portfolio is composed of related lines of business 
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(Markides & Williamson, 1996; McGahan, 1999; Miller, 2006; Rumelt, 1982). Related 
businesses can allow firms to create and capture higher value through greater resource sharing, 
efficient coordination of intra-organizational interdependencies, and the establishment of 
organization-wide routines. One way in which a supplier’s business portfolio may be related is 
when they provide multiple services to the same clients (i.e., cross-selling).  Cross-selling allows 
suppliers to build, disseminate, and embed greater levels of client-specific knowledge throughout 
their business portfolio (Chatain, 2011), which they can use to develop specialized routines and 
processes that, in turn, provide communication and coordination advantages when meeting the 
needs of those clients (Chatain & Zemsky, 2007). More fundamentally, cross-selling services to 
clients provide greater opportunities for suppliers to build relational assets, which can increase 
exchange value (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Madhok & Tallman, 1998) and reduce rivalry for client 
business (Chatain, 2011; Mayer et al., 2012). However, while both the diversification and the 
relational view literatures primarily focus on factors that drive performance (in the case of the 
relational view, relationship performance), surprisingly few studies in these research domains 
have addressed the issue of firm survival.   
The theorizing in this study bridges the corporate diversification and relational view 
literatures to propose a novel framework that places business scope as a significant driver of 
supplier survival, but which is impacted by key relational and market mechanisms. Although 
some prior research has connected firm survival with corporate scope (Barnett & Freeman, 2001; 
Bercovitz & Mitchell, 2007; Sorenson et al., 2006; Stern & Henderson, 2004), and similarly, 
firm survival with inter-organizational relationships (Hoetker, et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2014; 
Singh & Mitchell, 1996; Uzzi, 1997), no study has considered the effect of relational assets in 
the context of a scope-survival relationship.  Indeed, formulating and implementing strategies 
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that are focused on building strong ties with clients can be a critical driver of performance for 
suppliers, but may also decrease performance and leave suppliers vulnerable to the negative 
aspects of embedded relationships.  Furthermore, a suppliers scope strategy (i.e., corporate 
strategy) and relational strategy (i.e., business strategy) are often closely intertwined (Chatain, 
2011) and therefore it is valuable to understand if and how a broader business scope can provide 
advantages to suppliers in overcoming the potential hazards of embedded relationships, and how 
relational assets may enhance (or diminish) a scope-survival relationship.  Finally, only limited 
attention has been given to examining firm survival (or failure) in the context of knowledge-
based service industries
19
.  This is an important gap to address as client relationships are critical 
assets of knowledge-based service suppliers.  Thus, the mechanisms through which suppliers 
create and capture value (i.e., intangible services), and the competitive threats (and opportunities) 
that these firms face, may differ in important ways to the firms and industries that have been 
examined in the extant research literature.   
 
Supplier Diversification 
A broader business scope can enable firms to gain portfolio-level advantages that may 
not be available to narrower, more specialized firms.  For example, the sharing of knowledge and 
resources across multiple lines of business, and developing complex routines and processes to 
build and exploit inter-relationships between those businesses can significantly reduce 
production costs and generate economies of scope (Panzar & Willig, 1981; Siggelkow, 2003; 
Teece, 1980).  Diversified firms also have greater ability to redeploy more fungible resources, 
such as human capital, between lines of business should they experience resource slack in one 
                                                          
19 Two studies have examined the failure of knowledge-based service firms (Phillips, 2002; Wezel, Cattani, & 
Pennings, 2006) but these studies are in the context of the competitive implications of interfirm employee mobility.  
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domain but have opportunities for business growth in another (Farjoun, 1994; Sakhartov & Folta, 
2014).  
While the attributes of diversified firms outlined above suggests a broader business scope 
may confer performance advantages (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1994; Christensen & 
Montgomery, 1981; Robins & Wiersema, 1995; Palich et al., 2000; Rumelt, 1974; Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman, 2005; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987), the alternative perspective is that 
diversification may penalize firms as greater organizational complexity may create barriers for 
achieving cross-business synergies.  In addition, higher operational and governance costs may 
offset benefits from accruing greater revenue.  Research has explained these disadvantages in 
terms of a diversification discount that reduces profitability as firms become larger and more 
multifaceted (Berger & Ofek, 1995).   
However, it is important to underscore that even if diversification is “profit neutral” (i.e., 
increased revenues through business expansion are offset by higher organizational costs), firms 
may still attain survival benefits. For example, diversified firms are likely to be endowed with a 
more diverse set of organizational routines that provide advantages when searching for solutions 
to strategic problems (Bercovitz & Mitchell, 2007; Sorenson et al., 2006), while these firms may 
hold a broader array of external ties through which they gain to superior access to new 
information and resources (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999).   Finally, 
diversification allows firms to reduce their exposure to the demand fluctuations of a single 
market (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994). 
Alternatively, the process of diversification can stretch organizational resources, 
increasing the risk of firm failure, especially if firms expand too rapidly (Barnett & Freeman, 
2001).  Indeed, Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007) note that diversified firms are most vulnerable to 
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failure when they over-diversify and cannot refocus sufficiently to eliminate spare capacity. Prior 
research has also noted that expansion into less related markets can reduce firm survival due to 
unfamiliarity with the market and barriers to creating cross-business synergies (Sorenson et al., 
2006).     
Knowledge-based service suppliers may have important advantages over firms in other 
industries, particularly manufacturing, when it comes to increasing business scope.  First, 
because these suppliers are human capital intensive, they are able to dynamically adjust their 
resource capacity in line with their cost-base, essentially by hiring new talent to capture more 
business or releasing under-utilized talent back into the labor market.  Second, diversification for 
these firms arguably entails less financial risk as suppliers are not typically required to make 
substantial sunk-cost financial investments in specialized resources (e.g., a new manufacturing 
plant).  Indeed, suppliers can diversify simply through the strategic hiring of new talent or 
merging with another supplier.  Third, the emerging needs of existing clients can be an impetus 
for supplier diversification (Mawdsley & Somaya, 2015), lowering the risks of expansion 
through greater cross-selling opportunities (Chatain, 2011; Klemperer, 1992; Siggelkow, 2003).  
Taken together, a broader business scope confers portfolio-level benefits of strategic 
flexibility, increased revenues, reduced production costs through economies of scope and 
efficient resource redeployment, and diversification of risk, while also allowing suppliers to 
provide greater value to clients (Chatain & Zemsky, 2007).  I therefore maintain that, consistent 
with prior literature (e.g., Bercovitz & Mitchell, 2007; Sorenson et al., 2006), these 
diversification benefits provide suppliers with significant survival advantages relative to 
suppliers with a narrow scope.  Accordingly, I offer the following hypothesis:  
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H1: The greater the level of supplier diversification, the greater the probability of 
survival for that supplier. 
 
Long-Term Clients 
In contrast to arms-length, discrete-transactional exchange relationships (Macneil 1980), 
long-standing, embedded relational ties between suppliers and clients have the potential to 
deliver superior performance (Dyer & Sing, 1998; Madhok & Tallman, 1998).  For example, 
suppliers holding deeper levels of client-specific knowledge can meet their client’s needs with 
greater precision (Asanuma, 1989; Chatain, 2011; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988), while the 
building of client-specific resources and knowledge transfer routines can provide communication 
and coordination advantages in service delivery (Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Zollo et al., 2002).  
In addition, inter-organizational trust developed over a longer transactional history (Gulati, 1995) 
facilitates inter-organizational learning and lowers relationship governance costs (Dyer & Chu, 
2003; Macneil, 1980; Williamson, 1985; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Zaheer et al., 1998).  
Unsurprisingly, extant research finds these relational advantages often cement exchange 
relationships (Chatain, 2011; Mayer et al., 2012) and provide suppliers with longer-term survival 
benefits (Hoetker et el., 2007).  
 However, other research suggests that relationship duration alone is not sufficient to 
generate relational advantages (Poppo, et al., 2008a).  Rather, the potential opportunity costs 
from relationship dissolution are deemed at least as critical for aligning partner incentives for 
cooperation and reducing behavioral uncertainty (Axelrod, 1984; Vanneste & Frank, 2013).  
Moreover, suppliers who focus on building and maintaining existing client relationships, relative 
to gaining new clients, risk over-committing resources and becoming disproportionately 
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dependent on those clients for future business (Sorenson & Waguespack, 2006).  Dependency 
can increase the risk of client opportunism due to asymmetric power in the relationship (Baker, 
1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and a lower alternative use value for client-specific resources 
(Klein et al.,  1978), thereby exposing suppliers to the hazards inherent in small numbers 
competition (Williamson, 1975). Furthermore, prior studies show that the probability of 
relationship dissolution can increase with relationship duration owing to client needs evolving 
away from supplier expertise (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Seabright et al.,1992), while greater 
partner dependency can lead to firm failure when assets (i.e., client new business) accessed 
through a partner are critical for survival (Lee et al., 2014; Sheppard, 1995).  Indeed, the failure 
of the large US corporate law firm Heller Ehrman in 2008 was, in part, a result of the failure of 
financial institutions Washington Mutual and Lehman Brothers who Heller depended on for 
large fraction of its client business.  Therefore, although suppliers may capture value through a 
portfolio of long-standing clients, there are also potential vulnerabilities that can impact their 
survival.   
A broader business scope may provide suppliers with the ability to effectively manage 
vulnerabilities and capture the advantages from a portfolio of relationally embedded exchange 
relationships and, in turn, enhance the survival benefits from being more diversified firms. At a 
basic level, greater cross-selling opportunities can not only increase the revenues of suppliers, 
but also allows the establishment of multiplex ties (Rogan, 2014a) and the building of relational 
assets with clients (Chatain, 2011), which stabilize exchange relationships.  Supporting these 
economic bonding effects, broad-based suppliers can create greater value through the 
dissemination and embedding of client-specific knowledge, allowing for the superior 
identification and management of client-related interdependencies (Argyres & Zenger, 2012; 
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Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Moeen et al., 2013) and the generating of client-specific economies of 
scope (Chatain & Zemsky, 2007).   
The benefits to diversified suppliers from holding a portfolio of long-term clients are 
consistent with the extant diversification literature that maintains firms can gain advantages from 
a portfolio of related businesses (Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Rumelt, 1974).   While firm 
expansion may entail greater levels of managerial attention and operational costs to coordinate 
and manage complex independencies across business areas (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Kogut & 
Zander, 1993; Penrose, 1959), a portfolio of long-term clients can allow suppliers to draw on 
existing stocks of knowledge and resources to capture greater cross business synergies 
(Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1994; Markides & Williamson, 1994; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 
2005).  Finally, a portfolio of long-term clients can buffer suppliers from the risks of the 
diversification process itself. Expanding at a rapid rate and/or into more distant markets poses 
significant failure risks for firms (Sorenson et al., 2006) due to greater adjustment costs (Helfat 
& Eisenhardt, 2004) and uncertainty associated with entering new markets.  Drawing from long-
term clients and maintaining a stable flow of revenues may reduce some of these diversification 
hazards, particularly as recent research shows that suppliers often diversify in response to 
diversification in the needs of their relationally embedded clients (Mawdsley & Somaya, 2015). 
In summary, suppliers who dedicate a greater share of their resources to serving long-
term clients have the potential to gain relational advantages, but also risk being exposed to 
relational hazards associated with over-commitment of resources and greater exchange partner 
dependency.  I maintain that a broader business scope provides suppliers with the ability to 
dynamically manage their business portfolio to mitigate these potential hazards and realize 
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relational advantages, in turn, enhancing the survival benefits suppliers gain from diversification. 
I therefore provide the following hypothesis; 
H2: The greater the fraction of business in a focal supplier’s business portfolio that is 
from long-term clients, the stronger the effect of supplier diversification on the 
probability of survival for that supplier. 
 
Client Market Opportunity 
Attributes of the markets within the supplier’s business portfolio impact the level of 
supplier value creation and value capture.  Rapidly growing, more innovative markets may 
provide greater revenue opportunities advantages through munificent market (i.e., client) demand 
and cost advantages through  the ability to re-use scalable resources (Levinthal & Wu, 2010).  
However, they also require suppliers to maintain strategic and market flexibility by continually 
updating their capabilities in line with market advancements and ensuring their service offerings 
are competitive for a broad client base (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Teece et al., 1997).  In contrast, stable, less innovative markets are more favorable to 
creating value from committed exchange relationships and the building of relational assets 
(Ghemawat & del Sol, 1998; Moeen et al., 20130), but can increase the risk of strategic inertia 
and resource obsolescence.  However, the range of services that suppliers offer may not meet all 
the needs of their clients (Moeen et al., 2013), but the attributes of supplier markets compared to 
the markets of their clients may have important implications for supplier outcomes. 
 When clients have a greater presence in more innovative markets, relative to the suppliers 
they use for some of their outsourced work, suppliers in less innovative markets are at greater 
risk of their knowledge base becoming out of step with their clients’ needs.  Lacking the 
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absorptive capacity to recognize and assimilate information from these innovative markets 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and with learning often following a path dependent process that is 
linked to existing resource stocks (Chang, 1996; Nelson & Winter, 1982), there is a greater 
probability that these exchange relationships will dissolve as clients seek a stronger resource-fit 
with alternative suppliers (Seabright et al., 1992).  Suppliers may therefore be disadvantaged in 
their ability to attract and retain more innovative clients, in turn negatively impacting their 
ongoing competitive position. However, the private sharing of knowledge between relational 
partners is often an important conduit for organizational learning and the building of new 
competencies (Doz, 1996; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hamel, 1991; Kale et al., 2000; Khanna, 
Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Larsson et al., 1998; Mowrey, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Simonin, 
1999; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003).  Thus, suppliers can gain learning advantages from serving more 
innovative clients, and, moreover, clients may be more willing to share information and increase 
supplier learning if it enables the supplier to provide higher added value (compared to alternative 
suppliers) in their service provision. Therefore, in meeting at least some of the needs of 
innovative clients, less innovative suppliers may be able to overcome some of the vulnerabilities 
from serving those clients and increase their potential for capturing greater value. 
Suppliers with a greater presence in higher-paced, innovative markets, relative to their 
clients, may be following a strategy in which they are focused on more profitable demand 
opportunities. Yet, by concentrating more heavily on innovative markets, suppliers may focus 
less on client retention and, therefore, compete more intensely with rival suppliers for client new 
business. Although suppliers with superior capabilities are more likely to achieve and maintain 
competitive advantages (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993),  suppliers holding relatively lower quality 
capabilities may be more vulnerable to failure (Harper, 2013). This latter possibility may be a 
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distinct risk for suppliers who serve less innovative clients as they may not be able to capture the 
same learning benefits as those highlighted above.  In addition, the negative impacts may be 
strengthened by the signal that suppliers are conveying to the market (Greenwood et al., 2005). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that clients often pay close attention to who suppliers serve when 
selecting an outsourced partner as this is one mechanism through which clients can gauge 
supplier quality (Coates et al., 2011).  More specifically, a lack of innovative clients within a 
supplier’s portfolio of business may impede their ability to establish new client relationships. 
Thus, while suppliers have the possibility to capture advantages from providing services in 
markets that are more innovative than the majority of their clients’ needs, they are also 
potentially vulnerable to disadvantages that could impact their competiveness, and in turn, 
survival.  
I maintain that the business scope of suppliers is an important determinant for whether 
they can gain survival advantages or become exposed to survival hazards.  Suppliers who are 
more specialized (i.e., a narrower scope) may be more vulnerable when serving more innovative 
clients.  With fewer lines of business to buffer the potential loss of clients, suppliers may suffer 
greater penalties from holding resources that are less relevant to the needs of innovative clients.  
In addition, these suppliers have fewer conduits into the market through which they can gain 
learning advantages from innovative clients, thereby constraining their ability to build absorptive 
capacity and develop new capabilities.   However, suppliers with a broader business scope 
increase their opportunities for accessing a wider array of new knowledge and building 
absorptive capacity.  Furthermore, suppliers have the potential to meet multiple service needs of 
innovative clients, which increases client switching costs and, in turn, allows suppliers to gain 
learning advantages over a prolonged period.  A broader scope and greater learning opportunities 
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may also be valuable for suppliers to identify important complementarities and 
interdependencies between different lines of business.  This can enable suppliers to increase their 
value proposition to clients by providing services that bridge technology classes and support the 
more innovative lines of business in which their clients predominantly compete. Finally, a 
broader scope also increases the potential that suppliers will have at least some presence in these 
faster-paced markets, which reduces the risks of resource obsolescence and provides access to 
forming relationships with new, innovative clients. 
Suppliers who are more innovative than their clients may also be particularly vulnerable 
to failure when they are narrow in scope.  First, they are exposed to market risk and, second, they 
may have disadvantages in attracting the type of clients (i.e., innovate, faster growing) that 
would allow them to grow their business and compete successfully in those markets.  A broader 
scope diversifies market risk, but may also allow suppliers to gain additional advantages through 
developing relational assets with these clients.  Prior research studies have shown that clients in 
more stable markets prefer to concentrate their business into few suppliers and create value 
through building relational assets (Moeen et al., 2013).  A broader scope would provide suppliers 
with greater opportunities to develop deeper relationships and retain these clients, thus 
decreasing survival vulnerability and providing another avenue for value creation. Accordingly, I 
present the following hypothesis: 
H3: The greater the growth in the markets of (a supplier’s) clients relative to growth in 
the markets of the supplier (client market opportunity), the stronger the effect of supplier 
diversification on the probability of survival of that supplier. 
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SAMPLE & METHODS 
I tested my predictions using a longitudinal panel dataset of patent law firms (suppliers) 
and their corporate clients (buyers).  I used the official patent attorney roster published by the 
Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to 
identify my sample of patent law firms.  The register contains the name, employer and unique 
registration code for each patent attorney admitted to the US patent bar, and is continually 
updated to include new patent attorneys and account for inter-firm mobility of patent attorneys.  
For any point in time, the number of registered patent attorneys can be identified for each 
supplier.  My supplier sample comprised of all US patent law firms with at least five registered 
patent attorneys in 1990, which after accounting for firms with missing data, was 214 firms.  
I used outsourced patent legal projects that were filed to (and granted by) the USPTO to 
examine relationships between patent law firms and their clients.  Each patent is an individual 
legal project representing a transaction between the client and the supplier. Each patent 
application provides the client, law firm (or name of in-house patent attorney) who prosecuted 
the patent, and the specific technological domain of the patented invention.  Using the detailed 
information contained within patent applications, for each year I created fine-grained patent 
portfolios for every law firm and client firm in my sample, and used these portfolios to construct 
longitudinal transactional histories between law firms and their clients. To identify patents 
outsourced to my sample of patent law firms, I used multiple search algorithms on each law firm 
name to search in the “Attorney or Agent” field on the patent application. Including extra years 
for variable construction (1986-1989), between 1986 and 2000, I identified a core sample of 
approximately 509,000 patents outsourced to my sample of 214 suppliers from roughly 61,000 
unique clients. 
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Dependent Variable 
Supplier Survival: The dependent variable in this study is supplier survival, which was 
coded as 1 in year t if the focal supplier survived the following year.  A “failure” (coded as zero) 
is entered in year t if the supplier exited the sample completely or dropped below five registered 
patent attorneys (without recovering again in the observation period to at least five attorneys) in 
year t+1.  Knowledge-based service firms can fail for a number of reasons, such as bankruptcy 
deliberate dissolution of the firm, or merger and acquisition. Data limitations meant it was not 
possible to identify the cause or symptom of failure.  However, checks of company histories 
were undertaken to identify if “failed” suppliers had been acquired, and to determine, where 
possible, that failed firms had actually dissolved
20
.  Following these checks, 12 initial failures 
were recoded as having survived (and therefore treated as censored), resulting in 56 failures from 
214 suppliers and 1750 firm-year observations. 
 
Independent Variables 
Supplier Diversification:  To calculate the business scope for each of my sample of 
supplier firms, I exploited the nested structure of the International Patent Class (IPC) system 
(similar to the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system) and computed supplier 
diversification using the entropy index (Palepu, 1995), which is commonly employed in 
management studies as a measure of diversification (e.g., Lee & Kim, 2014; Markides, 1995; 
                                                          
20
 The treatment of merger and acquisitions (M&A) in studies of survival (or failure) may vary across literature.  At 
a basic level, firms may exit the sample because they have been acquired by another firm.  On the one hand, this 
may represent a failure in the sense that the acquired firm ceases to exist, and may have been acquired at a discount 
if it was struggling.  On the other hand, an acquisition may represent a success for the acquired firm, particularly if 
the strategic goal was to be acquired by a larger firm. In knowledge-based services, M&A are rife and often this has 
little relationship with a “failure”.  Importantly, the treatment of an acquired firm (i.e., failure or censored 
observation) may have a bearing on empirical findings of prior studies of firm survival. In this study, I follow recent 
studies in knowledge-based services and treat acquired suppliers as censored and not as having failed (Bermiss & 
Murmann, 2014). 
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Robins & Wiersema, 2003).  The IPC system has the advantage of sharply defined technology 
(patent) classes through which the scope of the firm can be cleanly identified.  However, the IPC 
system treats all patent classes as orthogonal (unrelated), when in reality they may be related.  
The entropy measure is attractive as it accounts for relatedness between lines of business 
(Palepu, 1985; Robins & Wiersema, 2003), thus mitigating any potential bias from non-
orthogonal (i.e., related) patent classes.  The entropy measure of diversification is given as;  
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1
ln (
1
𝑃𝑖𝑘 
) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑘 is the share supplier i’s patents of the kth 4-digit IPC
21
 (of N IPCs) in the total patent 
portfolio of the supplier over the prior three years.  Each IPC share was weighted by the relative 
importance of that IPC in the supplier’s patent portfolio, where the weight is the logarithm of the 
inverse of its share.  Palepu (1985) provides a derivation in which it is shown that the expression 
above consists of two elements; related diversification (DR) and unrelated diversification (DU), 
and that total diversification (DT) is the sum of DR and DU. 
 Long-Term Clients:  To compute the extent to which suppliers focus their business on 
serving long-term, repeated clients relative to new or ad-hoc clients, for each year (starting in 
1986) I constructed supplier-client dyads where each dyad match was identified as a client 
having outsourced patent legal work to the focal supplier in that year.  Then, for each supplier in 
each year, I calculated the fraction of patents in their business portfolio accounted for by clients 
they provided serves to in each of the previous five years.   
                                                          
21
 For example patent class B41G can be thought of a B/41/G, where B is 1 digit, B41 is 3 digit, and B41G is 4 digit. 
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Client Market Opportunity: The extent to which clients operate in faster-paced markets 
than suppliers (or vice-versa) was computed as the difference in the growth of IPCs within the 
business portfolios of a supplier’s clients, and the growth of IPCs within the same supplier’s 
business portfolio.  Using the universe of patents applied to, and granted by, the USPTO, I 
calculated a running three-year log-growth in the number of patents in each 4-digit IPC 
technology domain, and used these IPC growth rates to compute separate measures for “client 
market growth” and “supplier market growth”.  Specifically, Client Market Opportunity is 
calculated as
22
;  
 
𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ [(∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑛
𝑘=1
) ∗ 𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡]
𝑛
𝑗=1
−  ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑛
𝑘=1
  
 
where 𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑡 is the three-year log-growth of patents in each IPC k weighted by the three-year 
fraction of client j patents in IPC k,  𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the three-year fraction of client j patents accounted 
for in supplier i’s business portfolio, and  𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡is the three-year share of supplier i’s patents in 
each IPC k. 
 
Control Variables 
Market Volatility: The number of patents issued annually for the previous 3 years 
(including the focal year) was regressed on the year variable.  The standard error of the 
regression coefficient was then divided by the three year mean of patents in each 4-digit IPC 
(Kor, Mahoney, & Watson, 2008; Sharfman & Dean, 1991; Wang & Chen, 2010).  Finally, IPC-
volatility figures where weighted by the three-year fraction of supplier patents across IPCs, and 
                                                          
22
 Where the first term is client market growth and the second term is supplier market growth. 
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then aggregated to portfolio level.  Client Distance is computed as the Mahalanobis Distance 
(MD)
23
 between the patent vector of a focal supplier, and the weighted outsourced patent vector 
of that supplier’s clients.  The MD calculates the share of their clients’ business suppliers are 
able to capture.  Supplier Size is computed as the number of patent attorneys registered as being 
employed at a supplier in the focal year.  Domain Expertise is measured as the three-year share 
of non-prior art citations (such as citations to academic publications and research presentations) 
among all citations in a supplier’s patent portfolio.  A higher share of non-prior art citations is an 
indication that a supplier builds more on specialized scientific knowledge relative to practical 
inventions (Cassiman et al., 2008). Occupational Expertise is calculated as the percentage of 
patents in the supplier’s prior patent work that cite a previously litigated patent.  Such patents are 
themselves about six times more likely to be subject to litigation than an average patent (Mayer 
et al., 2012) and clients are more likely to seek superior legal competence to prosecute these 
patents in case they are later contested in the courts.  Client Size:  The average size of a 
supplier’s clients is proxied as the total level of innovation from clients within a supplier’s 
portfolio.  For each year, I calculated the number of patents obtained by each client and weighted 
those patents by the fraction of a supplier’s business accounted for by that client in the previous 
three years, before aggregating to compute a weighted average measure of client innovation for 
each supplier.  Outsourced Patents is the number of patents outsourced by each client to a focal 
                                                          
23 The MD is calculated as; 𝑀𝐷 =  √(𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐽𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑊−1(𝑆𝑖𝑡 −  𝐶𝐽𝑖𝑡)
′
 where W
-1
 is the inverse of the pooled 
covariance matrix. The supplier vector, Si, was calculated as the fraction of each supplier’s patents across 4-digit 
IPCs in a particular year t, while the client vector CJi is the aggregated share of patents in each IPC outsourced by 
clients of the focal supplier.  Each individual client IPC-share was weighted by the three year fraction of supplier 
business accounted for by that client, whereby greater weight in the measure is given to clients served more 
frequently by suppliers.  The MD has a critical advantage over the Euclidean Distance (ED) -- which is an 
alternative distance measure used extensively to calculate differences between organizations -- in that the MD 
accounts for correlations between dimensions.  In other words, by taking into account the correlation-covariance 
matrix, the MD considers underlying similarities between IPCs as well as the mean differences between the 
portfolios of suppliers and clients (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009; Kumar, Mahalanobis, & Juday, 2006). 
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supplier, which, again, is weighted by the three-year fraction of that suppliers’ total business 
accounted for by those clients before aggregating across all clients in the supplier’s portfolio. 
 
Econometric Model 
I tested my hypotheses using discrete-time survival analysis techniques.  Discrete time 
survival analysis treats time not as a continuous variable, but as partitioned into discrete periods.  
In this study, each discrete-time period was represented by one year.  Logistic models are 
particularly well suited to discrete-time survival estimation (Allison, 1984), particularly when the 
explanatory variables are taken in multi-year intervals (Bermiss & Murmann, 2014). For 
estimation, I employed a logit model which uses binary variables as survival indicators and 
calculates coefficients using logistic probabilities.  A link test (Pregibon, 1979) confirmed my 
estimated model was correctly specified and that no relevant variables had been omitted.  The 
data were organized in yearly cross-sectional panels, and the interest was in understanding 
between-firm rather than within-firm differences. Specifically, I estimated the probability of 
supplier firm survival in year t+1, conditional on surviving to year t.   To account for potential 
heteroskedasticity and non-independence of residuals within groups, I used robust standard 
errors that were clustered by supplier.  My results are also robust to using a complementary log-
log specification, which fits a discrete-time proportional hazard model, similar to a discrete-time 
Cox model (Prentice & Gloeckler, 1978). 
 
RESULTS   
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report the summary statistics and correlation matrix.  A Variance 
Inflation Test shows that multicollinearity is not a factor in my model.  The mean VIF value was 
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1.42 with the highest VIF value at 2.22. 
Table 4.3 presents the coefficients from the main logit models, wherein Model 1 reports 
control variables only.  Model 2 tests hypothesis 1 which predicted a positive relationship 
between supplier diversification and supplier survival.  The coefficient of Supplier 
Diversification is positive and significant at the 1% level, providing strong statistical support for 
H1.  Figure 4.1 graphically presents the predicted probability of supplier survival at different 
levels of supplier diversification, while Figure 4.2 presents the marginal effects for this 
hypothesis.  Both Figures 1 and 2 corroborate H1. 
Model 3 in Table 4.3 presents results for hypothesis 2, which predicted that a greater 
fraction of a supplier’s new business accounted for by long-term clients strengthens the positive 
relationship between supplier diversification and supplier survival.  The coefficient of the 
interaction of Supplier Diversification*Long-Term Clients is positive and significant at the 5% 
level, thus supporting H2.  However, the interpretation of interaction effects in non-linear models 
cannot be determined through the coefficient alone (Hoetker, 2007).   Unlike linear models, the 
marginal effect of a change in both interacted variables is not equal to the marginal effect of 
changing just the interaction term (Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004).  Moreover, both the sign and 
statistical significance may vary across observations (Huang & Shields, 2000) and, therefore, 
statistical significance cannot be determined from the z-statistic on the regression output 
(Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004).  To address this, scholars have recommended plotting the 
interaction effect for each observation and then identifying the range of values on which the 
interaction effect is statistically significant
24
 (Ai & Norton, 2003; Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004).  
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 provide this interpretation. Figure 4.3 plots the interaction effect of Supplier 
Diversification*Long-Term Clients for each observation in Model 3.  We see indeed that the 
                                                          
24
 This is computed in Stata using the user-written inteff command from Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004). 
 119 
 
signs of the interaction effects vary within the model; however, the mean interaction effect is 
positive.  Figure 4.4 plots the z-statistic for each interaction effect and it is observed that the 
range in which the interaction effect has a statistically significant positive impact on supplier 
survival is between 0.6 and 0.85, corroborating H2. 
Model 4 in Table 4.3 tests hypothesis 3, which predicted greater growth in client markets 
relative to supplier markets positively moderates the effect of supplier diversification on supplier 
survival.  The coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level, supporting H3.   Figures 4.5 
and 4.6 plot the interaction effects and z-statistics, respectively.   As with H2, we note in Figure 
4.5 that the signs of the interaction effects for H3 in Model 4 may be both positive and negative, 
although the mean interaction effect is negative, which is contrary to the prediction of H3.  
However, we observe in Figure 4.6 that the observations which have a statistically significant 
impact on the probability of supplier survival have a positive sign, as predicted by H3.  Overall, 
the findings corroborate the predictions made in the current study. 
 
Additional Analyses 
A number of additional analyses were performed to determine the robustness of the main 
results, and these tests are reported in Appendix C.  First, an alternative to the entropy index used 
in this study is the concentric index (Caves, Porter, & Spence, 1980; McGahan, 1999; 
Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988).   Like the entropy index, the 
concentric measure accounts for relatedness between lines of business and I ran the main logit 
models from Table 4.3 again with the concentric index as the dependent variable.  These 
alternative results corroborated H1 and H3 of the main findings, but is statistically a much 
weaker fitting model (comparing the full models; using the concentric diversification measure 
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yields a BIC’ = -15.275 and McFadden’s R-squared =0.362 compared to a BIC’ of -91.371 and a 
McFadden’s R-squared of 0.516 when using the entropy diversification measure).  Second, I 
tested an alternative time specification of three years (rather than five) to examine the impact of 
long-term clients on the supplier diversification-supplier survival relationship.  I found in this 
case, H2 is not statistically significant, suggesting that suppliers may only reap survival benefits 
from enduring relationships once those relationships have passed a certain duration threshold.  
Third, the current study examines suppliers who provide specialized patent legal services.  
However, suppliers in my sample that provide legal services beyond patent work (e.g., large, 
broad-based corporate law firms) are likely to gain survival advantages through being the “patent 
arm” within a larger firm.  While data limitations meant that I could not identify the full scope of 
legal services provided by my sample of suppliers, 24 suppliers were included in the annual 
National Law Journal (NLJ) rankings of the largest, and typically highly diversified, 250 US 
corporate law firms.  To check if my findings were being driven by these large suppliers, I 
removed them from the sample and ran the main models again. The main results were 
corroborated using this smaller sample of suppliers.   Finally, while the logit model was an 
appropriate specification for the analyses in the present study, my results are also robust to the 
alternative specification of a complementary log-log model.  Taken together, the additional 
analyses provide confidence in the robustness of the research findings presented in this study.   
 
Limitations 
While the findings of the current study provide contributions to the literatures in 
corporate diversification and the relational view, this study is not without limitations. The first 
limitation is the context of patent legal services.  While the theorizing and findings are likely 
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generalizable across other contexts in knowledge-based services, they may be less applicable to 
manufacturing industries or other industries where critical assets are less fungible across lines of 
business, and where the implementation of diversification strategies involves significant up-front 
financial sunk costs and greater risk. 
The second, related, limitation, is the examination of supplier-client relationships.  
Serving clients and building relational ties is of fundamental strategic importance to suppliers.  
However, it is less clear whether the theorizing and findings of this study would be relevant for 
other forms of inter-organizational relationships, such as horizontal strategic alliances.  For 
example, while partner-specific absorptive capacity has been cited as being an important 
mechanism for knowledge transfer and understanding the business of the partner firm (Zahra & 
George, 2002), it is unclear whether alliance partners with a greater resource overlap would be 
more or less likely to survive through forming their alliance.  
A third limitation concerns the factors that lead to supplier failure.  In knowledge-based 
service firms, the downward spiral leading to failure can manifest relatively quickly and is often 
linked to a drop in revenues and a subsequent decrease in the pool of firm profits that are 
distributed between firm manager-owners (“partners”).  When revenues are down, these firms 
are at risk of their key revenue makers defecting to a rival, which can have a pied-piper effect of 
other employees following, weakening the firm.  Data limitations meant that financial results 
were not available for my sample of suppliers, which would have allowed detection of a 
declining revenue position over time.  However, as employee exit can be closely linked to poorer 
financial performance, the control variable Employee Turnover is a suitable proxy.  
Unsurprisingly, we observe across most models in Table 4.3 that a higher level of Employee 
Turnover reduces a supplier’s probability of survival. 
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Suppliers with a higher market reputation for quality are likely to have a survival 
advantage as these suppliers are better able to attract and retain high caliber clients and talent 
(Greenwood et al., 2005).  Indeed, prior empirical findings reveal that higher firm reputation can 
significantly increase a supplier’s financial performance (Greenwood et al., 2005).  However, 
and the final limitation considered here, this study lacks a direct measure for supplier reputation.  
This lack of a direct measure for supplier reputation could be problematic if reputational effects, 
as can be reasonably expected, have an important bearing on supplier survival.  I do, however, 
feasibly address this concern through other mechanisms.  First, suppliers gain a positive 
reputation through having superior competencies which creates high value for clients.  The 
inclusion of variables that control for a supplier’s domain expertise and occupational expertise 
directly address how competent a supplier is in terms of knowledge of a client industry (i.e., 
Domain Expertise) and knowledge of patent and litigation law (i.e., Occupational Expertise).  
We note in Table 4.3 that greater Domain Expertise and Occupational Expertise increase the 
probability of supplier survival.  Second, those suppliers included in the NLJ 250 are likely to 
have a higher reputation than suppliers not included.  Yet, as noted above, the main findings in 
this study do not change when these suppliers are removed from the sample.  Therefore, I submit 
that the control variables included in the main models, together with the additional analyses 
discussed, mitigate this data limitation. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the current study provides a number of contributions 
to extant literature, which I discuss next. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Drawing from strategy research on corporate diversification and the relational view, this 
study examined how the scope of client services offered by knowledge-based service suppliers 
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impacted the survival of those firms.  Using a sample of patent law firms (i.e., suppliers) I found 
strong statistical support for the baseline prediction that a broader scope of services increases the 
probability of supplier survival (hypothesis 1).  This study, thus, contributes to nascent research 
that examines how firm scope impacts firm survival (e.g., Barnett & Freeman, 2001; Bercovitz & 
Mitchell, 2007; Sorenson et al., 2006; Stern & Henderson, 2004), though this study is distinct in 
that it is the first to examine the diversification-survival relationship in a human capital intensive 
industry, and moreover, is the first study to investigate the moderating impact of vertical 
exchange relationships on the efficacy of horizontal business scope for firm survival advantages. 
Knowledge-based service suppliers exist solely to provide services to clients.  
Consequently, prior research and practitioner evidence extol the importance of strategies for 
capturing new business and maintaining client relationships (Bower, 2014; Chatain, 2011; 
Maister, 1993; Mawdsley, 2015).  Specifically, one critical concern for managers is the extent to 
which they should channel firm resources towards sourcing greater levels of new business from 
their existing clients.  While focusing on serving existing clients can provide advantages in terms 
of a more stable revenue stream (Chatain, 2011), the trade-off to such an approach is a decreased 
focus on capturing new clients from the market, which in turn, can negatively impact 
organizational learning (Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003).  Therefore, due to the criticality of clients to 
the well-being of suppliers, an appropriate examination of the performance impacts of a 
supplier’s business scope should also consider the supplier’s relational, or demand-side, strategy 
(Adner & Zemsky, 2006; Priem, 2007).   
Accordingly, I bridged literatures on corporate diversification and the relational view, 
and connected corporate-level strategy with business-level strategy, by examining the 
moderating effect of a supplier’s relational strategy – specifically, the extent to which a 
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supplier’s focus their business on serving long-term clients -- on their scope-survival 
relationship.  Prior research suggests long-term exchange relationships can lead to potential 
disadvantages for suppliers, such as knowledge obsolescence (Anderson & Jap, 2005), increased 
resource dependency (Sorenson & Waguespack, 2006; Sheppard, 1995), and reduced market 
focus (Lazzarini et al., 2008).  Moreover, long-term relationships may, in fact, be at a greater risk 
of dissolution due to evolving client requirements which can weaken the resource-fit between 
suppliers and clients (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Seabright et al., 1992).  Dissolution of long-
standing client ties can be hazardous for suppliers due to having likely accumulated significant 
levels of specialized resources (Argyres & Zenger, 2012) that hold less value for alternative 
clients (Klein et al., 1978).  However, the finding that suppliers can increase the positive survival 
effect from having a broader scope when their business portfolio does, in fact, comprise of 
relatively more business from long-term clients (hypothesis 2) reveals an important condition 
under which suppliers can gain advantages from bonding themselves more strongly to, and 
increasing dependency on, their clients.  Thus, this study showed that suppliers can gain 
relational advantages when implementing strategies that enable them to meet more needs from 
existing clients (as opposed to new clients).  In meeting more needs of these long-term clients, 
suppliers can develop internal routines and processes that more effectively manage client 
interdependencies, while the dissemination of client-specific knowledge across more lines of 
business enables suppliers to more precisely meet the needs of those clients.  Moreover, by 
creating multiplex ties (Rogan, 2014a), suppliers are able to increase the economic bonding with 
clients due to greater client switching costs of using an alternative supplier (Williamson, 1985). 
Another implication for suppliers who hold a portfolio of embedded client relationships is that it 
may allow suppliers to be more risk averse in their strategic formulations, which may have 
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particular advantages for survival
25
. Therefore, with this finding I also contribute to and extend 
recent research that examines how suppliers can derive economic benefits when providing 
multiple services to clients (Chatain & Zemsky, 2007; Siggelkow, 2003), and how these service 
offerings increase relationship stability and preserve future relationship value (Chatain, 2011). I 
also extend the relational view by revealing how a supplier’s business scope strategy interacts 
with its relational strategy to deliver positive performance outcomes. 
The current study also investigated the effect of market conditions on the efficacy of 
supplier diversification for supplier survival. Controlling for the volatility of markets within a 
supplier’s portfolio of businesses, the finding that greater growth in the markets of clients, 
relative to markets of suppliers (hypothesis 3), underscores the importance of innovative 
exchange partners as mechanism for organizational learning.  Indeed, a broader business scope 
increases the channels through which suppliers can gain new knowledge from innovative clients 
that provide greater opportunities for suppliers to build new competencies, and identify 
complementarities between their businesses and the businesses of their clients. 
The relational view primarily focuses attention on factors specific to exchange 
relationships, such as inter-organizational resources and capabilities and mutual forms of 
relationship governance, while often paying only cursory attention to the environment in which 
exchange relationships occur.  Therefore, I extend the relational view by revealing the contextual 
importance of a client markets to supplier performance.  I also contribute to nascent research that 
establishes a link between market conditions and a firm’s diversification-survival relationship 
                                                          
25
 This point is illustrated by the contrasting experiences of corporate law firms Coudert Brothers and Clifford 
Chance.  US-based Coudert Brothers were the first truly international law firm, and their overseas expansion 
initially gave them a competitive advantage.  However, Coudert lacked an embedded portfolio of clients which they 
could rely on for business, and their overseas offices were unprofitable.  Coudert were soon overtaken by rivals, 
including UK-based Clifford Chance who had a portfolio of deep and lasting relationships with lucrative investment 
banking clients who they could leverage as part of a lower risk strategy for expanding into foreign markets.  While 
Coudert failed in 2006, Clifford increased their profitability and strengthened their position as one of the preeminent 
UK law firms (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/30/business/30law.html?pagewanted=all). 
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(e.g., Stern & Henderson, 2004).  However, while Stern and Henderson (2004) examined market 
effects in the context of competitive (i.e. rivalrous) inter-organizational relationships, my 
approach considers the effects of markets within cooperative inter-organizational relationships. 
The findings in this study offer a number of opportunities for future research.  First, while 
the present study offers insights into the performance advantages of serving long-term clients, 
future research may examine the extent to which suppliers focus their strategies on meeting more 
of their clients’ needs and capturing a greater share of their clients’ business – in other words, 
how closely does the service scope of suppliers mirror or overlap with the overall demand from 
their portfolio of clients.  For example, one recent study (Mawdsley & Somaya, 2015) finds that 
suppliers are more likely to diversify their business scope in response to scope changes by their 
clients, and this diversification effect is driven by their underpinning relational assets.  Building 
on this, researchers may investigate the drivers which increase or decrease the portfolio overlap 
between suppliers and clients.  In this vein, Table 5 offers one potential avenue for exploration.  
Using Client Distance as the dependent variable, a random effects OLS regression reveals that 
while greater supplier diversification is not necessarily a strong predictor of scope overlap (as 
shown by the insignificant coefficient on Supplier Diversification), suppliers with a portfolio 
comprised mainly of business from long-term clients do, on average, have greater scope overlap 
with their clients.  However, when client markets are growing more rapidly than supplier 
markets, there is less overlap between suppliers and clients, and when suppliers have superior 
domain and occupational expertise (and therefore are less likely to build relational assets with 
clients).   
Another avenue for future research is to test my theory and predictions in a context 
outside of legal services.  Typically, law firms do not extend significantly, if at all, beyond areas 
 127 
 
of legal practice. Other types of knowledge-based service firms are, however, noted for having 
branched out beyond their core offerings.  For example, large accounting firms (e.g., KPMG) 
diversified into business advisory services in order to offer more services to clients, and, 
moreover, these diversification strategies were in response to both the recognition that clients 
required more services than those suppliers currently offered, and that globalization of clients 
offered rich opportunities for new business acquisition. Indeed, examining geographic 
diversification as well as service diversification could provide an interesting research 
opportunity, not least because it has been noted in prior studies that relational assets can increase 
firm performance when firms expand internationally (Hitt et al., 2006).  Thus, can suppliers gain 
even greater advantages from aligning both their geographic and service footprint with clients, or 
would this strategy bring significant constraints and lead to relational disadvantages?  
Finally, previous research outlines the hazards associated with increased dependency on 
exchange partners for critical resources (Baker, 1990; Lee et al., 2014; Sheppard, 1995).  In the 
present study, long-term clients on which suppliers may feasibly be dependent upon for new 
business are found to confer survival benefits when that supplier has a broader scope.  However, 
the present study did not investigate contingencies in which dependency may impact these 
positive results.  For example, if clients can exercise power over suppliers, can suppliers still 
reap relational advantages?  Could suppliers diversify their scope away from clients if they 
become too dependent and started to suffer performance disadvantages?  However, the resolution 
of these questions, and those noted earlier, must await future research. 
In summary, the research findings in the present study make important contributions to 
the strategic management field by highlighting that, while suppliers can improve their survival 
chances from holding a broader scope of client services, strategies for maintaining long-term 
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client relationships have an important bearing on the effectiveness of diversification for survival.  
In addition, market conditions in the lines of business that suppliers and clients operate also 
significantly influence the scope-survival relationship. I encourage scholars to use this study as a 
platform to further develop the conversation on connecting business scope with inter-
organizational relationships.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of key variables 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Between 
S.D. 
Within 
S.D. 
       Supplier Diversification  3.46 0.82 0.63 4.97 0.79 0.46 
       Long-Term Clients 0.24 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.16 
       Client Market Opportunity -0.03 0.07 -0.53 0.64 0.04 0.06 
       Market Volatility 0.92 0.05 0.36 1.00 0.03 0.04 
       Client Distance 40.71 28.96 4.97 189.46 16.61 23.43 
       
Supplier Size 21.19 21.48 1.00 183.00 19.22 7.13 
       Supplier Turnover 0.03 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.06 
       Domain Expertise 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.53 0.06 0.03 
       Occupational Expertise 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.01 
       Client Size 139.67 270.44 0.25 3115.60 223.84 145.46 
       Outsourced Patents 53.89 116.38 0.44 1157.13 99.26 46.54 
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Table 4.2: Correlations between variables 
  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Survival 
1 
           
2 Supplier Diversification  
0.38 1 
          
3 Long-Term Clients 
-0.08 0.19 1 
         
4 Client Market Opportunity 
-0.05 -0.09 0.11 1 
        
5 Market Volatility 
-0.07 0.00 0.22 -0.07 1 
       
6 Client Distance 
-0.01 0.27 0.14 -0.09 -0.20 1 
      
7 Supplier Size 
0.07 0.37 0.19 -0.15 0.17 0.33 1 
     
8 Supplier Turnover 
-0.11 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 1 
    
9 Domain Expertise 
0.07 0.01 0.21 -0.16 0.29 0.02 0.29 0.01 1 
   
10 Occupational Expertise 
0.04 -0.12 -0.20 -0.15 0.04 -0.08 0.12 0.00 0.13 1 
  
11 Client Size 
-0.01 0.18 0.44 0.17 0.22 0.10 0.16 0.04 0.10 -0.14 1 
 
12 Outsourced Patents 
0.04 0.16 0.53 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.03 0.13 -0.18 0.69 1 
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Table 4.3: Determinants of supplier survival using logistic discrete-time survival analysis  
 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables   logit logit logit logit logit 
  
 
          
Supplier  Diversification H1 
 
1.9105*** 1.4828*** 2.1309*** 1.6937*** 
   
(0.1939) (0.2548) (0.2322) (0.2727) 
Supplier Diversification * 
Long Term Clients H2 
  
1.8620** 
 
2.0570*** 
    
(0.7924) 
 
(0.7752) 
Supplier Diversification * 
Client Market Opportunity H3 
   
4.5871*** 5.3494*** 
          (1.5932) (1.8300) 
Long Term Clients 
 
-2.7356*** -2.4832*** -6.2378*** -2.6118*** -6.7718*** 
  
(0.9298) (0.7469) (2.0338) (0.7128) (1.9454) 
Client Market Opportunity 
 
-1.5331 0.1709 0.0794 -5.9570** -7.2153** 
  
(3.2586) (1.6375) (1.8528) (2.6633) (3.0423) 
Market Volatility 
 
-23.8099** -6.5658** -8.1668** -5.1725* -7.0517** 
  
(9.9160) (3.0675) (3.6310) (2.7048) (3.2925) 
Client Distance 
 
-0.0135*** -0.0168** -0.0188** -0.0153* -0.0170** 
  
(0.0050) (0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0086) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.0372*** 0.0235 0.0218 0.0263 0.0254 
  
(0.0142) (0.0185) (0.0215) (0.0189) (0.0221) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
-5.0803* -4.7228*** -5.4875*** -5.0907*** -6.0140*** 
  
(2.6921) (1.6754) (1.5522) (1.6460) (1.5442) 
Domain Expertise 
 
11.3819** 7.8458** 8.2808** 8.3713** 8.9253** 
  
(4.6674) (3.2902) (3.7021) (3.4064) (3.9561) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
23.3328 7.5832 15.7984 10.4975 19.7857 
  
(23.8424) (18.2627) (18.7339) (18.0546) (18.8435) 
Client Size 
 
-0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0012 
  
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Outsourced Patents 
 
0.0142** 0.0043 0.0025 0.0043 0.0022 
  
(0.0070) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0030) 
Constant 
 
25.2324*** 5.3187* 7.6734** 3.5151 6.1305* 
  
(9.0430) (2.9896) (3.4882) (2.6489) (3.1699) 
       Observations 
 
1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 
Number of Firms 
 
214 214 214 214 214 
McFadden’s R-Squared  0.223   0.491 0.502 0.503 0.516 
BIC’  31.256 -94.012 -91.849 -92.545 -91.371 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES 
    Robust standard errors clustered by supplier in parentheses.  Logit  regressions.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.4: Determinants of portfolio overlap (Client Distance) between suppliers and 
clients 
 
  (1) 
VARIABLES OLS RE 
    
Supplier Diversification 0.0221 
 
(0.0577) 
Long-Term Clients -0.0710*** 
 
(0.0254) 
Client Market Opportunity 0.1270** 
 
(0.0616) 
Market Volatility -0.0116 
 
(0.0772) 
Supplier Size -0.0011*** 
 
(0.0004) 
Supplier Turnover -0.0041 
 
(0.0690) 
Domain Expertise 0.2463*** 
 
(0.0823) 
Occupational Expertise 1.3087*** 
 
(0.4719) 
Client Size -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) 
Outsourced Patents 0.0000 
 
(0.0001) 
Constant 0.3144*** 
 
(0.0970) 
  Observations 1,538 
Number of Suppliers 208 
Robust SE YES 
Year Dummies YES 
Robust standard errors clustered by supplier in 
parentheses.  Coefficients from random effects OLS. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 4.1: Hypothesis 1.  Impact of Supplier Diversification on the probability of supplier 
survival. 
 
 
Figure 4.2:  Hypothesis 1. Marginal effects of Supplier Diversification on the probability 
supplier survival. 
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Figure 4.3: Hypothesis 2:  Plotting of interaction effects for each observation 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Hypothesis 2:  Z-statistics of interaction effects for each observation 
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Figure 4.5: Hypothesis 3:  Plotting of interaction effects for each observation 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Hypothesis 3:  Z-statistics of interaction effects for each observation 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this dissertation was to advance strategic management scholarship 
through examining the implications on the performance and business scope of knowledge-based 
service suppliers that build deeply embedded exchange relationships with their clients.  Drawing 
from the relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale et al., 2000) -- which theorizes exchange 
partners can create and capture superior levels of value through the greater use of cooperative 
inter-organizational relationships (Madhok & Tallman, 1998) -- I developed the rationale that 
irreversible relationship-specific investments (or relational commitments) have important 
implications for the ability of suppliers to (1) grow their business, (2) expand their range of 
services offered to clients, and (3) to survive.    
This dissertation built on the insights of prior research that suggests suppliers, rather than 
formulating a different strategic approach for each individual client relationship, often adopt a 
more embedded, relational strategy or a more arms-length, transactional strategy to managing 
their entire portfolio of client relationships (Baker et al., 1998; Broschak, 2004; Moeen et al., 
2013).  Specifically, I examined the outcomes for suppliers who follow a more relational versus 
transactional portfolio strategy.  Moreover, since the relational view is a theoretical perspective 
that has developed largely at the level of the dyad, the firm-level implications of relationship-
specific investments are less clear.  Thus, I advanced the research literature by examining 
whether the dyadic-level relational advantages predicted by relational view can also be created 
and captured at the firm-level.  Across three dissertation studies, I found greater relationship-
specific investments significantly impacted supplier performance and business scope; however, 
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the dyadic-level theoretical predictions of the relational view are not necessarily corroborated at 
the firm-level. Rather, under certain conditions, relationship-specific investments can result in 
firm-level relational hazards.  I summarize my dissertation questions and main findings in Table 
5.1. 
While the relational view theorizes that unilateral relationship-specific investments -- 
such as suppliers building client-specific knowledge or developing idiosyncratic routines and 
processes for serving certain clients -- are important mechanisms for creating superior 
relationship value (e.g., Dyer, 1997), other research maintains that unilateral relationship-specific 
investments, in contrast, lead to negative impacts, for example, due to increased partner 
dependency and a higher exposure to potential partner opportunism (Baker, 1990; Sorenson & 
Waguespack, 2006; Williamson, 1975).  These negative impacts, or relational hazards, can 
reduce the level of value the investing partner is able to appropriate from the relationship.  
Chapter 2 investigated this theoretical tension by examining the impact of deeper relationship-
specific investments by suppliers and their clients on the long-run growth performance of 
suppliers.  Growth performance is a highly salient and visible signal of reputation and strength 
for suppliers (Maister, 1993), and provides advantages for capturing high-value clients and 
talented employees.  To emphasize the importance of growth, the leading US legal industry news 
outlet The National Law Journal annually publishes the top 250 US corporate law firms ranked 
by attorney headcount.  Prior to the 2008 economic downtown, these leading law firms had grew 
year-on-year for over two decades (Harper, 2013). 
In addition to unilateral relationship-specific investments, Chapter 2 also investigated the 
impact on supplier growth performance from both suppliers and their clients mutually investing 
to the relationship. The extant research literature maintains that mutual (or bilateral) relationship-
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specific investments can maximize exchange value through greater relationship productivity and 
longevity, while relationship transaction costs are lowered through governing the relationship 
through more flexible and cooperative forms of relational contracting (Macneil, 1980; 
Williamson, 1979; Zajac & Olsen, 1993).  Finally, one notable limitation of prior research in the 
relational view is that the environmental context in which relationships are formed is largely 
absent from empirical examination.  However, we know from the dynamic capabilities literature 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003) and contingency theorists (e.g., 
Donaldson, 2001; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967) that the environment is an 
important factor for a firm’s resource management strategies (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007).  
Therefore, in fast-paced, innovative environments, supplier strategies for creating value from 
stable, long-term exchange relationships may compete with strategies intended to maintain 
strategic flexibility and enable responses to environmental fluctuations (Ghemawat & del Sol, 
1998). Accordingly, chapter 2 examined the impact of fast-paced markets on supplier growth 
performance when suppliers follow a more relational, as opposed to discrete transactional, 
strategy. 
The findings of chapter 2 corroborated the mutual relationship commitment proposition 
of the relational view (Zajac & Olsen, 1993) by showing that supplier growth performance is 
highest when both suppliers and clients jointly invest in exchange relationships. However, while 
suppliers were found to gain advantages when their clients unilaterally made themselves more 
dependent on suppliers, greater unilateral knowledge investments by suppliers in their clients’ 
business did not lead to supplier growth advantages.  Rather, these unilateral knowledge 
investments may result in growth disadvantages for suppliers.   
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One explanation for this unexpected finding may be grounded in the theoretical tension 
between the relational view and transaction cost economics.  While the relational view maintains 
that client-specific knowledge can be a key driver of relationship value (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Zahra & George, 2002), transaction cost economics posits that specialized, unilateral investments 
restrict a firms alternative options and increase the risk of partner opportunism (Williamson, 
1975).   Moreover, although the productivity of a focal relationship may improve when suppliers 
hold deeper knowledge of their clients’ business and technologies (Dyer, 1997), across a 
portfolio of clients these specialized relationship investments may constrain a supplier’s strategic 
flexibility and increase barriers to new relationship formation. The surprising lack of empirical 
support provides compelling evidence that, counter to the predictions of the relational view, 
dyadic-level advantages do not necessarily translate to the firm-level.   
Finally, greater relationship-specific investments by either suppliers or clients were found 
in chapter 2 to be hazardous for supplier growth performance when a greater fraction of a 
supplier’s business portfolio is in higher growth markets.  These results reinforce the importance 
of environmental attributes that impact suppliers and clients. The findings of chapter 2 are 
summarized in Table 5.2. 
The finding that suppliers, under certain conditions, can generate performance advantages 
from formulating and implementing embedded client-management strategies has important 
implications for the next empirical dissertation study, chapter 3.  Building from the logic that 
suppliers often have advantages in sourcing greater volumes of new business from existing 
clients (Chatain, 2011; Mayer et al., 2012; Maister, 1993), chapter 3 examined whether suppliers 
can leverage existing client relationships in their business scope strategies. The central 
predictions of chapter 3 were that changes in the scope of outsourced needs from a supplier’s 
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portfolio of clients represent a significant demand-pull for suppliers to expand their scope of 
services into more distant (i.e., less related) lines of business, and that this “client-led 
diversification” effect was strengthened by greater relationship-specific investments. The 
theoretical underpinnings of client-led diversification were grounded in the notion that providing 
existing clients with services in new areas allows suppliers to gain economic advantages through 
generating client-specific economies of scope (Chatain & Zemsky, 2007).  It also enables 
suppliers to draw on (and extend) previously accumulated stocks of client-specific knowledge 
and developed forms of mutual relationship governance to reduce the adjustment costs that may 
otherwise be incurred through business portfolio expansion (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004).  As 
well as examining relationship-based drivers of business scope, chapter 3 also tested two 
alternative conditions that feasibly stimulate client-led diversification.  First, when the markets of 
clients offer higher potential for growth and profitability than suppliers’ own markets, suppliers 
are likely to have greater incentives to undertake client-led diversification. Second, suppliers 
holding greater excess resource capacity may be induced to internally redeploy those resources 
through business scope expansion rather than divesting through market mechanisms 
(Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982).   
The findings of chapter 3 revealed that changes in the scope of client needs are indeed a 
significant driver of changes in the business scope of suppliers; specifically, suppliers are more 
likely to diversify in response to diversification by their clients.  However, this client-led 
diversification effect was found to be driven almost entirely by relationship-specific investments 
from suppliers and their clients.  Moreover, the findings of chapter 3 show that relationship-
specific investments provide incentives for suppliers to diversify into areas less related to their 
current scope, in which the adjustment costs and diversification risks are theorized by extant 
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literature to be greater. I also found robust empirical support for client-led diversification when 
suppliers hold greater excess resource capacity which they can apply to their diversification 
strategies.   Surprisingly I found no empirical support for the prediction that greater demand in 
client markets relative to suppliers own markets increase the proclivity of client-led 
diversification.  It is possible that this lack of empirical support may be driven by the suboptimal 
behavior of suppliers who may take on easy business from existing clients despite attractive 
alternative market opportunities (but which may be costly to develop), or if it is an anomaly of 
the data and measures.  The findings of chapter 3 are provided in Table 5.3. 
While chapter 3 found that greater relationship-specific investments have important 
implications for the composition of a supplier’s portfolio of businesses, it left open the question 
of whether suppliers are able to capture performance advantages from relational-based strategies 
of business scope.  Indeed, a central concern of corporate diversification research over the last 
few decades has been to gain an understanding of whether diversified firms outperform 
specialized firms (e.g., Palich et al., 2000), and whether related or unrelated diversification 
provides greater performance benefits (e.g., Markides & Williamson, 1994; Miller, 2006; 
Rumelt, 1982).  Thus, a relational theory of diversification would be incomplete without an 
examination of the performance consequences.  In my third, and final, empirical study, chapter 4, 
I filled this gap by investigating how a supplier’s business scope, and the extent to which 
suppliers focus on serving existing clients, impacts the survival of suppliers.  The scope of 
services that suppliers can offer to existing clients determines not only their ability to meet a 
greater range of their clients’ needs and capture greater volumes of new business, but also the 
extent to which suppliers can diversify market risk, build relational advantages and economically 
bond clients.   Thus, I first theorized and predicted that suppliers can gain survival advantages 
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from holding a more diversified business scope, and then I built on insights from previous 
research which highlight the value of long-term, enduring relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Gulati, 1995; Hoetker et al., 2007; Seabright et al., 1992) to investigate whether suppliers 
increase their survival advantage when they dedicate a greater share of organizational resources 
and attention to serving long-standing clients.   Finally, I examined how differences in market 
growth of client markets relative to supplier markets moderated the supplier scope-survival 
relationship. 
The findings of chapter 4 corroborated the baseline prediction that suppliers increase their 
probability of survival when holding a more diversified portfolio of businesses.  Building on the 
notion that existing clients are a valuable source of new business, I also found suppliers can 
increase their scope-survival advantage by focusing greater attention (and building dependency) 
on serving long-standing clients rather than ad-hoc or new clients. This result reflects the value 
suppliers can achieve from creating strategies for building long-term relationships, which is a 
core premise of both the relational view and relational contracting literatures. A final finding 
from chapter 4 is that greater new business opportunities in client markets, relative to supplier 
markets, increases supplier survival when suppliers hold a broader service scope.  Thus, while 
chapter 3 suggests greater relative growth in client markets may not be a significant antecedent 
to client-led diversification, suppliers are still able to gain performance advantages from serving 
clients who are relatively more innovative due to greater learning opportunities, and the bonding 
of these important clients by meeting more of their needs.  A further interesting finding from 
chapter 4 is that relational assets may have negative implications for supplier survival, but a 
broader business scope provides suppliers with a dynamic ability to manage these vulnerabilities.  
The findings of chapter 4 are summarized in Table 5.4. 
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Taken together, the findings of this dissertation provide new, and nuanced, insights into 
the mechanisms that drive relational advantages, but which can also lead to relational hazards.  
In addition, the findings cast new light onto understanding the antecedents and consequences of 
horizontal business scope.   
In addition, it is well established that firm value creation is equal to a firm’s revenues 
minus its costs, while its appetite for risk influences the potential revenues gain and cost 
implications in terms of “where and how” to compete.  My dissertation provides insights into 
these three value creation “levers” in the context of vertical supplier-client relationships.  In 
chapters 2 and 3, specialized relational assets of client specific knowledge and relational 
commitments from clients may increase supplier revenues (i.e., organizational rents) through 
superior returns to specialized resources (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993) and capturing a greater 
share of their clients’ outsourced business over the longer term.  These relational assets may also 
lower production costs due to suppliers being able to draw on a stock of client specific 
knowledge in meeting the new needs of clients, while their costs of managing their client 
relationships are lowered due to superior coordination of client interdependencies.  Greater 
commitment from clients is also indicative of exchange relationships being governed through 
more efficient, cooperative governance mechanisms (Macneil, 1980; Mooen et al., 2013). These 
mechanisms which create superior value for suppliers also allow them to, at a lower risk, 
implement strategies that would ordinarily be considered higher risk, notably growing their firm 
(chapter 2) and diversification (chapter 3).  
 In chapter 4, suppliers increase their survival chances through a broader business scope.  
A broader scope offers greater potential for higher revenues, while a more related portfolio of 
businesses allows for lower production costs due to resource synergies and efficient resource 
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redeployment.  Providing numerous services to the same client is one mechanism through which 
business areas can be related (even if the businesses themselves are less related in terms of 
underlying resources).  Holding a portfolio of long-term clients allows suppliers to build 
significant levels of specialized relational assets which generate superior revenues (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998), while a deeper understanding of these clients’ business lowers the costs of service 
provision (Chatain, 2011; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Maister, 1993) due to reduced (or 
eliminated) upfront learning and relationship development costs.  Moreover, the stable stream of 
revenues from long-term clients can allow suppliers to be either more risk averse (i.e., less need 
to take on risky ventures to generate revenues) or may allow suppliers to take on higher risk 
ventures, such as exploration into new domains, due to this financial buffer.   
In sum, my dissertation research makes significant inroads into understanding, in more 
detail, the mechanisms which create value and impact strategy from vertical exchange 
relationships. I present the specific contributions to research and practice after discussing the 
limitations of this dissertation in the next section. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
While this dissertation advances strategic management research through offering new 
insights into the implications of committed exchange relationships for firm-level performance 
and business scope, there are a number of limitations.  The first limitation concerns the empirical 
context of US patent legal services.  Although the project-level longitudinal data used across all 
three empirical studies allowed the construction of fine-grained, dynamic relational portfolios 
between suppliers and clients, this context is nonetheless highly specific and may not generalize 
to other contexts.  In particular, this dissertation may not generalize to contexts where firms 
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create value from physical assets (rather than intangible, knowledge-based assets), and where 
strategic resource investments may require substantial sunk-cost financial commitments (e.g., a 
new manufacturing plant).  Therefore, one clear extension to this dissertation is to test the 
predictions in alterative contexts where irreversible relationship-specific investments may 
influence firm strategy differently. 
A second limitation of this dissertation is the potential generalizability to horizontal inter-
organizational relationships, in particular strategic alliances.  Strategic alliances are often formed 
with the goals of learning from the other partner or for accessing new resources (Doz, 1996; 
Hamel, 1991; Kale & Singh, 2007), while one partner may also take an equity stake in the other.  
Therefore, the relational strategies proposed in this dissertation may not apply equally, or at all, 
across different forms of alliances.  For example, although strategic alliance research has begun 
to make inroads into examining the performance impacts from alliance portfolios (e.g., Vassolo, 
Anand, & Folta, 2004; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2011), strategic alliance research also suggests 
that partners may capture less value when they are more similar in terms of their respective 
knowledge bases (e.g., Gulati et al., 2009).  Furthermore, it might be unlikely that a firm 
diversifies because of diversification by the other alliance partner; indeed, forming an alliance 
with a partner in a new line of business may actually substitute for the firm diversifying 
organically. Thus, future research may examine the predictions and findings of this dissertation 
within the context of different inter-organizational relationships. 
A third limitation relates to a lack of direct measures for relational governance and 
supplier reputation.  In regards to the former, relational governance is theorized in the research 
literature as an important mechanism for building relational advantages (Macneil, 1980; Zaheer 
& Venkatraman, 1995; Zaheer et al., 1998).  Prior studies have typically measured relational 
 146 
 
governance through survey (e.g., Dyer 1997; Dyer & Chu, 2003) but this tool is not suitable for 
large-scale longitudinal datasets as used in this dissertation.  While the measures I employ may 
be viewed as suitable proxies, in particular Relational (client) Commitment (chapters 2 and 3) 
and Long-Term Clients (chapter 4), this nonetheless remains a limitation.  In terms of the lack of 
a direct measure for supplier reputation, suppliers with a stronger reputation for quality are likely 
to gain benefits for both growth performance and survival as they should have advantages in 
gaining clients and high caliber talent (Greenwood et al., 2005).  While I included control 
variables for the quality of firm expertise and performed additional analyses that controlled for 
(or removed) elite law firms, a precise, exogenous, reputation measure for all my supplier firms 
was not available.   
A fourth limitation concerns the symptoms that can ultimately lead to supplier failure, 
which was the focus of chapter 4.  In knowledge-based service industries, suppliers are 
particularly vulnerable when they suffer a sharp decline in revenues (Harper, 2013).  The 
partnership governance structure of most modern-day knowledge-based service firms (Maister, 
1993) means that firm manager-partners are residual claimants to firm profits.  When firm 
revenues decline, the pool of firm profits to be distributed among manager-partners shrinks, 
which increases the risk that a supplier’s best talent and clients can be poached by rivals (Teece, 
2003).  The loss of important clients and superior talent can quickly lead to a downward spiral 
where even large, apparently financially strong suppliers, are more vulnerable to failure (Harper, 
2013).  The limitation for this dissertation is that only the largest US corporate law firms 
regularly report their financial performance, and the majority of my supplier sample firms do not 
fall into this category. Therefore, I was unable to identify in chapter 4 whether suppliers who 
failed were in financial difficulty in the periods preceding the failure event. Future research may 
 147 
 
examine client relationships of the largest law firms and see if they can detect similar patterns to 
my findings, or if different mechanisms result in the failure (or poorer financial performance) of 
these elite supplier firms. 
The final limitations of this dissertation concern the impact of human capital and 
individual-level ties for value creation in exchange relationships. Prior studies suggest that 
mechanisms which underpin relational advantages, such as client-specific knowledge and trust, 
may reside at the inter-personal level rather than at the organizational-level (Kale et al., 2000; 
Zaheer et al., 1998), and this is reflected by clients switching their business between suppliers 
when professionals change employer (Broschak, 2004; Somaya et al., 2008).  Furthermore, 
because the productive assets of suppliers are the knowledge and expertise of professional talent 
(von Nordenflycht, 2010), the business scope of suppliers is determined exclusively by the 
human capital of their professional workforce.  Consequently, suppliers can alter their spectrum 
of client services and augment their portfolio of clients through the strategic hiring of new talent, 
while losing talent to rivals may also have significant impacts on supplier business scope and 
client retention (Somaya et al., 2008).  In my dataset, I was unable to observe these individual-
level mechanisms, and therefore I cannot rule out the potential influence of inter-personal 
relationships between exchange managers, or the particular areas of expertise of inbound or 
outbound patent attorneys, on my empirical findings.  However, in my empirical tests I am able 
to control for the impact of outbound employee mobility in general. 
In mitigation of critical relational assets that are potentially held the individual, rather 
than firm, level, anecdotal evidence from managers of supplier and client firms point to the 
importance of mechanisms that are indeed at the inter-organizational level.  For example, the 
managing partner of a large US law firm comments that:  “The important element…is to have a 
 148 
 
completely integrated approach to clients which is all about information flow and making sure 
you have appropriate [organizational] processes in place [to manage clients’ needs]”.26  
Similarly, the Chief Legal Officer of a client firm (responsible for her firms’ legal outsourcing 
strategy) notes the strong correlation between individual and organizational level factors; “Yes 
you hire lawyers not firms, but typically the lawyer you are hiring is a relationship person within 
that firm who is providing 80% of the types of advice that you need in a particular matter” 
(Coates et al., 2011: 1015).  Finally, the senior manager of a management consultancy 
emphasized the importance of multiple ties between suppliers and clients, which again is 
indicative of organizational-level relationships; “It’s a bit like binding Gulliver…. Each of these 
individual strings may not be tough enough to hold it, so you’re much better to try and have a 
whole range of small connections, which actually creates a whole lot of strength, I think, much 
more strength than one strong piece of rope which be just cut by a knife leaving you with 
nothing” (Rogan, 2014: 563).  Notwithstanding this anecdotal evidence, one important area of 
future research is to examine in more depth the correlations between mechanisms at the inter-
personal and organizational-level. Sorenson and Rogan (2014) provide a useful discussion of the 
main considerations in this regard, and how these impact supplier firm outcomes. I turn next to 
the main contributions and managerial implications of this dissertation. 
 
Contributions and Managerial Implications 
Across three empirical studies, this dissertation, as a whole, makes a number of 
contributions to the research literature. First, I contribute to strategic management scholarship by 
connecting corporate-level strategy with business-level strategy.  Research examinations of 
                                                          
26
 Quote obtained from panel discussion with law firm executives hosted by Practising Law Institute. Reproduced 
with permission. 
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which arenas firms compete in (corporate strategy) and how they should compete in those arenas 
(business strategy) are part of the bedrock of strategic management research.  However, prior 
studies have, in the main, failed to make linkages between the two levels, even though in reality 
they are intimately connected (Rawley & Simcoe, 2010, being one notable exception).  Thus, by 
examining the scope strategies of suppliers in concert with their strategies for managing their 
portfolio of clients, this dissertation represents a significant advancement in our understanding of 
how business strategy influences corporate strategy. 
While traditional research explorations in the relational view have provided substantial 
insights at the level of the dyad, the potential firm-level impacts of being a more relational 
partner are less understood.  Thus, one main contribution of this dissertation is to extend the 
relational view by going beyond the dyad to examine the firm-level impacts of relationship-
specific investments across a supplier’s portfolio of relationships. This portfolio-level 
examination also contributes to the emerging perspective in strategic alliance research that 
investigates portfolio-effects from a firm’s entire collection of alliance partners (e.g., Vassolo et 
al., 2004; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2011).  Furthermore, this dissertation connects the relational 
view to resource-based theory (e.g., Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984) by 
examining how intangible and difficult-to-imitate resources and capabilities that span 
organizational boundaries (as opposed to be being firm-specific) can drive firm competitive 
advantage (Madhok & Tallman, 1998), and in addition, pays explicit attention to demand-side 
mechanisms that influence supply-side capabilities.  Therefore, this dissertation also contributes 
to nascent research in demand-side strategy (e.g., Adner & Zemsky, 2006; Priem, 2007).   
Another contribution of the dissertation as a whole is to the literature that extends the unit 
of analysis beyond the individual transaction (e.g., Argyres & Liebeskind; Kang et al., 2009), 
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which is the traditional focus of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975).  The perspective 
adopted in this dissertation views specialized investments as a means to capture long-term value 
from repeated transactions.  In this way, this dissertation extends transaction cost theory, and 
contributes to the relational contracting (Macauley, 1963; Macneil, 1980; Zaheer & 
Venkatramanm 1995) and cooperative game-theory literatures (Axelrod, 1984; Vanneste & 
Frank, 2013) that take a longer term perspective on inter-organizational relationships.   
In the chapter 2, I contribute to the relational view through a firm-level examination of 
whether suppliers capture performance advantages from a relational, as opposed to discrete 
transactional, strategy.  I extend the relational view by revealing conditions under which 
relational advantages that are theorized to exist at the level of individual relationship also transfer 
to firm-level advantages. Furthermore, I identify conditions under which relationship-specific 
investments harm firm-level performance, and which run counter to the predictions of the 
relational view.  In addition, my explicit theorizing on how relationship-specific investments 
impact firm growth performance contributes to recent research that criticizes management 
research for abstract conceptualizations of firm performance and the use of empirical measures 
that may not align with underlying theoretical constructs (see Miller, Washburn & Glick, 2013).   
As well as connecting corporate-level strategy with business-level strategy, the second 
empirical study, chapter 3, specifically contributes to the cooperative strategy literature by 
extending the theorizing in the relational view to develop and test a theory about how 
relationship-specific investments impact firm-level business scope.  In addition, this novel, 
relational theory of diversification contributes to the corporate strategy literature by providing an 
unexplored rationale for diversification.  Furthermore, in contrast to prior resource-based studies 
of corporate diversification that posit firms are more likely to apply excess resource capacity 
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towards entering related lines of business (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980; 1982), I found that 
suppliers can apply excess resources towards entering markets that are less related to their 
current business portfolio.  Therefore, I contribute to extant research on resource-based drivers of 
diversification. 
The third empirical study, chapter 4, bridges and extends research in the relational view 
and corporate strategy by revealing an important interactive relationship between a supplier’s 
business scope and its relational strategy for firm survival.   I also contribute to the small body of 
diversification research that connects business scope to organizational mortality (e.g., Barnett & 
Freeman, 2001; Bercovitz & Mitchell, 2007; Sorenson et al., 2006; Stern & Henderson, 2004).   
Chapter 4 also contributes to and extends recent studies that examine the value suppliers can 
create from providing multiple services to their clients, and how these multi-service offerings 
increase relationship stability (Chatain, 2011; Chatain & Zemsky, 2007).  
As well as contributions to scholarship, this dissertation also provides a number of 
managerial implications.  The first managerial implication concerns the extent to which suppliers 
should become dependent on their existing clients for revenues.  While existing clients are 
valuable sources of new business that can provide suppliers with competitive advantages, 
managers also need to consider the potential trade-offs from building embedded relational 
strategies that commit scarce organizational resources to those clients.  For example, building 
embedded exchange relationships is likely to reduce strategic flexibility and could lead to 
constraints in building new capabilities.  On the other hand, while the market frictions from 
relationship-specific investments may limit the ability of suppliers to capture new clients, they 
also reduce the risks of existing clients from being lured away by rivals (Chatain, 2011; Chatain 
& Zemsky, 2011).  
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A second managerial implication is that managers should pay due care to the emerging 
needs of their existing clients, as these needs can often be met at a lower cost than sourcing and 
establishing new clients.  In particular, identifying ways in which to meet more needs of existing 
clients can be a fruitful avenue of increased revenues, while these clients may also be particularly 
valuable for reducing the risks associated with firm expansion. 
A third managerial implication concerns the finding that the value of relationship-specific 
investments may be significantly affected by prevailing market conditions.  If the future resource 
requirements of the market are less certain, then the net-present value of any new specialized 
investments may be low.  Therefore, managers need to carefully consider the types of resources 
that will most likely be required to remain competitive in the future, and formulate client 
management strategies in accordance with those resource requirements. 
In conclusion, this dissertation empirically revealed that suppliers can gain significant 
performance advantages from adopting a firm-level strategy of being a more relational partner to 
its clients.  However, like many organizational resources, the efficacy of specialized relationship 
investments depends on the context in which they are applied.  Thus, while extant theory in the 
relational view extols the benefits of deeply embedded inter-organizational relationship, the 
mechanisms that underpin predicted relational advantages may have the opposite effect.  
Therefore, this dissertation provides inroads into understanding how managers should manage its 
portfolio of client relationships to build competitive advantages.  In addition, through building 
and empirically testing a novel, relational theory of diversification, this dissertation offers 
another avenue for future research to generate new insights into an established body of literature.  
 153 
 
TABLES 
Table 5.1: Summary of empirical chapters 
 
Chapter Research Question Main Findings 
 
Chapter 2: Relational 
Advantage and the Growth 
Performance of Knowledge-
Based Service Firms 
 
What is the effect of relational assets shared 
between suppliers and their clients on the long-
run growth performance of suppliers? 
 
 Joint relationship commitments from suppliers and clients 
provide the strongest conditions for supplier growth 
performance 
 Relationship commitments attenuate supplier growth 
performance in higher growth markets 
 
Chapter 3: Relational 
Advantage and Partner-
Driven Corporate Scope: The 
Case for Client-Led 
Diversification 
 
To what extent do relational assets shared 
between suppliers and their clients determine 
the horizontal business scope of suppliers? 
 
 Client diversification drives supplier diversification – “client-
led diversification” 
 “Client-led diversification” is driven by underlying relational 
assets 
 
Chapter 4: Corporate Scope 
and the Survival of 
Knowledge-Based Service 
Firms 
 
 
How does the horizontal business scope of 
suppliers impact the survival of those suppliers, 
and what is the effect on this scope-survival 
relationship from relational assets shared 
between suppliers and their clients? 
 
 A broader business scope increases supplier survival 
 Providing a greater share of business to long-term clients 
reinforces the supplier diversification-survival relationship 
 Higher growth in client markets relative to suppliers markets 
reinforces the supplier diversification-survival relationship 
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Table 5.2: Overview of hypotheses for Chapter 2 
 
Hypothesis Outcome 
 
H1:  The greater the client-specific knowledge of a supplier, the higher the growth performance of that supplier. 
 
Not supported 
 
H2: The greater the level of relational commitment a supplier receives from its portfolio of clients, the higher the 
growth performance of that supplier.  
 
Supported 
 
H3:  The greater the client-specific knowledge of a supplier, the stronger the positive association between 
relational (client) commitment and the growth performance of that supplier. 
 
Supported 
 
H4a: The greater the growth of the markets within a supplier’s portfolio, the weaker the positive association 
between client-specific knowledge and supplier growth performance. 
 
Supported 
 
H4b: The greater the growth of the markets within a supplier’s portfolio, the weaker the positive association 
between relational (client) commitment and supplier growth performance.  
 
Supported 
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Table 5.3: Overview of hypotheses for Chapter 3 
 
Hypothesis Outcome 
 
H1. Greater diversification in the outsourcing needs of a supplier’s existing clients will be associated with greater 
supplier diversification. 
 
Supported 
 
H2. The greater the level of client-specific knowledge held by a supplier (developed through prior work for 
clients), the stronger the effect of clients’ diversification on diversification by that supplier 
 
Supported 
 
H3. The greater the level of relational commitment provided by clients in a supplier’s portfolio, the stronger the 
effect of client diversification on diversification by that supplier. 
 
Supported 
 
H4. The higher the growth in the markets of (a supplier’s) clients relative to growth in the markets of a supplier, 
the stronger the effect of client diversification on diversification by that supplier. 
 
Not supported 
 
H5. The greater the resource slack of a supplier, the stronger the effect of client diversification on diversification 
by that supplier. 
 
Supported 
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Table 5.4:  Overview of hypotheses for Chapter 4 
 
 
Hypothesis Outcome 
 
H1: The greater the level of supplier diversification, the greater the probability of survival of that supplier. 
 
Supported 
 
H2: The greater the fraction of business in a focal supplier’s business portfolio that is from long-term clients, the 
stronger the effect of supplier diversification on the probability of survival for that supplier. 
 
Supported  
 
H3: The greater the growth in the markets of (a supplier’s) clients relative to growth in the markets of the supplier 
(Client Market Opportunity), the stronger the effect of supplier diversification on the probability of survival of 
that supplier. 
 
Supported 
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APPENDIX A 
CHAPTER TWO ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Table A.1: Three-year logged supplier growth using Ordinary Least Squares regression 
with Newey-West standard errors. 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logged Variables   
3 Year 
Growth 
3 Year 
Growth 
3 Year 
Growth 
3 Year 
Growth 
3 Year 
Growth 
3 Year 
Growth 
3 Year 
Growth 
  
 
              
Client-Specific Knowledge H1 
 
-0.019 
 
-1.110** 0.088 
 
-0.799* 
   
(0.034) 
 
(0.492) (0.075) 
 
(0.467) 
Relational (client) Commitment H2 
  
0.144** -0.485* 
 
0.572*** 0.063 
    
(0.062) (0.263) 
 
(0.135) (0.254) 
Client-Specific Knowledge * 
Relational (client) Commitment 
(Mutual Commitment) H3 
   
0.270** 
  
0.206* 
     
(0.120) 
  
(0.107) 
Market Growth * Client-Specific 
Knowledge H4a 
    
-0.641 
 
-0.318 
      
(0.417) 
 
(0.357) 
Market Growth * Relational (client) 
Commitment H4b 
     
-2.152*** -1.994*** 
              (0.553) (0.515) 
Market Growth 
 
0.462* 0.437* 0.534* 0.480* 1.902** 9.192*** 9.238*** 
  
(0.268) (0.265) (0.274) (0.263) (0.938) (2.225) (2.306) 
Client Dynamism 
 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Outsourced Percentage (by clients) 
 
1.584** 1.597** 1.375** 1.328** 1.613** 1.283** 1.262** 
  
(0.657) (0.661) (0.648) (0.623) (0.667) (0.582) (0.574) 
Outsourced Volume (to focal 
supplier) 
 
-0.004 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 0.002 -0.012 -0.006 
  
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.023 0.023 0.021 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.033 
  
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
0.009 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.013 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Supplier Scope 
 
-0.029 -0.030 -0.038 -0.039 -0.036 -0.037 -0.041* 
  
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) 
Domain Expertise 
 
0.041 0.042 0.047* 0.050** 0.044 0.047* 0.051** 
  
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.066 0.067 0.048 0.054 0.070 0.039 0.045 
  
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.048) (0.047) 
Constant 
 
-1.587** -1.561** -1.941*** 0.667 -1.827*** -3.582*** -1.601 
  
(0.630) (0.620) (0.685) (1.160) (0.665) (0.846) (1.235) 
         Observations 
 
1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 
Number of Suppliers 
 
126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.2: Four-year logged supplier growth using Ordinary Least Squares regression 
with Newey-West standard errors. 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logged Variables   
4 Year 
Growth 
4 Year 
Growth 
4 Year 
Growth 
4 Year 
Growth 
4 Year 
Growth 
4 Year 
Growth 
4 Year 
Growth 
  
 
              
Client-Specific Knowledge H1 
 
-0.051 
 
-1.421** 0.073 
 
-1.056* 
   
(0.045) 
 
(0.610) (0.082) 
 
(0.586) 
Relational (client) Commitment H2 
  
0.203*** -0.590* 
 
0.722*** 0.061 
    
(0.074) (0.322) 
 
(0.164) (0.323) 
Client-Specific Knowledge * 
Relational (client) Commitment 
(Mutual Commitment) H3 
   
0.338** 
  
0.266* 
     
(0.147) 
  
(0.136) 
Market Growth * Client-Specific 
Knowledge H4a 
    
-0.784* 
 
-0.441 
      
(0.462) 
 
(0.390) 
Market Growth * Relational (client) 
Commitment H4b 
     
-2.844*** -2.629*** 
              (0.704) (0.675) 
Market Growth 
 
0.606* 0.536 0.686** 0.592* 2.326** 12.170*** 12.225*** 
  
(0.348) (0.331) (0.347) (0.326) (1.072) (2.890) (2.925) 
Client Dynamism 
 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Outsourced Percentage (by clients) 
 
2.130** 2.180** 1.768** 1.747** 2.161** 1.640** 1.629** 
  
(0.956) (0.961) (0.895) (0.846) (0.958) (0.797) (0.766) 
Outsourced Volume (to focal 
supplier) 
 
-0.006 0.002 -0.014 -0.003 0.004 -0.017 -0.006 
  
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.031 0.033 0.030 0.036 0.035 0.037 0.042 
  
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
0.018 0.018 0.023 0.022 0.016 0.025 0.023 
  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Supplier Scope 
 
-0.021 -0.023 -0.033 -0.038 -0.032 -0.034 -0.043 
  
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) 
Domain Expertise 
 
0.040 0.043 0.050 0.055* 0.046 0.049 0.055* 
  
(0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.070 0.073 0.044 0.053 0.075 0.041 0.050 
  
(0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.067) (0.062) (0.061) 
Constant 
 
-2.150** -2.091** -2.585*** 0.730 -2.361** -4.560*** -1.950 
  
(0.917) (0.893) (0.949) (1.378) (0.925) (1.115) (1.499) 
         Observations 
 
876 876 876 876 876 876 876 
Number of Suppliers 
 
126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.3:  Five-year growth (non-logged) growth using Ordinary Least Squares 
regression with Newey-West standard errors. 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Non-logged variables   
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
  
 
              
Client-Specific Knowledge H1 
 
-0.407 
 
-5.187** 2.575* 
 
-1.513 
   
(0.642) 
 
(2.539) (1.376) 
 
(2.616) 
Relational (client) Commitment H2 
  
0.470** -0.389 
 
1.535*** 0.840 
    
(0.211) (0.458) 
 
(0.412) (0.519) 
Client-Specific Knowledge * 
Relational (client) Commitment 
(Mutual Commitment) H3 
   
8.051** 
  
5.644 
     
(3.985) 
  
(3.623) 
Market Growth * Client-Specific 
Knowledge H4a 
    
-19.921** 
 
-16.116* 
      
(9.611) 
 
(9.139) 
Market Growth * Relational 
(client) Commitment H4b 
     
-6.603*** -6.051*** 
              (2.423) (2.199) 
Market Growth 
 
1.482** 1.427** 1.533** 1.541** 3.320*** 5.304*** 6.486*** 
  
(0.629) (0.614) (0.608) (0.606) (1.166) (1.684) (1.967) 
Client Dynamism 
 
-0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Outsourced Percentage (by clients) 
 
0.374 0.385 0.232 0.242 0.379 0.222 0.234 
  
(0.281) (0.282) (0.275) (0.268) (0.280) (0.265) (0.260) 
Outsourced Volume (to focal 
supplier) 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
-0.016 -0.022 0.060 0.053 -0.058 0.087 0.047 
  
(0.271) (0.271) (0.262) (0.258) (0.273) (0.261) (0.261) 
Supplier Scope 
 
-0.011 -0.036 -0.246 -0.258 -0.411 -0.204 -0.535 
  
(1.071) (1.063) (1.111) (1.041) (1.008) (1.049) (0.958) 
Domain Expertise 
 
0.444 0.482 0.455 0.447 0.552 0.445 0.524 
  
(0.461) (0.458) (0.449) (0.452) (0.454) (0.440) (0.442) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
5.347 5.210 4.948 4.762 5.365 5.759 5.593 
  
(4.481) (4.466) (4.423) (4.353) (4.427) (4.300) (4.228) 
Constant 
 
-0.250 -0.207 -0.394 0.143 -0.468* -1.020*** -0.771** 
  
(0.256) (0.249) (0.249) (0.308) (0.283) (0.343) (0.389) 
         Observations 
 
750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Number of Suppliers 
 
126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.4:  Five-year compound annual growth rate using Ordinary Least Squares 
regression with Newey-West standard errors. 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables   
5 year 
CAGR 
5 year 
CAGR 
5 year 
CAGR 
5 year 
CAGR 
5 year 
CAGR 
5 year 
CAGR 
5 year 
CAGR 
  
 
              
Client-Specific Knowledge H1 
 
-0.093 
 
-0.974** 0.340 
 
-0.462 
   
(0.118) 
 
(0.488) (0.209) 
 
(0.529) 
Relational (client) Commitment H2 
  
0.104*** -0.053 
 
0.282*** 0.150 
    
(0.040) (0.078) 
 
(0.078) (0.096) 
Client-Specific Knowledge * 
Relational (client) Commitment 
(Mutual Commitment) H3 
   
1.477** 
  
1.114 
     
(0.738) 
  
(0.713) 
Market Growth * Client-Specific 
Knowledge H4a 
    
-2.895** 
 
-2.169 
      
(1.351) 
 
(1.326) 
Market Growth * Relational 
(client) Commitment H4b 
     
-1.102*** -1.017*** 
              (0.412) (0.391) 
Market Growth 
 
0.244* 0.232* 0.255** 0.254** 0.507*** 0.885*** 1.034*** 
  
(0.129) (0.124) (0.125) (0.123) (0.185) (0.298) (0.317) 
Client Dynamism 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Outsourced Percentage (by 
clients) 
 
0.110* 0.113* 0.079 0.081 0.112* 0.077 0.080 
  
(0.063) (0.063) (0.059) (0.058) (0.063) (0.057) (0.056) 
Outsourced Volume (to focal 
supplier) 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.001** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
-0.018 -0.020 -0.002 -0.003 -0.025 0.003 -0.003 
  
(0.061) (0.061) (0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.058) (0.058) 
Supplier Scope 
 
-0.085 -0.090 -0.137 -0.141 -0.145 -0.130 -0.177 
  
(0.174) (0.173) (0.182) (0.170) (0.168) (0.173) (0.160) 
Domain Expertise 
 
0.075 0.084 0.078 0.078 0.094 0.076 0.089 
  
(0.076) (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) (0.072) (0.072) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.185 0.153 0.096 0.054 0.176 0.231 0.189 
  
(0.729) (0.738) (0.704) (0.701) (0.732) (0.652) (0.652) 
Constant 
 
-0.082 -0.072 -0.113** -0.013 -0.110* -0.218*** -0.157** 
  
(0.056) (0.052) (0.057) (0.055) (0.058) (0.075) (0.075) 
         Observations 
 
750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Number of Suppliers 
 
126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.5:  Five-year DHS Index using Ordinary Least Squares regression with Newey-
West standard errors. 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables   
5 year 
DHS 
Index 
5 year 
DHS 
Index 
5 year 
DHS 
Index 
5 year 
DHS 
Index 
5 year 
DHS 
Index 
5 year 
DHS 
Index 
5 year 
DHS 
Index 
  
 
              
Client-Specific Knowledge H1 
 
-0.405 
 
-4.407* 1.421 
 
-2.282 
   
(0.543) 
 
(2.259) (0.945) 
 
(2.491) 
Relational (client) Commitment H2 
  
0.500*** -0.212 
 
1.284*** 0.674 
    
(0.187) (0.363) 
 
(0.356) (0.455) 
Client-Specific Knowledge * 
Relational (client) Commitment 
(Mutual Commitment) H3 
   
6.700* 
  
5.150 
     
(3.420) 
  
(3.353) 
Market Growth * Client-Specific 
Knowledge H4a 
    
-12.198** 
 
-8.867 
      
(5.884) 
 
(5.862) 
Market Growth * Relational 
(client) Commitment H4b 
     
-4.861*** -4.479** 
              (1.868) (1.800) 
Market Growth 
 
1.113* 1.058* 1.167** 1.161** 2.217*** 3.943*** 4.533*** 
  
(0.590) (0.571) (0.570) (0.563) (0.831) (1.354) (1.424) 
Client Dynamism 
 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Outsourced Percentage (by 
clients) 
 
0.530* 0.541* 0.379 0.389 0.537* 0.372 0.384 
  
(0.292) (0.295) (0.276) (0.270) (0.293) (0.267) (0.262) 
Outsourced Volume (to focal 
supplier) 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
-0.127 -0.134 -0.047 -0.053 -0.155 -0.027 -0.053 
  
(0.293) (0.293) (0.278) (0.274) (0.293) (0.277) (0.274) 
Supplier Scope 
 
-0.406 -0.432 -0.657 -0.673 -0.661 -0.626 -0.821 
  
(0.763) (0.758) (0.793) (0.740) (0.742) (0.759) (0.704) 
Domain Expertise 
 
0.352 0.391 0.364 0.367 0.434 0.357 0.412 
  
(0.348) (0.342) (0.332) (0.333) (0.342) (0.327) (0.330) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.337 0.200 -0.088 -0.274 0.295 0.510 0.314 
  
(3.230) (3.275) (3.099) (3.092) (3.253) (2.856) (2.863) 
Constant 
 
-0.402 -0.358 -0.554** -0.099 -0.518* -1.016*** -0.721** 
  
(0.259) (0.245) (0.262) (0.257) (0.272) (0.345) (0.353) 
         Observations 
 
750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Number of Suppliers 
 
126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.6:  Five-year logged supplier growth using Ordinary Least Squares regression 
with Newey-West standard errors: Alternative market growth specification of Market 
Growth in the Number of Clients 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logged variables   
5 Year 
Growth 
5 Year 
Growth 
5 Year 
Growth 
5 Year 
Growth 
5 Year 
Growth 
5 Year 
Growth 
5 Year 
Growth 
  
 
              
Client-Specific Knowledge H1 
 
-0.083 
 
-1.771** 0.098 
 
-1.577** 
   
(0.059) 
 
(0.736) (0.103) 
 
(0.730) 
Relational (client) Commitment H2 
  
0.257*** -0.729* 
 
0.631*** -0.357 
    
(0.090) (0.400) 
 
(0.205) (0.444) 
Client-Specific Knowledge * 
Relational (client) Commitment 
(Mutual Commitment) H3 
   
0.418** 
  
0.406** 
     
(0.175) 
  
(0.172) 
Market Growth (in # clients) * 
Client-Specific Knowledge H4a 
    
-1.561** 
 
-1.256* 
      
(0.753) 
 
(0.664) 
Market Growth (in # clients) * 
Relational (client) Commitment H4b 
     
-3.056** -2.819** 
              (1.334) (1.240) 
Market Growth (in # clients) 
 
1.476** 1.338** 1.454** 1.294** 4.869*** 13.820** 15.549*** 
  
(0.598) (0.552) (0.576) (0.534) (1.823) (5.517) (5.229) 
Client Dynamism 
 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Outsourced Percentage (by 
clients) 
 
2.751* 2.884* 1.956 2.006 2.916* 1.888 1.966 
  
(1.505) (1.502) (1.410) (1.322) (1.537) (1.345) (1.296) 
Outsourced Volume (to focal 
supplier) 
 
-0.006 0.006 -0.015 0.000 0.009 -0.016 0.000 
  
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.045 0.048 0.048 0.054 0.050 0.049 0.058* 
  
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
0.023 0.022 0.029 0.027 0.019 0.030 0.025 
  
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Supplier Scope 
 
-0.034 -0.037 -0.049 -0.053 -0.044 -0.046 -0.056 
  
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.038) 
Domain Expertise 
 
0.021 0.025 0.038 0.043 0.033 0.037 0.049 
  
(0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.064 0.066 0.040 0.051 0.069 0.043 0.055 
  
(0.088) (0.087) (0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.083) (0.081) 
Constant 
 
-2.795* -2.744* -3.024** 1.063 -3.200** -4.483*** -0.762 
  
(1.461) (1.417) (1.432) (1.765) (1.509) (1.680) (2.056) 
         Observations 
 
750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Number of Suppliers 
 
126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.7.  Five-year (logged) supplier growth using Ordinary Least Squares regression 
with robust standard errors 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logged Variables   OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
  
 
              
Client-Specific Knowledge H1 
 
-0.081 
 
-1.786** 0.092 
 
-1.484* 
   
(0.065) 
 
(0.811) (0.095) 
 
(0.750) 
Relational (client) Commitment H2 
  
0.268** -0.731* 
 
0.775*** -0.159 
    
(0.104) (0.441) 
 
(0.197) (0.399) 
Client-Specific Knowledge * 
Relational (client) Commitment 
(Mutual Commitment) H3 
   
0.423** 
  
0.380** 
     
(0.192) 
  
(0.176) 
Market Growth * Client-Specific 
Knowledge H4a 
    
-1.161** 
 
-0.874* 
      
(0.535) 
 
(0.491) 
Market Growth * Relational (client) 
Commitment H4b 
     
-3.093*** -2.879*** 
              (0.935) (0.932) 
Market Growth 
 
0.848 0.722 0.919 0.794 3.379** 13.464*** 14.473*** 
  
(0.601) (0.554) (0.582) (0.544) (1.322) (3.907) (3.693) 
Client Dynamism 
 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Outsourced Percentage (by clients) 
 
2.761 2.884 1.939 1.980 2.830 1.914 1.921 
  
(1.766) (1.772) (1.689) (1.578) (1.759) (1.583) (1.480) 
Outsourced Volume (to focal 
supplier) 
 
-0.009 0.004 -0.019 -0.004 0.007 -0.022 -0.005 
  
(0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.046 0.049 0.047 0.054 0.052 0.051 0.060* 
  
(0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
0.022 0.022 0.029 0.026 0.019 0.031 0.026 
  
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Supplier Scope 
 
-0.033 -0.035 -0.050 -0.053 -0.045 -0.048 -0.059 
  
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.043) 
Domain Expertise 
 
0.039 0.043 0.053 0.057 0.047 0.049 0.057 
  
(0.053) (0.052) (0.048) (0.046) (0.051) (0.047) (0.046) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.066 0.070 0.036 0.048 0.072 0.042 0.055 
  
(0.096) (0.093) (0.094) (0.089) (0.092) (0.085) (0.081) 
Constant 
 
-2.779 -2.727 -3.025* 1.110 -3.074* -5.068*** -1.461 
  
(1.722) (1.682) (1.714) (1.900) (1.718) (1.871) (1.897) 
         Observations 
 
750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Number of Suppliers 
 
126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
R-squared  0.099 0.105 0.127 0.146 0.112 0.149 0.171 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors clustered by supplier in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.8: Main models controlling for suppliers included in the National Law Journal 250 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logged Variables   
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
5 year 
Growth 
  
 
              
Client-Specific Knowledge H1 
 
-0.071 
 
-1.725** 0.098 
 
-1.431** 
   
(0.058) 
 
(0.717) (0.096) 
 
(0.704) 
Relational (client) Commitment H2 
  
0.292*** -0.680* 
 
0.792*** -0.116 
    
(0.089) (0.389) 
 
(0.194) (0.399) 
Client-Specific Knowledge * 
Relational (client) Commitment 
(Mutual Commitment) H3 
   
0.411** 
  
0.369** 
     
(0.171) 
  
(0.163) 
Market Growth * Client-Specific 
Knowledge H4a 
    
-1.138** 
 
-0.854* 
      
(0.527) 
 
(0.495) 
Market Growth * Relational 
(client) Commitment H4b 
     
-3.055*** -2.850*** 
              (0.987) (0.957) 
Market Growth 
 
0.854* 0.743 0.931** 0.825* 3.348*** 13.321*** 14.341*** 
  
(0.482) (0.453) (0.466) (0.443) (1.288) (4.123) (4.120) 
Client Dynamism 
 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Outsourced Percentage (by 
clients) 
 
2.740* 2.848* 1.842 1.872 2.797* 1.819 1.817 
  
(1.482) (1.487) (1.377) (1.303) (1.482) (1.285) (1.217) 
Outsourced Volume (to focal 
supplier) 
 
-0.004 0.007 -0.014 -0.002 0.010 -0.017 -0.003 
  
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.034 0.037 0.033 0.040 0.040 0.037 0.046 
  
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
0.018 0.018 0.025 0.022 0.016 0.026 0.022 
  
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Supplier Scope 
 
-0.044 -0.045 -0.064 -0.066* -0.055 -0.062 -0.072** 
  
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.037) 
Domain Expertise 
 
0.042 0.046 0.058 0.061 0.050 0.054 0.061 
  
(0.042) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.037) (0.037) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.069 0.073 0.037 0.048 0.074 0.043 0.055 
  
(0.088) (0.086) (0.086) (0.083) (0.086) (0.078) (0.076) 
NLJ Firms 
 
0.113* 0.107* 0.135** 0.126** 0.106* 0.133** 0.123** 
  
(0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) 
Constant 
 
-2.757* -2.713* -3.021** 0.989 -3.053** -5.038*** -1.547 
  
(1.437) (1.402) (1.381) (1.707) (1.437) (1.608) (1.923) 
         Observations 
 
750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Number of Suppliers 
 
126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX B 
CHAPTER THREE ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Table B.1: Sub-sample of main models with suppliers included in the National Law Journal 
250 removed from the main sample 
Variables   1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
 
            
Client Diversification H1 
 
0.0953 -0.848*** 0.0855 -0.0912 -0.947*** 
   
(0.108) (0.315) (0.121) (0.129) (0.329) 
Client Diversification * 
Client Specific Knowledge H2 
  
6.008*** 
  
5.267*** 
    
(1.642) 
  
(1.667) 
Client Diversification * 
Relational (client) 
Commitment H3 
  
0.815** 
  
0.848** 
    
(0.402) 
  
(0.410) 
Client Diversification * 
Relative Market Growth H4 
   
-0.189 
 
-0.170 
     
(1.072) 
 
(1.126) 
Client Diversification * 
Supplier Excess Capacity H5 
    
0.0201*** 0.0160** 
            (0.00598) (0.00648) 
Client Specific Knowledge 
 
-0.446** -0.419** -1.458*** -0.416** -0.393** -1.310*** 
  
(0.184) (0.192) (0.383) (0.192) (0.190) (0.398) 
Relational (client) 
Commitment 
 
-0.00748 -0.0202 -0.165* -0.0201 0.00919 -0.147* 
  
(0.0440) (0.0431) (0.0846) (0.0432) (0.0424) (0.0873) 
Relative Market Growth 
 
0.0982 0.0969 0.0781 0.133 0.108* 0.123 
  
(0.0605) (0.0608) (0.0603) (0.234) (0.0610) (0.249) 
Supplier Excess Capacity  0.000146 -0.000164 -0.000244 -0.000149 -0.00601*** -0.00491** 
  (0.000960) (0.000919) (0.000920) (0.000917) (0.00194) (0.00203) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.318 0.298 0.469 0.290 0.339 0.496 
  
(0.725) (0.720) (0.713) (0.721) (0.697) (0.699) 
Non-Patent Citation Share 
 
-0.0122 0.00963 -0.0785 0.0123 0.00371 -0.0739 
  
(0.113) (0.120) (0.107) (0.119) (0.113) (0.103) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.000132 1.68e-05 -0.000190 1.08e-05 3.02e-05 -0.000167 
  
(0.000382) (0.000378) (0.000328) (0.000377) (0.000359) (0.000315) 
Client Size 
 
-0.0573* -0.0620** -0.0591** -0.0619** -0.0429 -0.0424 
  
(0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0263) (0.0298) (0.0297) (0.0259) 
Turnover 
 
-0.00648 -0.00690 -0.00873 -0.00686 0.00854 0.00347 
  
(0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0347) (0.0365) (0.0376) (0.0358) 
Outsourced Percentage 
 
-0.0441 -0.0368 -0.0463 -0.0384 -0.0433 -0.0528 
  
(0.0473) (0.0493) (0.0477) (0.0505) (0.0477) (0.0472) 
Constant 
 
0.599*** 0.589*** 0.763*** 0.591*** 0.598*** 0.759*** 
  
(0.0477) (0.0533) (0.0732) (0.0557) (0.0514) (0.0775) 
        Year Dummies  
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
NLJ Firms 
 
N N N N N N 
Observations 
 
735 735 735 735 735 735 
R-squared 
 
0.157 0.160 0.205 0.160 0.181 0.218 
Number of Suppliers   85 85 85 85 85 85 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.2: Subsample of supplier firms with high average (median) turnover 
 
    High Turnover 
Variables   (1) (2) (3) 
     
Client Diversification H1 
 
0.302** -0.599* 
   
(0.123) (0.323) 
Client Diversification * Client Specific 
Knowledge 
H2 
  
5.075*** 
    
(1.793) 
Client Diversification * Relational (client) 
Commitment 
H3     0.980* 
    
(0.539) 
Client Specific Knowledge 
 
-0.0347 -0.0638 -1.051*** 
  
(0.256) (0.249) (0.381) 
Relational (client) Commitment 
 
0.00309 -0.0290 -0.214* 
  
(0.0521) (0.0495) (0.114) 
Relative Market Growth 
 
-0.0348 -0.0428 -0.0719 
  
(0.0736) (0.0697) (0.0712) 
Supplier Excess Capacity 
 
1.677* 1.216 1.345 
  
(0.989) (0.929) (0.926) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
0.160 0.174 0.0934 
  
(0.157) (0.154) (0.143) 
Non-Patent Citation Share 
 
0.000212 -4.11e-05 -0.000163 
  
(0.000411) (0.000381) (0.000356) 
Supplier Size 
 
-0.0488* -0.0636*** -0.0590*** 
  
(0.0259) (0.0227) (0.0217) 
Client Size 
 
0.000984 0.000102 -9.08e-05 
  
(0.00101) (0.000838) (0.000828) 
Outsourced Percentage 
 
-0.0598 -0.0380 -0.0399 
  
(0.0581) (0.0657) (0.0732) 
Constant 
 
0.479*** 0.466*** 0.641*** 
  
(0.0576) (0.0596) (0.0716) 
     
Year Dummies  
 
Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
 
Y Y Y 
Observations 
 
412 412 412 
R-squared 
 
0.176 0.206 0.240 
Number of Suppliers   50 50 50 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.3: Subsample of supplier firms with larger average (median) clients   
 
    High Client Size 
Variables   (1) (2) (3) 
     
Client Diversification H1 
 
0.0509 -1.521*** 
   
(0.151) (0.479) 
Client Diversification * Client Specific 
Knowledge 
H2 
  
9.762*** 
    
(3.060) 
Client Diversification * Relational (client) 
Commitment 
H3 
  
1.235** 
        (0.600) 
Client Specific Knowledge 
 
-0.681** -0.667** -2.561*** 
  
(0.277) (0.289) (0.672) 
Relational (client) Commitment 
 
0.141** 0.132* -0.149 
  
(0.0656) (0.0685) (0.131) 
Relative Market Growth 
 
0.164** 0.162** 0.184** 
  
(0.0781) (0.0792) (0.0768) 
Supplier Excess Capacity 
 
-0.000904 -0.00106 -0.00138* 
  
(0.000807) (0.000829) (0.000733) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
-0.546 -0.539 -0.642 
  
(0.756) (0.767) (0.788) 
Non-Patent Citation Share 
 
0.0528 0.0620 -0.0471 
  
(0.125) (0.127) (0.112) 
Supplier Size 
 
-0.000186 -0.000231 -0.000199 
  
(0.000387) (0.000399) (0.000348) 
Turnover 
 
-0.0140 -0.0151 0.00255 
  
(0.0460) (0.0445) (0.0416) 
Outsourced Percentage 
 
-0.0492 -0.0465 -0.0502 
  
(0.0880) (0.0901) (0.0805) 
Constant 
 
0.494*** 0.486*** 0.825*** 
  
(0.0757) (0.0883) (0.127) 
     
Year Dummies  
 
Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
 
Y Y Y 
Observations 
 
415 415 415 
R-squared 
 
0.229 0.230 0.328 
Number of Suppliers   46 46 46 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C 
CHAPTER FOUR ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Table C.1: Main analyses using a concentric measure of Supplier Diversification  
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables   logit logit logit logit logit 
  
 
          
Supplier Diversification (concentric) H1 
 
8.0957*** 7.5489*** 8.8342*** 7.8067*** 
   
(1.1003) (1.8033) (1.2511) (1.6814) 
Supplier Diversification * Long Term 
Clients H2 
  
2.1968 
 
4.4792 
    
(6.0727) 
 
(6.2056) 
Supplier Diversification * Client 
Market Opportunity H3 
   
27.4361*** 29.2295*** 
          (10.1951) (10.4256) 
Long Term Clients 
 
-2.7356*** -3.1086*** -4.6444 -2.9523*** -6.1021 
  
(0.9298) (0.8258) (4.0225) (0.7843) (4.1721) 
Client Market Opportunity 
 
-1.5331 0.6931 0.7142 -16.6067** -17.5253** 
  
(3.2586) (2.2190) (2.3789) (7.0304) (7.0835) 
Market Volatility 
 
-23.8099** -8.7640* -8.9336* -10.7416** -11.0719** 
  
(9.9160) (4.5503) (4.7758) (4.5318) (4.4835) 
Client Distance 
 
-0.0135*** -0.0136** -0.0139** -0.0133** -0.0138** 
  
(0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0062) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.0372*** 0.0176 0.0163 0.0184 0.0162 
  
(0.0142) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0122) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
-5.0803* -4.4563** -4.5589** -4.6689** -4.9131*** 
  
(2.6921) (2.0749) (2.0504) (1.8320) (1.7778) 
Domain Expertise 
 
11.3819** 9.4336*** 9.6124*** 9.4230*** 9.8728*** 
  
(4.6674) (3.0098) (3.0499) (3.0459) (3.1598) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
23.3328 21.8282 24.1978 22.7906 27.2956 
  
(23.8424) (19.2092) (20.4492) (19.6001) (20.9229) 
Client Size 
 
-0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0013 
  
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Outsourced Patents 
 
0.0142** 0.0157** 0.0163** 0.0152** 0.0164** 
  
(0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0075) (0.0067) (0.0079) 
Constant 
 
25.2324*** 5.8086 6.2849 7.2119* 8.1172* 
  
(9.0430) (4.5265) (4.9174) (4.3831) (4.2979) 
       Observations 
 
1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 
Number of Firms 
 
214 214 214 214 214 
McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared  0.223 0.342 0.343    0.360 0.362 
Log-Likelihood  -192.535 -163.017 -162.856 -158.688 -158.069 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC')  31.256 -20.313 -13.168 -21.504 -15.275 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.2: Main analyses using a 3-year measure of Long-Term Clients 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables   logit logit logit logit logit 
  
 
          
Supplier Diversification H1 
 
1.9073*** 1.6011*** 2.1080*** 1.7876*** 
   
(0.2046) (0.3077) (0.2447) (0.3303) 
Supplier Diversification * Long Term 
Clients (3yr) H2 
  
0.7969 
 
0.8707 
    
(0.7080) 
 
(0.7794) 
Supplier Diversification * Client 
Market Opportunity H3 
   
4.1232** 4.3679** 
          (1.6489) (1.8099) 
Long Term Clients (3yr) 
 
-1.9309** -1.5253** -2.7961* -1.5515** -2.9710* 
  
(0.9528) (0.7420) (1.5730) (0.7584) (1.7883) 
Client Market Opportunity 
 
-1.7733 0.1908 0.1252 -5.1692* -5.5096* 
  
(3.0917) (1.6118) (1.6769) (2.7083) (2.8276) 
Market Volatility 
 
-24.3635** -6.5933** -7.1882** -5.1418* -5.7743* 
  
(10.0418) (3.0838) (3.3667) (2.7897) (3.1329) 
Client Distance 
 
-0.0137*** -0.0176** -0.0186** -0.0159** -0.0169** 
  
(0.0049) (0.0080) (0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0082) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.0384*** 0.0252 0.0242 0.0281 0.0273 
  
(0.0149) (0.0179) (0.0192) (0.0180) (0.0197) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
-4.8268* -4.8126*** -5.0662*** -5.1836*** -5.4725*** 
  
(2.6002) (1.6013) (1.5487) (1.5926) (1.5369) 
Domain Expertise 
 
11.3223** 6.9744** 6.8569** 7.5173** 7.4300** 
  
(4.7005) (3.0067) (3.0870) (3.1081) (3.2013) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
25.6892 7.7569 11.2357 10.9888 15.0992 
  
(23.5420) (18.4968) (20.1062) (18.3064) (20.5739) 
Client Size 
 
-0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0010* -0.0011* 
  
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Outsourced Patents 
 
0.0126* 0.0025 0.0016 0.0023 0.0014 
  
(0.0069) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0020) 
Constant 
 
26.3843*** 5.7716** 6.8164** 3.9472 5.0402* 
  
(9.0435) (2.9016) (3.2031) (2.6269) (3.0082) 
       Observations 
 
1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 
Number of Firms 
 
214 214 214 214 214 
McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared  0.209 0.481 0.484 0.491 0.494 
Log-Likelihood  -196.035 -128.644 -127.920 -126.150 -125.312 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC')  38.254 -89.060 -83.039 -86.580 -80.789 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.3: Sub-sample of main models with suppliers included in the National Law 
Journal 250 removed from the main sample 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables   logit logit logit logit logit 
  
 
          
Supplier Diversification H1 
 
1.9055*** 1.4143*** 2.1519*** 1.6587*** 
   
(0.1980) (0.2600) (0.2413) (0.2812) 
Supplier Diversification * Long Term 
Clients H2 
  
2.3097** 
 
2.5975*** 
    
(0.9303) 
 
(0.9054) 
Supplier Diversification * Client Market 
Opportunity H3 
   
4.8529*** 5.8753*** 
          (1.5690) (1.8166) 
Long Term Clients 
 
-2.5049*** -2.3695*** -7.1069*** -2.4947*** -7.8563*** 
  
(0.9271) (0.7496) (2.4238) (0.7117) (2.3070) 
Client Market Opportunity 
 
-1.3947 0.3769 0.3296 -5.9230** -7.4297** 
  
(3.2810) (1.6842) (1.9786) (2.5578) (2.9121) 
Market Volatility 
 
-23.7160** -6.6700** -8.3187** -5.3029* -7.3441** 
  
(10.1832) (3.0756) (3.6200) (2.7642) (3.3600) 
Client Distance 
 
-0.0126** -0.0166* -0.0183** -0.0148* -0.0158* 
  
(0.0051) (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0087) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.0351** 0.0263 0.0251 0.0298 0.0294 
  
(0.0140) (0.0185) (0.0215) (0.0199) (0.0239) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
-4.9443* -4.6992*** -5.7030*** -5.1032*** -6.3533*** 
  
(2.6702) (1.6973) (1.5449) (1.6615) (1.5655) 
Domain Expertise 
 
10.8498** 5.8068* 5.8112* 6.1737** 6.1619* 
  
(4.6558) (3.0428) (3.1586) (3.1250) (3.2530) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
22.7406 4.6096 13.4193 6.7328 16.8544 
  
(23.4224) (17.4707) (17.6553) (17.3756) (17.9108) 
Client Size 
 
-0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0011 
  
(0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Outsourced Patents 
 
0.0143** 0.0048 0.0025 0.0048 0.0022 
  
(0.0069) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0031) 
Constant 
 
25.0979*** 5.5525* 8.1121** 3.7354 6.6540** 
  
(9.3072) (3.0670) (3.5537) (2.7737) (3.3308) 
       Observations 
 
1,523 1,523 1,523 1,523 1,523 
Number of Firms 
 
190 190 190 190 190 
NLJ Firms 
 
NO NO NO NO NO 
McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared  0.223 0.491 0.502 0.503 0.516 
Log-Likelihood  -192.535 -126.168 -123.516 -123.167 -120.021 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC')  31.256 -94.012 -91.849 -92.545 -91.371 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.4: Main analyses estimated using a complementary log-log specification 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables   cloglog cloglog cloglog cloglog cloglog 
  
 
          
Supplier Diversification  H1 
 
0.7727*** 0.5545*** 0.8344*** 0.6207*** 
   
(0.0866) (0.1041) (0.0930) (0.1074) 
Supplier Diversification*Long Term 
Clients H2 
  
1.0588*** 
 
1.0889*** 
    
(0.3297) 
 
(0.3148) 
Supplier Diversification*Client Market 
Opportunity H3 
   
1.5073*** 1.7558*** 
          (0.5745) (0.6392) 
Long Term Clients 
 
-0.8862*** -0.9056*** -3.5142*** -0.9396*** -3.6021*** 
  
(0.2595) (0.2618) (0.9452) (0.2596) (0.8919) 
Client Market Opportunity 
 
-0.0180 0.6433 0.6060 -2.2683* -2.7292* 
  
(0.6783) (0.6685) (0.7125) (1.3231) (1.4305) 
Market Volatility 
 
-6.3366*** -2.8033*** -3.3989*** -2.4575** -3.0380*** 
  
(1.7675) (1.0504) (1.1967) (1.0051) (1.1318) 
Client Distance  
 
-0.0047*** -0.0066*** -0.0072*** -0.0059** -0.0063*** 
  
(0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Supplier Size 
 
0.0147*** 0.0046 0.0039 0.0057 0.0053 
  
(0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
Supplier Turnover 
 
-2.3541*** -2.2809*** -2.4414*** -2.3550*** -2.5277*** 
  
(0.7350) (0.8602) (0.7598) (0.8493) (0.7327) 
Domain Expertise 
 
2.4795*** 2.6470*** 2.7305*** 2.7484*** 2.8112*** 
  
(0.9377) (0.8713) (0.9046) (0.8590) (0.8860) 
Occupational Expertise 
 
11.2872* 12.8715* 14.5298** 14.2245** 16.0728** 
  
(6.4195) (7.0810) (6.6800) (7.0584) (6.7104) 
Client Size 
 
-0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004* -0.0004* 
  
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Outsourced Patents 
 
0.0047*** 0.0018* 0.0010 0.0018* 0.0009 
  
(0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
Constant 
 
6.9968*** 1.7839* 2.8836** 1.2556 2.3297** 
  
(1.6191) (0.9760) (1.1423) (0.9323) (1.0754) 
       Observations 
 
1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 
Number of Suppliers 
 
214 214 214 214 214 
McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared 
 
0.218 0.489 0.506 0.497 0.515 
Log-Likelihood 
 
-193.738 -126.693 -122.363 -124.745 -120.126 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC') 
 
33.66 -92.961 -94.154 -89.389 -91.161 
Robust SE 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors clustered by supplier in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Complementary log-log regressions 
 
 
